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PREFACE
TH IS book is a comprehensive treatment of case and statutory
law applicable particularly to public accountants. The first chapter
is concerned with the public accountant’s liability for negligence,
libel and fraud. The three remaining chapters involve the law
relative to the public accountant’s certificate, the accountant as an
expert witness and some special rights of public accountants.
In the development of the subjects, primary emphasis has been
placed upon the case law in England and America. I am reasonably
sure that every appeal case in England prior to July, 1933, and
every appeal case in America prior to February, 1935, has been
taken into consideration in the preparation of this work. A limited
search of the English law books leads me to believe that no im
portant appeal case on the responsibilities of auditors arose in
England during the period from July, 1933, to January, 1935. While
the English decisions cited in the treatise have been colored some
what by the English companies acts, the portions of such opinions
reported have to do in the main with common-law principles. The
English companies acts have been reviewed only so far as has been
necessary to afford a proper interpretation of the English case law
presented. The American state and District of Columbia statutes
on public accountants have been summarized under appropriate
titles. While these summaries have been supported principally by
citations to Certified Public Accountant Laws of the United States,
published by the American Institute of Accountants in 1930, I
found from a close search of state and District of Columbia stat
utes as of July, 1933, that the summaries were as applicable in 1933
as in 1930. The United States statutes affecting directly public
accountants have been reviewed to January 1, 1935.
I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to: Professors James L.
Dohr and Roy B. Kester of Columbia University for their critiv ii

viii
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cisms and suggestions as to organization and content of the treatise;
Professors I. P. Hildebrand, R. W. Stayton, W. P. Keeton, and
A. W. Walker of the University of Texas School of Law for con
ferences on unsettled questions of law; Walter A. Staub, partner of
Lybrand, Ross Brothers & Montgomery, A. P. Richardson, Editor
of the Journal of Accountancy, J. M. B. Hoxsey of New York
Stock Exchange, and Professor Chester F. Lay of the University
of Texas School of Business Administration for materials furnished;
and my wife for her untiring efforts in helping me with the manu
script.

Wiley D aniel R ich .
Hardin-Simmons University,
Abilene, Texas, 1935.
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LEGAL RESPONSIBILITIES
AND RIGHTS
OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

I

C hapter I

LIABILITY OF THE PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT FOR
NEGLIGENCE, FRAUD AND LIBEL

T

development of the law on the liability of the public ac
countant for negligence, fraud and libel is unfolded in this
chapter under main divisions as follows:
he

I. Interest in the public accountant’s liability for negligence and
fraud.
II. Nature of negligence.
III. Liability of the public accountant to his client for negligence.
IV. Liability of the public accountant to his client for libel.
V. Liability of the public accountant to third parties for negligence
and fraud.
VI. Extension of the ambit of negligence rather than that of fraud
to cover the public accountant’s liability to third parties for inno
cent but negligent misrepresentation.
VII. Criminal liability of the public accountant for fraud.
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sion of the last half century there have been wrought in England
and America the greatest legal developments of the responsibilities
of public accountants.
As in preceding economic depressions, there has been prevalent
during the past few years of dislocations of trade and industries a
keen public and professional interest in the duties of public account
ants. The public has sought to surround investments in business
with greater safeguards by means of placing more responsibilities
upon the accounting profession. Several cases, the United States
securities act of 1933, as amended in 1934, and the United States
securities exchange act of 1934, dealing with negligence and fraud
of public accountants, have thus far resulted.
II
NATURE OF NEGLIGENCE
“Negligence has been defined to be either the non-performance or
the inadequate performance of a legal duty. The existence of a duty
to plaintiff, omission to perform it or performance in an improper
or inadequate manner and injury to him resulting therefrom, are
essential to the maintenance of an action for negligence.” 1 In neg
ligence there is no wrongful intent. Negligence is unreasonable
conduct, in violation of a legal duty owed to the plaintiff, resulting
directly in injury to the plaintiff. Every action for negligence must
be based upon all the following elements: (1) a failure to exercise
due care; (2) a breach of duty; (3) an injury; (4) defendant’s act
a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.
F ailure to E xercise D ue C are

The tests which courts have advanced for determining the lack
of due care or the existence of negligence have been many. The
early decisions and writings upon negligence generally divided the
subject into gross, ordinary, and slight negligence, depending upon
1 Newton Auto Salvage Co. v. Herrick (supreme court of Iowa, 1927) 212 N. W.
680.
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the amount of care required in the particular circumstances.2 Thus,
according to this school of thought, slight negligence is the want of
great diligence; gross negligence is the want of slight diligence;
ordinary negligence is the want of a moderate amount of diligence.
For example, persons who employ dangerous agencies, such as guns
and explosives, may be held liable for slight negligence for such
persons are required to use a very high degree of care. A gratuitous
bailee, i.e., one who takes custody of a chattel solely for the benefit
of the bailor, is liable only for gross negligence, for such a person
owes a duty to the owner of the chattel to exercise only a slight
degree of care. An ordinary bailee for hire may be held liable for
ordinary negligence if he fails to use a moderate amount of care
with reference to the chattel. While the theory of three degrees of
negligence commands the support of some of the best courts in the
country and is to be found in a few statutes, it is undesirable and
leads to confusion.
The better and more recent view of negligence holds that “the
law imposes but one duty in such cases, and that is the duty to use
due care; and the law recognizes only one standard by which the
quantum of care can be measured, and that is the care which a
person of ordinary prudence would exercise under like circum
stances.” 3 The test should be what a reasonable person would have
done or would have omitted to have done in the particular set of
circumstances. The test of the existence of negligence is, not what
the defendant thought was wise, but whether an ordinarily careful
and reasonable person would have thought the particular course of
action was wise and would have acted as did the defendant. Again,
in different language, the test of the existence of negligence is
whether a reasonable person would have foreseen injury to the
plaintiff and then acted as did the plaintiff in the circumstances.
The juror or the judge furnishes the standard of an ordinary rea
sonable man. If the particular circumstances involve special skill,
technique or scientific learning, the defendant must have conducted
2 29 Cyc. 415-426. Burdick’s Law of Torts, 1926, pp. 510-513.

3 Union Traction Co. v. Berry (supreme court of Indiana, 1919) 188 Ind. 514,
121 N . E. 655, 124 N . E. 737; A m erican L aw Institute, Restatement of the Law of

Torts, T. D. No. 4, 1929, secs. 165-171.
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himself as other persons of the same profession or calling would
have done in the same circumstances.4
As a requisite to the existence of negligence in a breach of duty
there must have been an unreasonable risk of injury to the plaintiff.
In determining whether or not a risk was unreasonable, as viewed
by an ordinary prudent man in the position of the defendant at
the time the alleged act of negligence occurred, the magnitude of
the risk must be balanced against the utility of the particular con
duct, and, if the risk exceeded the utility, the conduct was negli
gent.5 If a reasonable person would have deemed the defendant’s
conduct to involve too great risk as compared to the utility that
might be derived from the act, then negligence was existent. In
considering the reasonableness of the risk it is not sufficient to show
that the chances of no injury were greater than the chances of
injury, for, where there was probability of injury from the conduct,
the conduct was negligent, unless it was sufficiently useful to offset
the risk of injury. A person rushing in front of a speeding train
to rescue a child is not assuming an unreasonable magnitude of
risk in view of the great utility involved, namely, the saving of the
child’s life.6 On the other hand, a person would assume an un
reasonable amount of risk if he should rush before a rapidly moving
train to save a cat. The risk would be too great as compared to the
utility. Money in a business is a legal object of utility. It has been
held that a business owner is not required to incur an unreasonable
4 Chapman v. Walton, io Bing. 57, 131 Reprint 826 (1833). Note: “Every man
who offers his services to another and is employed, assumes the duty to exercise
in the employment such skill as he possesses with reasonable care and diligence.
In all those employments where peculiar skill is requisite, if one offers his services,
he is understood as holding himself out to the public as possessing the degree of
skill commonly possessed by others in the same employment, and if his pretensions
are unfounded, he commits a species of fraud upon every man who employs him
in reliance on his public profession. But no man, whether skilled or unskilled,
undertakes that the task he assumes shall be performed successfully, and without
fault or error; he undertakes for good faith and integrity, but not for infallibility,
and he is liable to his employer for negligence, bad faith or dishonesty, but not for
losses consequent upon mere errors of judgment." (Cooley on Torts, third edition,
volume II, p. 1386.)
5 Note: In the determination of the reasonableness of conduct in negligence cases,
courts rarely state that the comparison of the utility with the risk of injury of an
act is the basis of decision; yet, in reality such comparison is the underlying prin 
c p le of substantially all the decisions on negligence. (The American Law Institute,
explanatory notes on torts, tentative draft No. 4, 1929, p. 7.)
6 Eckert v. Long Island R.R. Co., 43 N. Y. 502 (1871).
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amount of expense in taking precautions against injury.7 He must
take such precautions as the business can afford. In other words,
in view of all the circumstances, he must balance the risk of injury
against the utility of money required to take precautions. He is not
negligent as long as he does not take an unreasonable risk in order
to save the cost of precautions.
The distinction between the existence of negligence as a matter
of fact and the existence of negligence as a matter of law deserves
consideration.8 The determination of reasonableness or unreason
ableness of conduct is an inference from data. If the inference of
reasonableness or unreasonableness of conduct can not be governed
by a precedent, but must be made on the basis of the factual data
in terms of the common experience of the lay jurors, the question
of negligence is said to be one of fact. On the other hand, if general
rules of law can be applied to a set of facts from which only one
inference may be drawn, the question of negligence is one of law.
If the circumstances of a case in which a decision is made are so
peculiar that a similar case will never arise again, no precedent is
established; but if the circumstances are such as commonly happen,
the decision affords a precedent, and whenever a new set of facts
arises similar to the precedent, the court will rule that, if the jury
finds such a set of facts to exist, there is negligence per se, that is,
negligence as a matter of law. For example, it is negligence as a
matter of law for one to point a gun at another person and pull
the trigger, even though the actor believes the gun to be unloaded.9
Breach

of

D uty

Liability for a negligent act can exist only where the act was done
in breach of a duty owed to the plaintiff. One’s legal duty and
moral duty may not be the same. One is morally bound to rescue
a stranger from drowning, but he owes no legal duty to do so.
One’s legal duty to exercise care may arise from the express terms
of a contract or from legislation, but generally it grows out of
7 Henry T. Terry, “Negligence,” 29 Harvard L. Rev. 46.
8 Cooley on Torts, vol. II, pp. 1428-1438. Henry T. Terry, “Negligence,” 29 Har
vard L. Rev. 50.
9 Henry T . Terry, “Negligence,” 29 Harvard L. Rev. 50.
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common-law implications from a contractual relationship or from
other circumstances.10
One’s duty to use care, arising from the express terms of a con
tract, may be as varied as it is possible to make different contracts.
Where a negligent act is nothing more than a breach of the express
terms of a contract, the action for recovery must be brought on the
contract and not in tort.11 The public accountant’s duty to use care
in the accountant-client relation as affected by the terms of the
auditing contract is given extended treatment in a subsequent part
of this volume.
There are great variations in the duty of care as imposed by
legislation. Where an act in breach of a statute becomes both a
public and a private wrong, American courts uniformly hold that
the public and the party aggrieved have concurrent remedies.12
The public wrong is sought to be cured through indictment; the
private wrong is sought to be remedied through tort action. But,
where an act is a public wrong, courts do not always hold that
there exists also a private wrong. If a statute requires an affirmative
act, as in the case of a municipality placing its own duty upon
citizens to keep snow off sidewalks abutting the property of such
citizens, the violation of the statute would not be negligence per
se—the defendant would owe to the person injured no duty to
perform the affirmative act. On the other hand, it has been held
by many courts that the commission of an act forbidden by statute
constitutes negligence per se, and that damages should be allowed
where the defendant’s act was a proximate cause of the injury to
the plaintiff. This type of holding would seem to be sound. If a
statute prohibits certain conduct, it is because that conduct has
been found dangerous to society. It is fair to presume that an
ordinary reasonable person would not engage in conduct dangerous
to society and that one who does so may be guilty of negligence.
If society has seen fit to protect itself by prohibiting certain conduct,
it would be logical to conclude that such conduct would also violate
the defendant’s common-law duty to exercise care to the particular
10 29 Cyc. 424, 425.
11 Burdick’s Law of Torts, pp. 46, 47.
12 Ibid., pp. 42-46.
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person or class of persons protected by the statute. Some courts,
however, have held that liability for negligence does not necessarily
follow the breach of a prohibitory statute and that under police
ordinances there is no implied power to create tort liability.13 The
English companies acts and the United States securities act of 1933
have placed specific responsibilities upon public accountants to exer
cise due care to particular classes of persons.
Whatever legal duty the defendant may owe to the plaintiff is to
be found principally in the common-law implications requiring a
person to conduct himself in such a manner as not to injure an
other’s person or property.14 This duty of care owed to others may
be implied from a contract, or it may be implied from many other
circumstances. The defendant’s duty to use due care does not
extend to the world in general, but only to the particular plaintiff
or the definite class of persons to which the plaintiff belongs. The
defendant owes a duty of care only to those persons who might
reasonably be expected to be endangered by the risk taken by the
defendant.15 For example, one driving a car down a street owes a
duty of careful driving to all those pedestrians and motorists who
might reasonably be expected to be injured by his reckless driving.
But if the driver should negligently collide with a car containing
bombs and thereby set off an explosion which injured office workers
in adjacent buildings, he would not be liable to such persons—he
would have owed those persons no duty of careful driving, for
it would not have been reasonably expected that his negligent
driving would injure persons in adjacent buildings.
I njury

The plaintiff’s action for negligence must be founded upon an
injury to his person or property. If the plaintiff does nothing more
than to prove an injury, with the other elements essential to an
action for negligence, he can recover only substantial damages. It
behooves the plaintiff to prove the actual monetary loss resulting
13 Burdick’s Law of Torts, p. 45.
14 29 Cyc. 424, 425.

15 Harper on Torts, pp. 165-170.
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from the injury if he would obtain proper redress for defendant’s
negligent conduct.16
P roximate C ause of I njury

The defendant’s liability to the plaintiff for negligence is depend
ent upon proof that the defendant’s negligent act was the direct
cause of the plaintiff’s injury. The direct cause of injury has been
interpreted to mean a substantial factor in producing the alleged
damage.17 An act is a direct cause if it is a substantial part of the
causative antecedents, if it is one of several substantial factors. If
the plaintiff’s injury would not have happened without the defend
ant’s negligent act, the defendant’s act was a direct cause of the
plaintiff’s injury. If the injury would have occurred regardless of
the defendant’s negligent act, the defendant’s conduct was not the
actual cause of the injury. Before the defendant’s act can be said
to have been the actual cause of the alleged damage, the effect of
the act must have had an appreciable continuation, either down
to the very moment of injury, or, at least, down to the setting in
motion of the final active injurious force which immediately pro
duced the damage.
A review of a few cases on direct causation of injury is in order.
Direct causation of injury was held to have existed where the de
fendant with a boat negligently ran into a group of piles in a
stream, whereby force communicated from one pile to another fin
ally created a wedge between two piles so as to injure plaintiff who
was caught within the wedge.18 In another case where the defen
dant negligently left in the highway a truck loaded with iron slabs
in such a way that some of the iron could easily slide off the
truck, and a third person wrongfully moved the truck and unin
tentionally let slabs of iron fall off and injure plaintiff, it was
held that the defendant’s act was a direct cause of the plaintiff’s
injury.19 A child was negligently sold gun powder by the defen
dant. With its parent’s knowledge the child placed the powder in
a cupboard; and later, after the child was handed the powder by
16 Ibid., pp. 283-287.
17 Burdick’s Law of Torts, pp. 32-38.
18 H ill v. Winsor, 118 Mass. 251 (1875).
19Lane v. Atlantic Works, i n Mass. 136 (1872).
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its parent, the child used the powder and thereby sustained an in
jury. The court held in this case that the active effect of the
defendant’s conduct was so slight that no cause of action arose.20
Where a client who was interested in a corporation wrote to the
defendant accountant a libelous letter concerning two officers of
the company, and the accountant negligently left the letter where
a third person found it and communicated it to the company officers,
the court held that the accountant’s act was not a direct cause of
the client plaintiff’s damages sustained from having been sued by
the officers, that the chain of causation between the accountant’s
negligent act and the plaintiff’s loss was broken by the wrongful
conduct of the third person.21 As shown by these cases, it is not
always easy to determine whether or not a particular act was
the cause of an injury. If the defendant negligently induced a
third person’s act, which was the immediate cause of the plaintiff’s
injury, the defendant is generally held to have caused directly the
injury. But, on the other hand, where a third person intervened
to break the chain of causation between the commission of the
negligent act and the happening of the injury, courts hold that
the act was not the direct cause of the injury.
The defendant’s reasonable ability to foresee risk of injury
to the plaintiff as a test to determine whether an act was the
proximate cause of the injury deserves consideration. The majority
of American courts hold that before a finding that a negligent act
was the proximate, direct, or substantial cause of an injury can be
justified, it must appear that the injury was the natural and prob
able consequence of the negligent act, and that the injury ought
to have been foreseen by the defendant in the light of the attend
ing circumstances.22 Under this rule courts hold that defendant
must have been able reasonably to foresee injury to the plaintiff
or to the class of persons to which plaintiff belonged. The defen
dant is not charged with prevision of injury to persons in general
but only those in the class threatened by the risk taken by the
defendant. A railroad company negligently failed to keep its stock20 Carter v. Towne, 103 Mass. 507 (1870).
21 Weld-Blundell v. Stephens, page 60, post.
22 Burdick’s Law of Torts, pp. 38-41. Henry T. Terry, “Negligence,” Harvard
Law Review Association, Selected Essays on the Law of Torts, p. 263.
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pen in repair. A passing train, as a result of the engineer’s negli
gence, frightened plaintiff’s cattle enclosed within the pen. The
stampeded cattle injured not only themselves, but the plaintiff
while he was attempting to make the gate secure. The court im
puted to the defendant railroad company ability to foresee the prop
erty loss, that is, the injury to the cattle, but refused to charge
the defendant with prevision of the personal injury to the plain
tiff.23
III
LIABILITY OF T H E PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT TO HIS
CLIENT FOR NEGLIGENCE
R elation of the A ccountant-client C ontract to the P ublic
A ccountant’s L iability for N egligence

Robert H. Montgomery, in his address before the International
Congress on Accounting, 1933, London, had this to say about the
scope of the public accountant’s employment: 24
“In determining whether or not an auditor has been guilty of
negligence, it is necessary to consider specifically what he was em
ployed to do. A client can not expect a detailed audit where the
auditor was engaged to make merely a balance-sheet audit. The
auditor should be careful, however, to obtain definite written in
structions to which he can refer and to limit his statements and
certificates to the matters of which he has actual knowledge.
“Sometimes after a balance-sheet audit, specifically requested in
writing, has been made and the report rendered, it is discovered that
petty defalcations have been going on for a long time. It is natural
for the client, in such a case, to criticize the auditor, but if the latter
has specific instructions to which he can refer, he can clearly show
that the detection of the small theft was not within the scope of the
audit.
“The scope of the employment can not be determined simply from
the compensation paid, though in a doubtful case the amount of
compensation would be some evidence of the character of employ23 T. & P. Ry. Co. v. Bigham, 90 Tex. 223, 38 S. W. 162 (1896).
24 R. H . Montgomery, The Auditor's Responsibility in Relation to Balance-sheets
and Profit-and-loss Accounts, p. 3.
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ment. An auditor may undertake to perform for one hundred dollars
work for which the reasonable compensation is one thousand dol
lars. He will, nevertheless, be held to have agreed to exercise the skill
of his calling in the work which he agreed to do.”

A public accountant’s liability for negligence will usually involve
a breach of duty emanating from a contract. A breach of a contract
may or may not be the result of negligence. If the plaintiff’s right
which had been invaded by the defendant was created solely by the
agreement of the parties, the plaintiff is limited to an action for
breach of contract. On the other hand, if the invaded right of the
plaintiff was created by law, the plaintiff may sue in tort. The dis
tinction between a cause of action resulting from an invasion of a
right created solely by contract and a cause of action resulting
from an invasion of a right created solely by law was clearly set
forth by the supreme court of Alabama: “Take for illustration
the contract of a carpenter to repair a house partly decayed or
defective. The implications of his contract are that he will bring
to the service reasonable skill, good faith and diligence. If he fail
to do the work or leave it incomplete the remedy, and the only
remedy, against him is ex contractu. Suppose in the attempted
performance he, by his want of skill or care, destroys, damages and
needlessly wastes the materials furnished by the hirer; or suppose
that in making the needed repair he did it so unskillfully or care
lessly as to damage other portions of the house—this is tort, for
which the contract furnished the occasion. The contract is mere in
ducement, and the action is on the case.” 25 Between the extreme
situations, first, where negligent conduct is merely an invasion of a
right created by agreement, and, second, where negligent conduct
is merely an invasion of a right created by law, a numerous and
extensive class of cases involves negligent conduct which is both a
breach of duty created by contract and a breach of duty created
by law.26 The plaintiff in such cases may elect to sue in either
contract or tort. For example, the bailee of a horse, which is in
jured through the bailee’s negligence, may be sued either for
25 Insurance Co. v. Randall, 74 Ala. 170 (1883). In accord: Junker v. Forbes
(C.C.A., 1891) 45 Fed. 840; Royce v. Oakes, 20 R. I. 252, 38 A. 371, 39 L. R. A.
845 (1898).
26 Burdick’s Law of Torts, pp. 46-48.
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breach of his contract to treat the horse with ordinary care or for
breach of his legal duty so to treat the horse.27 Wherever the plain
tiff is entitled to sue in either contract or tort, generally it is to
his advantage to sue in tort (trespass on the case for negligence).
The plaintiff is entitled to substantial damages without proof of
actual damage if he bases his claim on negligence; but if he sues
in contract, he can recover only a nominal sum, unless he proves
his actual damage. It is also true that, if the plaintiff bases his claim
on negligence, he can attach defendant’s property prior to judg
ment. The plaintiff can not attach defendant’s property prior to
judgment where his action is brought in contract. On the other
hand, it may be more advantageous to the plaintiff to sue in con
tract because the proof of the cause of action can be effected more
easily in assumpsit than in tort.28 Obviously, it would generally be
better for the public accountant if he were charged with a breach
of contract than if he were charged with negligence for the same
offense.
Of course, a definite contract reduced to writing will save many
difficulties in the accountant-client relation, but not all. If the
public accountant merely fails to perform the duties intended by
the contract—as where he fails to perform the audit at all or fails
to bring to the task he has undertaken a reasonable amount of
skill, good faith and diligence—he can be held liable only in con
tract. If the auditor carries out the terms of the auditing contract,
express or implied in fact, but in so doing violates a duty implied
by law, he can be held liable only in tort. For example, if an audi
tor should, inadvertently and without any wrongful intention,
divulge to a third person a client’s trade secret which was learned,
not in the audit, but incidentally from a conversation with an
employee of the client, the auditor would be liable to his client only
in tort (for negligence). In most cases where a public accountant
is guilty of negligence to his client his negligence amounts to a
breach of duties created by the intentions of the parties to the
auditing contract and also his common-law duties implied from
the contract and other circumstances. For example, it is submitted
27 Pelton v. Nichols, 180 Mass. 345, 62 N. E. I (1902).
28 Burdick’s Law of Torts, pp. 50, 51.
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that, where an auditor has undertaken a detailed audit, if the audi
tor in verifying the cash-disbursements record fails to test the genu
ineness of cancelled cheques, he can be held liable for loss resulting
from his negligence either on the ground of negligence or for breach
of contract. In every contract rights and obligations are created
either by the intentions of the contracting parties or by implications
of the law from the circumstances. The public accountant and his
client would intend nothing about verification of cancelled cheques
at the time of making the contract for a detailed audit. But, on the
other hand, a court would imply a duty on the part of the auditor
to verify cancelled cheques in a detailed audit for the client—the
court would imply the obligation of the auditor to afford justice
in the circumstances. Hence, a failure to test the genuineness of
cheques would be a breach of a phase of the contract implied by
law and would give to the client a right to sue in contract (in
assumpsit). This breach of a duty implied by law would also give
rise to an action in tort.
On February 24, 1933, a group of the largest accounting firms
of New York addressed to President Richard Whitney of the New
York Stock Exchange a letter relative to the scope of the auditor’s
employment. The letter was signed by: Arthur Anderson & Co.;
Barrow, Wade, Guthrie & Co.; Deloitte, Plender, Griffiths & Co.;
Haskins & Sells; Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery; Peat, Mar
wick, Mitchell & Co.; Price, Waterhouse & Co.; Touche, Niven &
Co.; Arthur Young & Co. Two paragraphs of the letter read as
follows:
“We fully recognize the importance of defining the responsibility
of auditors and of bringing about a proper understanding on the
part of the investing public of the scope and significance of financial
audits, to the end that their importance should not be underrated nor
their protective value exaggerated in the minds of investors. This is
the more necessary because the problem of delimiting the scope of
audits or examinations is essentially one of appraising the risks against
which safeguards are desirable in comparison with the costs of pro
viding such safeguards. The cost of an audit so extensive as to safe
guard against all risks would be prohibitive; and the p roblem is,
therefore, to develop a general scheme of examination of accounts
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under which reasonably adequate safeguards may be secured at a cost
that will be within the limits of a prudent economy. The position was
clearly stated by a partner in one of the signatory firms in 1926 as
follows:
“ ‘In any such work we must be practical; it is no use laying down
counsels of perfection or attempting to extend the scope of the audit
unduly. An audit is a safeguard; the maintenance of this safeguard
entails an expense; and this expense can be justified only if the value
of the safeguard is. found to be fully commensurate with its cost.
The cost of an audit so extensive as to be a complete safeguard would
be enormous and far beyond any value to be derived from it. A super
ficial audit is dangerous because of the sense of false security which
it creates. Between the two extremes there lies a mean, at which
the audit abundantly justifies its cost.’ ”

The statement to the New York Stock Exchange is founded on
solid legal principles. Of course, if an auditor expressly agrees to
check every item in an entire set of books, he will generally be
held liable for failing to do so. In the absence of an express agree
ment covering in detail every sort of review and verification which
it would be possible to make, the question arises: How far must
the audit extend in view of the requirements for safeguards and
the amount of compensation inuring to the auditor? In other
words, how much risk of errors may be taken as compared to the
utility accruing to the public accountant in the form of audit fees?
It is well-established law that if the defendant assumed an unrea
sonable amount of risk as compared to the utility of his act, he
was negligent; and, if his conduct violated a duty owed the plain
tiff and resulted directly in injury to the plaintiff, he is liable.29
It would not be expected that the accountant should take no risk
at all as compared to his compensation; neither would it be ex
pected that the accountant should take no precautions at all against
errors. The accountant is expected to assume a reasonable amount
of risk of error as compared to his compensation. The test of rea
sonableness of the accountant’s assumption of risk as compared to
his compensation is how much risk other skilled professional ac
countants would have taken in the same set of circumstances.
29 Henry T. Terry, “Negligence,” 29 Harvard L. Rev., pp. 40-54.
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D uty of the P ublic A ccountant to I nquire into the Substantial
A ccuracy of A ccounting R eports

The first important English court decision on the duties of an
auditor 30 was rendered by Justice Sterling of the chancery division
in 1887. This case, Leeds Estate Building and Investment Company
v. Shepherd,31 extended the auditor’s duties to inquiry into the
soundness, not merely the mathematical accuracy, of the figures
included in the balance-sheet.
The articles of association of the Leeds Estate, Building and In
vestment Company entitled the directors and manager to a bonus
in proportion to the amount of profits available for dividends. It
was to the interest of these officers to report profits as high as
possible. And that is what they did; they overstated the assets of
the balance-sheet so as to show a profit available for dividends.
The auditor, elected by a vote of the stockholders, accepted with
out any inquiry whatever the reports of the manager and directors
and certified the accuracy of the balance-sheet which included a
profit-and-loss account. Dividends were illegally paid out of capital
as a result of the inaccurate statement. The stockholders brought
an action for damages against the auditor and other officers of the
company. Justice Sterling held:
“It was in my opinion the duty of the auditor not to confine
himself merely to the task of verifying the arithmetical accuracy of
the balance-sheet, but to inquire into its substantial accuracy, and to
ascertain that it contained the particulars specified in the articles of
association (and consequently a proper income and expenditure ac
count), and was properly drawn up, so as to contain a true and
correct representation of the state of the company’s affairs.”

The principle of the Leeds Estate Building and Investment Co. v.
Shepherd case seems too obvious to the modern accountant to re30 Note: “The sphere of accountancy is strictly limited to work of a constructive
nature upon the books and accounts of a business or undertaking and involves little
liability beyond that of an agent to his principal, while that of the auditor is confined
to the criticism of accounts already prepared and submitted to him for certification
and report; and therein lies the whole essence of his liability.” (Grainger, W. H.,
“The Duties, Obligations and Liabilities of Auditors,” The Accountant, London,
1923, volume 68, p. 521.)
31 (1887) 36 Ch. D. 787.
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quire statement; yet, this early decision laid a foundation stone
upon which many cases rest. The auditor certainly falls short of
his duty if he stops at merely verifying the arithmetical accuracy
of the balance-sheet. Proving the accounting equation upon which
the balance-sheet is based is not enough. The auditor must reason
ably test the genuineness of the representation and amount of each
item on the balance-sheet.32
82 Under the English companies acts the auditor is an officer of the company
and directly responsible to the stockholders by whom he was elected. While the
English cases are colored with the auditor’s duties as set forth in the companies
acts, it is generally true that the principles laid down in such decisions find general
application in the common law. The English accountants’ attitude toward the
auditor’s duties was colorfully portrayed in an address before a meeting of chartered
accountants during the economic depression of the middle nineties:
“In conclusion, I would remark that it is impossible for an auditor to check in
detail, in a few days, work which it has taken a large staff twelve months to do.
An audit is really an examination by an expert in accounts resembling the diagnosis
of a skilled physician. His wide experience and knowledge of affairs enable him
by a careful examination to form an opinion as to the financial soundness of the
business and to say whether the balance-sheet gives a truthful account of the state
of the institution. The expert may be mistaken, for he is neither omniscient nor
infallible. Many a man has been told by a physician that he has not six months to
live, and yet has survived for a score of years; but eminent physicians still have a
large practice, and rightly so. Much depends on the experience, the judgment and
the character of the expert you have called in. He observes how the books are kept,
suggests precautions against fraud, points out in what way the accounts can be
arranged so that the working of the business can be facilitated and its operations
controlled, and forms an opinion whether the liabilities are stated at too little or
the assets put down at too much. Subsequent visits enable him to keep the accounts
on right lines, if his advice be followed. If through negligence on his part loss is
sustained, he is liable for damages. If he is not merely negligent but is guilty of
wilfully shutting his eyes to the truth; if when the truth lay under his hand he
abstained from finding it out, not from mere negligence, but from the wilful deter
mination not to inquire, then he may be liable to imprisonment. If he has been
auditor of a company, and it is wound up, he may, as an officer of the company,
be examined as to the manner in which he performed his duties, and unless he
has full notes of his audit, to which he can refer, and an able counsel, it may go
hardly with him. If through want of care on his part a dividend has been paid out
of capital, he may have to refund as damages 50 or 100 times the amount of the
modest fee he has been paid. If, owing to any report of his, a dividend has not
been paid, and alarm is in consequence occasioned amongst the shareholders or
customers, and the company comes to a premature end, he runs the risk of being
sued for damages for having by his report caused the suspension of a concern
which was perfectly sound. He is between Scylla and Charybdis and needs a clear
brain and a stout heart, for the responsibility of auditors is a reality; but so far
as the members of the Institute of Chartered Accountants are concerned, I think I
may safely say that they intend to face that responsibility, and to perform the duty
that is laid upon them without fear and without favor.” (Theodore Gregory, “The
Responsibilities of Auditors,” The Accountant, London, 1894, volume 20, p. 957.)
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D uty of the P ublic A ccountant to E xercise R easonable C are
to S how the W hole T ruth as to V alue of A ssets
R epresented by the B alance-sheet

Perhaps the world’s greatest single legal development in defining
the duties of the public accountant with respect to a proper showing
of the values of assets on the balance-sheet was made by the English
court of appeal in 1895 in the case In re London and General
Bank.33
The London and General Bank was a limited company formed
for the purpose of lending to and otherwise assisting certain build
ing companies called the “Balfour” group. The bank’s profits con
sisted of interest and commissions derived from loans to the “Bal
four” group.
For some years prior to the action in this case the greater part
of the capital of the bank had been advanced to four of the “Bal
four” companies on securities which were insufficient and difficult
of realization. The defendant, Theobald, had been auditor of the
company since 1882, and had in his reports to the directors re
peatedly called their attention to the precarious financial position
of the bank, which became more evident year by year. His reports
to the shareholders took the form of a certificate or memorandum
written on the balance-sheet for the year; and in the earlier years
contained a statement to the effect that in his opinion the balancesheet exhibited a correct view of the position of the bank. But for
the year 1891 this statement was omitted from Mr. Theobald’s
report to the shareholders.
The report to the directors for 1891 was submitted on February
3, 1892. In the balance-sheet of that date the most important asset
was £ 346,975, put down as “Loans to customers and other securi
ties.” The report, also, contained a detailed statement calling the
directors’ serious attention to the unsatisfactory nature of such loans
and securities and the difficulty of their realization in the following
sentences:
“The gravity of the situation is enhanced by the fact, as we be
lieve it to be, that the board is in many cases powerless to decline
33 (1895) 2 Ch. 673.
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further help because they are powerless to realize. We beg also
respectfully to point out that the quarters from which the bank
obtains by far the larger proportion of its business are such that
the constitution of the bond must make it difficult, if not impossible,
to obtain a sufficiently independent opinion upon many vital ques
tions which have to be decided in the management.” The auditors
concluded the report to the directors with the observation: “We can
not conclude without expressing our opinion unhesitatingly that
no dividend should be paid this year.” This last sentence, however,
the auditor was persuaded by the chairman of the board to omit
before the report was officially laid before the directors. The report
contained this postscript: “We do not wish it to be understood
that we consider all the accounts in the schedule unsecured, but
as a whole the capital therein represented is locked up.”
In contrast with this report to directors, the certificate signed
by the auditor and laid before the shareholders at their annual
meeting was as follows: “We have examined the above balancesheet and compared it with the books of the company; and we
certify that it is a correct summary of the accounts therein recorded.
The value of the assets as shown on the balance-sheet is dependent
upon realization.” The report to the shareholders as originally
drawn contained this additional sentence: “And on this point we
have reported specifically to the board.” But this sentence, at the
request of the chairman of the board, was withdrawn before the
report was presented to the meeting of shareholders.
The favorable report of the auditor to the shareholders induced
them to declare a dividend. The shareholders believed they were
paying dividends out of profits of the bank; but, as a matter of
fact, the shareholders were disbursing invested capital in the form
of dividends. For this conduct it was contended by the shareholders
that the auditor was guilty of misfeasance. Hence arose this action
on the part of the shareholders to recover from the auditor, Theo
bald, the sum paid out as dividends.
The holding in this case that the auditor was guilty of mis
feasance doubtless could have been sustained on the basis of com
mon law. However, the English companies acts played a part in
the decision. The relevant sections follow:
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By subsection I of section 7 of the companies act of 1879, a bank
ing company registered after that date was required to have its
accounts audited by an auditor elected annually by the stock
holders.
By subsection 5 of the 7th section of the companies act of 1879,
“Every auditor shall have a list delivered to him of all books kept
by the company, and shall at all reasonable times have access to
the books and accounts of the company; and any auditor may, in
relation to such books and accounts, examine the directors or any
other officer of the company.”
By subsection 6 of the 7th section of the companies act of 1879,
“the auditor or auditors shall make a report to the members on
the accounts examined by him or them and on every balance-sheet
laid before the company in general meeting during his or their
tenure of office; and in every such report shall state whether, in
his or their opinion, the balance-sheet referred to in the report is a
full and fair balance-sheet properly drawn up, so as to exhibit a
true and correct view of the state of the company’s affairs, as shown
by the books of the company.”
On a former appeal of this case judgment was given on the pre
liminary point whether the auditor of a banking company were an
officer of the company within the 10th section of the companies
act of 1890, and it was held that the auditor was an officer within
the meaning of the act and if guilty of misfeasance might be made
liable in damages under that section.
Lord Justice Lindley delivered the opinion of the court:
“* * * In connection with these articles (the charter), and in order
to save repetition, it should be stated that by the articles of this bank
it is the duty of the directors, and not of the auditors, to recommend
to the shareholders the amounts to be appropriated for dividends
(clause 98), and it is the duty of the directors to have proper ac
counts kept, so as to show the true state and condition of the company
(clause 103). Lastly, it is for the shareholders, but only on the recom
mendation of the directors, to declare a dividend (clause 115). It is
impossible to read s. 7 of the companies act, 1879, without being
struck with the importance of the enactment that the auditors are to
be appointed by the shareholders, and are to report to them directly,
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and not to or through the directors. The object of this enactment is
obvious. It is evidently to secure to the shareholders independent
and reliable information respecting the true financial position of the
company at the time of the audit. * * * It is no part of an auditor’s
duty to give advice, either to directors or shareholders, as to what
they ought to do. An auditor has nothing to do with the prudence
or imprudence of making loans with or without security. It is
nothing to him whether the business of a company is being con
ducted prudently or imprudently, profitably or unprofitably. It is
nothing to him whether dividends are properly or improperly de
clared, provided he discharges his own duty to the shareholders. His
business is to ascertain and state the true financial position of the
company at the time of the audit, and his duty is confined to that.
But then comes the question, How is he to ascertain that position?
The answer is, By examining the books of the company. But he does
not discharge his duty by doing this without inquiry and without
taking any trouble to see that the books themselves show the com
pany’s true position. He must take reasonable care to ascertain that
they do so. Unless he does this his audit would be worse than an
idle farce. Assuming the books to be so kept as to show the true
position of a company, the auditor has to frame a balance-sheet show
ing that position according to the books and to certify that the
balance-sheet presented is correct in that sense. But his first duty is to
examine the books, not merely for the purpose of ascertaining what
they do show, but also for the purpose of satisfying himself that they
show the true financial position of the company. This is quite in
accordance with the decision of Stirling, J. in Leeds Estate Building
and Investment Co. v. Shepherd, (1887) (36 Ch. D. 787). An auditor,
however, is not bound to do more than exercise reasonable care and
skill in making inquiries and investigations. He is not an insurer; he
does not guarantee that the books do correctly show the true position
of the company’s affairs; he does not even guarantee that his balancesheet is accurate according to the books of the company. If he did, he
would be responsible for error on his part, even if he were himself
deceived without any want of reasonable care on his part, say, by the
fraudulent concealment of a book from him. His obligation is not
so onerous as this. Such I take to be the duty of the auditor: he must
be honest—i.e., he must not certify what he does not believe to be
true, and he must take reasonable care and skill before he believes
that what he certifies is true. W hat is reasonable care in any par
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ticular case must depend upon the circumstances of that case. Where
there is nothing to excite suspicion very little inquiry will be reason
ably sufficient, and in practice I believe business men select a few cases
at haphazard, see that they are right and assume that others like them
are correct also. Where suspicion is aroused, more care is obviously
necessary; but, still, an auditor is not bound to exercise more than
reasonable care and skill, even in a case of suspicion, and he is
perfectly justified in acting on the opinion of an expert where special
knowledge is required. Mr. Theobald’s evidence satisfies me that he
took the same view as myself of his duty in investigating the com
pany’s books and preparing his balance-sheet. He did not content
himself with making his balance-sheet from the books without
troubling himself about the truth of what they showed. He checked
the cash, examined vouchers for payments, saw that the bills and
securities entered in the books were held by the bank, took reason
able care to ascertain their value, and in one case obtained a solicitor’s
opinion on the validity of an equitable charge. I see no trace whatever
of any failure by him in the performance of this part of his duty.
It is satisfactory to find that the legal standard of duty is not too
high for business purposes and is recognized as correct by business
men. The balance-sheet and certificate of February, 1892 (i.e., for the
year 1891), was accompanied by a report to the directors of the bank.
Taking the balance-sheet, the certificate, and report together, Mr.
Theobald stated to the directors the true financial position of the
bank, and if this report had been laid before the shareholders Mr.
Theobald would have completely discharged his duty to them. Un
fortunately, however, this report was not laid before the shareholders,
and it becomes necessary to consider the legal consequences to Mr.
Theobald of this circumstance. A person whose duty it is to convey
information to others does not discharge that duty by simply giving
them so much information as is calculated to induce them, or some
of them, to ask for more. Information and means of information are
by no means equivalent terms. Still, there may be circumstances under
which information given in the shape of a printed document cir
culated amongst a large body of shareholders would, by its conse
quent publicity, be very injurious to their interests, and in such a case
I am not prepared to say that an auditor would fail to discharge his
duty if, instead of publishing his report in such a way as to insure
publicity, he made a confidential report to the shareholders and invited
their attention to it and told them where they could see it. The
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auditor is to make a report to the shareholders, but the mode of
doing so and the form of the report are not prescribed. If, there
fore, Mr. Theobald had laid before the shareholders the balancesheet and profit-and-loss account, accompanied by a certificate in the
form in which he first prepared it, he would perhaps have done
enough under the peculiar circumstances of this case. I feel, however,
the great danger of acting on such a principle; and in order not to be
misunderstood I will add that an auditor who gives shareholders
means of information instead of information respecting a company’s
financial position does so at his peril and runs the very serious risk of
being held judicially to have failed to discharge his duty.
“In this case I have no hesitation in saying that Mr. Theobald did
fail to discharge his duty to the shareholders in certifying and laying
before them the balance-sheet of February, 1892, without any refer
ence to the report which he laid before the directors and with no
other warning than is conveyed by the words, ‘The value of the assets
as shewn on the balance-sheet is dependent upon realization.’ The
most important asset on that balance-sheet is put down as ‘Loans to
customers and other securities,’ £ 346,975, and on these a full and
detailed report was made to the directors showing the very unsatis
factory state of these loans and securities, and it is impossible to read
the oral evidence, the report of Balfour and Brock, dated December
22, 1891, and the report of the auditor to the directors of February 3,
1892, without coming to the conclusion that the entry of that large
sum as a good asset without explanation was unjustifiable. It is a
mere truism to say that the value of loans and securities depends on
their realization. We were told that a statement to that effect is so
unusual in an auditor’s certificate that the mere presence of those
words was enough to excite suspicion. But, as already stated, the
duty of an auditor is to convey information, not to arouse inquiry,
and, although an auditor might infer from an unusual statement that
something was seriously wrong, it by no means follows that ordinary
people would have their suspicions aroused by a similar statement if,
as in this case, its language expresses no more than any ordinary
person would infer without it. But Mr. Theobald relies on the fact
that he was induced to omit from his certificate all reference to the
report which he made to the directors because Mr. Balfour, the
chairman, promised to mention that report in his speech to the share
holders, and he did so. But, although Mr. Balfour twice alluded to the
report, he did so in such a way as to avoid attracting attention to it.
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The second time he mentioned it was after a dividend had been
declared and when a motion to reappoint the auditors was before
the meeting. The truth is that not a word was said to convey to the
shareholders the substance of the information contained in the report
or to induce them to ask any question about it. The balance-sheet
and profit-and-loss account were true and correct in this sense—that
they were in accordance with the books. But they were, nevertheless,
entirely misleading, and misrepresented the real position of the com
pany. Under these circumstances I am compelled to hold that Mr.
Theobald failed to discharge his duty to the shareholders with respect
to the balance-sheet and certificate of February, 1892. Possibly he did
not realize the extent of his duty to the shareholders as distinguished
from the directors, and he unfortunately consented to leave the chair
man to explain the true state of the company to the shareholders
instead of doing so himself. The fact, however, remains, and can
not be got over, that the balance-sheet and certificate of February,
1892, did not show the true position of the company at the end of
1891, and that this was owing to the omission by the auditor to lay
before the shareholders the material information which he had ob
tained in the course of his employment as auditor of the company,
and to which he called the attention of the directors.
“But then it is contended that, even if this be so, there was after
all no payment of dividend out of capital, and further that, even if
there was, still that such payment was not the natural or immediate
result of Mr. Theobald’s certificate and of the accounts which he
prepared. W hether the payment was made out of capital or not is a
question of fact. The payment was professedly made out of profits
made by the bank, by charging its customers with interest and com
mission on loans and discount. The books showed such profits; but
the question is, Where did the money come from with which the
dividends were paid? The money came from cash at the bankers’
or in hand; but this cash could not be properly treated as profit, and
the directors and auditors knew this perfectly well. This part of the
case has been most carefully investigated by the learned judge whose
decision we are reviewing and, after attending closely to the observa
tions of counsel on the reasonings and conclusions contained in the
judgment appealed from, I see no reason whatever for dissenting
from them. On the contrary, I entirely agree with the learned judge
in saying that the profits for the year 1891 never really existed except
on paper, and that, to use his words, ‘whatever may be the right
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line to draw as to when profit not received may be carried to profit
for the purpose of the annual revenue account, it is plain that there
was not justification for so doing in the present case.’ The real truth is
that the assets of the bank were put down in the balance-sheet at far
too high a figure, and this entry, though not misleading if explained
(as it was to the directors), was seriously misleading in the absence
of explanation. Mr. Theobald says that he regarded the assets of the
bank as only locked up; but his report and the schedule to it go far
beyond this. The value of the principal asset depended on the proba
bility of the Balfour group of companies and some of the other large
borrowers repaying their loans. They were financing each other;
their indebtedness to the bank had increased largely during the year;
the securities held by the bank for these loans were, to say the least,
to a great extent of very doubtful value; and yet the total amount due
to the bank in respect of these loans is inserted in the balance-sheet
as a good asset, without any deduction and without a word of ex
planation to the shareholders. We know now that those assets have
realized a comparatively small sum, and we were very properly warned
against the danger of doing injustice by being wise after the event.
But, disregarding the result of realization, and attending only to what
was known to the auditors in February, 1892, the entry in the balancesheet of the sum of £ 346,975 as a good asset was wholly unjustifiable,
unless explained. We are now in a position to understand the true
meaning of the passage contained in the auditors’ report to the
directors of February 3, 1892, and which runs thus: ‘We can not
conclude without expressing our opinion unhesitatingly that no
dividend should be paid this year.’ I find it impossible to treat this as
a statement by the auditors that there are profits divisible amongst
the shareholders, but that the auditors can not recommend a dividend.
I can only regard the passage as meaning that there are no funds
out of which a dividend can properly be paid, and therefore no
dividend ought to be paid this year. A dividend of 7 per cent. was,
nevertheless, recommended by the directors, and was resolved upon
by the shareholders at a meeting furnished with the balance-sheet
and profit-and-loss account certified by the auditors, and at which
meeting the auditors were present, but silent. Not a word was said to
inform the shareholders of the true state of affairs. It is idle to say that
these accounts are so remotely connected with the payment of the
dividend as to render the auditors legally irresponsible for such pay
ment. The balance-sheet and account certified by the auditors, and
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showing a profit available for dividend, were, in my judgment, not the
remote, but the real operating cause of the resolution for the pay
ment of the dividend which the directors improperly recommended.
The auditors’ accounts and certificate gave weight to this recom
mendation, and rendered it acceptable to the meeting. It was wholly
unnecessary for the official receiver to call a shareholder to say that he
was induced by the auditors’ certificate to concur in the resolution
to pay a dividend. As to this part of the case res ipsa loquitur.”

The duty which the auditor owed to the shareholders of the Lon
don and General Bank emanated from the companies acts; yet, in
view of the fact that the auditor was elected by the shareholders,
it would seem that the auditor’s duty would have been held not
different under contract and in the absence of the statute providing
that the auditor owed as an officer a duty to state to the share
holders the true financial condition of the business. In other words,
it would appear that all the principles laid down in this case are
applicable at common law.
Following the Leeds Estate Building and Investment Company
v. Shepherd case, supra, the London and General Bank case held
that an auditor is in duty bound to ascertain and state the true
financial position of his client’s business at the time of the audit.
In ascertaining the financial condition of the business, the auditor
must go beyond the mere showing of the books; he must exer
cise reasonable care to ascertain whether or not the books them
selves show the true financial position of the business. Yet, the
auditor is not an insurer; he does not guarantee that the books
show the true financial position of his client’s business. As a mat
ter of fact, it is impossible to know the true financial position of
an unliquidated enterprise. An auditor is bound only to exercise
reasonable care and skill in making inquiries and investigations
to determine whether the records and the balance-sheet correctly
show the financial condition of the business. The test of the rea
sonableness of the amount of care and skill exercised by the audi
tor in making inquiries and investigations is the amount of care
and skill other members of the profession would have made in
the same circumstances. It is not enough that the auditor deter
mine for himself the correct values of items on the balance-sheet.
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He must show the true values of the balance-sheet items in unequiv
ocal terms. The auditor must not stop at stating in his report to his
client the means of information which will show correct values of
the assets represented on the balance-sheet; he must clearly state
the values of assets to the best of his knowledge after he has
exercised a reasonable amount of care and skill in determining
such values.
In the instant case it was also held that, since the stockholders
of the bank used the auditor’s balance-sheet prior to declaring a
dividend upon recommendation of the board of directors, proof of
negligence of the auditor in overstating the values of the assets of
the bank was sufficient to fix the auditor’s liability to the stock
holders for injury resulting from payment of dividends out of
capital. It was not necessary to prove that the false balance-sheet
induced the stockholders to declare the dividends out of capital.
The court held that proof of the circulation of printed copies of
the balance-sheet among the stockholders was sufficient evidence
from which to infer that the defendant’s negligent audit was the
proximate cause of the stockholders’ injury. The principle of res
ipsa loquitur (the thing speaks for itself) was applied in holding
defendant’s negligence, not the remote, but the real operating cause
of the stockholders’ loss.
Ordinarily, in actions for negligence the plaintiff must prove by
direct evidence that the defendant committed a specific act of
negligence, and that the defendant’s negligence was the proximate
cause of the plaintiff’s injury. But such proof may be dispensed
with where the proven circumstances were such as to make it pos
sible to infer a negligent act on the part of the defendant, and
that the defendant’s negligent act was the direct cause of the plain
tiff's injury. This rule, res ipsa loquitur, applies where the instru
mentalities causing the injury were under the control of the de
fendant and the nature of the case was such that in the ordinary
course of events no injury would have resulted without negli
gence.34 In this case the court did not infer from the circumstances

the existence of negligence, for the defendant’s specific act of negli
gence, the preparation and certification of the false balance-sheet,
34 Burdick’s Law of Torts, pp. 515-517; Cooley on Torts, p. 1425.
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was proven by direct evidence. It was not necessary for the court
to determine whether the preparation of the balance-sheet was
under the control of the auditor or not. The court merely inferred
that no injury would have happened except for the defendant’s
negligence and, therefore, that the proven negligence was the proxi
mate cause of the injury.
It would seem that in most instances a dividend would not be
declared by the directors of a corporation unless the auditor’s re
port would justify such a dividend. If the auditor’s report gives
assets at inflated values as a result of the auditor’s negligence, and
the directors, after receiving such report, declare a dividend injuri
ous to the business of the corporation, it should be held that the
circumstances attendant upon the injury were of such a character
as to justify an inference that the auditor’s negligence caused the
injury.
The principles laid down in In re London and General Bank
are unimpeachable. The case has been followed in many decisions
and should be followed in future decisions under like conditions.
T he A uditor’s D uty R elative to Stock-in -trade

The auditor’s duty relative to a proper showing of the value of
stock-in-trade on the balance-sheet was set forth by the English
court of appeal, 1896, in the oft-quoted case of In re Kingston
Cotton Mill Company.35 The facts of the case follow:
For several years prior to 1894 the defendant auditors were the
official auditors of the Kingston Cotton Mill Company. In their
capacity as company auditors the defendants audited the company’s
records and prepared balance-sheets as of the close of each of those
years. The auditors included in each of such balance-sheets a certifi
cate that the balance-sheet gave a correct view of the financial
condition of the Kingston Cotton Mill Company at the date of
the particular balance-sheet. The stockholders relied upon these
several balance-sheets and paid out dividends for each of the four
years preceding 1894. Each of these balance-sheets overstated the
financial condition of the company. The result was that the divi
dends were paid out of invested capital. The company became in35 (No. 2), (1896) 2 Ch. D. 279.
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solvent and went into the hands of a liquidator in 1894. To restore
the estate’s losses from the payment of these improper dividends
the liquidator brought an action against the company auditors for
negligence under s. 10 of the English companies act of 1890,
which provided for the liability of company auditors to the com
pany for losses resulting from their failure to use reasonable care
and skill in representing the financial condition of the company.
The alleged negligent conduct of the defendant auditors con
sisted in the auditors’ failure to disclose an overstatement of the
company’s stock of cotton yarn. The auditors did not look into the
manager’s figures for the cotton-yarn inventories on the dates of
the balance-sheets. They simply accepted the manager’s certificate
that the inventory sheets showed correctly the values and quanti
ties of cotton yarn on hand. The auditors placed in their balancesheets immediately preceding the figures for the inventories the
words, “As per manager’s certificate.” The auditors had access to
figures for the beginning inventories, the cost of purchases and the
cost of sales. They could have easily tested the accuracy of the
manager’s figures for stocks; but they did not. The court in the
following language refused to hold the auditors liable for negligence
in overstating inventories:
“* * * The auditors did not profess to guarantee the correctness
of this item. They assumed no responsibility for it. They took the
item from the manager, and the entry in the balance-sheet showed
that they did so. I confess I can not see that their omission to check
his returns was a breach of their duty to the company. It is no part
of an auditor’s duty to take stock. No one contends that it is. He
must rely on other people for details of the stock-in-trade on hand.
In the case of a cotton mill he must rely on some skilled person for
the materials necessary to enable him to enter the stock-in-trade at
its proper value in the balance-sheet. In this case the auditors relied
on the manager. He was a man of high character and of unques
tioned competence. He was trusted by everyone who knew him.
The learned judge has held that the directors are not to be blamed
for trusting him. The auditors had no suspicion that he was not to
be trusted to give accurate information as to the stock-in-trade on
hand, and they trusted him accordingly in that matter. But it is said
they ought not to have done so, and for this reason. The stock
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journal showed the quantities—that is, the weight in pounds—of the
cotton and yarn at the end of each year. Other books showed the
quantities of cotton bought during the year and the quantities of
yarn sold during the year. If these books had been compared by the
auditors they would have found that the quantity of cotton and yarn
in hand at the end of the year ought to be much less than the
quantity shown in the stock journal, and so much less that the value
of the cotton and yarn entered in the stock journal could not be
right, or at all events was so abnormally large as to excite suspicion
and demand further inquiry. This is the view taken by the learned
judge. But, although it is no doubt true that such a process might
have been gone through, and that, if gone through, the fraud would
have been discovered, can it be truly said that the auditors were
wanting in reasonable care in not thinking it necessary to test the
managing director’s return? I can not bring myself to think they
were, nor do I think that any jury of business men would take a
different view. It is not sufficient to say that the frauds must have been
detected if the entries in the books had been put together in a way
which never occurred to any one before suspicion was aroused. The
question is whether, no suspicion of anything wrong being enter
tained, there was a want of reasonable care on the part of the auditors
in relying on the returns made by a competent and trusted expert
relating to matters on which information from such a person was
essential. I can not think there was. The manager had no apparent
conflict between his interest and his duty. His position was not similar
to that of a cashier who has to account for the cash which he receives,
and whose own account of his receipts and payments could not
reasonably be taken by an auditor without further inquiry. The
auditor’s duty is not so onerous as the learned judge has held it to be.
The order appealed from must be discharged with costs.
“• * * But in determining whether any misfeasance or breach of
duty has been committed, it is essential to consider what the duties
of an auditor are. They are very fully described in In re London and
General Bank , (1895) 2 Ch. D. 673, to which judgment I was a
party. Shortly, they may be stated thus: It is the duty of an auditor
to bring to bear on the work he has to perform that skill, care, and
caution which a reasonably competent, careful and cautious auditor
would use. W hat is reasonable skill, care and caution must depend on
the particular circumstances of each case. An auditor is not bound
to be a detective, or, as was said, to approach his work with suspicion
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or with a foregone conclusion that there is something wrong. He is
a watch-dog, but not a bloodhound. He is justified in believing tried
servants of the company in whom confidence is placed by the com
pany. He is entitled to assume that they are honest, and to rely upon
their representations, provided he takes reasonable care. If there is
anything calculated to excite suspicion he should probe it to the
bottom; but in the absence of anything of that kind he is only bound
to be reasonably cautious and careful.
“In the present case the accounts of the company had been for
years falsified by the managing director, Jackson, who subsequently
confessed the frauds he had committed. It is only, however, just to
him to say that they were not committed with a view of putting
money in his own pocket, but for the purpose of making things
appear better than they really were and in the hope of the com
pany ultimately recovering itself. Jackson deliberately overstated the
quantities and values of the cotton and yarn in the company’s mills.
He did this for many years. It was proved that there is great waste in
converting cotton into yarn, and the fluctuations of the market in the
prices of cotton and yarn are exceptionally great. Jackson had been so
successful in falsifying the accounts that what he had done was never
detected or even suspected by the directors. The auditors adopted the
entries of Jackson and inserted them in the balance-sheet as ‘per
manager’s certificate.’ It is not suggested but that the auditors acted
honestly and honestly believed in the accuracy and reliability of
Jackson. But it is said that they ought not to have trusted the figures
of Jackson, but should have further investigated the matter. Jackson
was a trusted officer of the company in whom the directors had every
confidence; there was nothing on the face of the accounts to excite
suspicion, and I can not see how in the circumstances of the case it
can be successfully contended that the auditors are wanting in skill,
care or caution in not testing Jackson’s figures.
“It is not the duty of an auditor to take stock; he is not a stock
expert; there are many matters in respect of which he must rely on
the honesty and accuracy of others. He does not guarantee the dis
covery of all fraud. I think the auditors were justified in this case in
relying on the honesty and accuracy of Jackson and were not called
upon to make further investigation. It is not unimportant to bear in
mind that the learned judge has found the directors justified in
relying on the figures of the managing director.
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“The duties of auditors must not be rendered too onerous. Their
work is responsible and laborious, and the remuneration moderate.
I should be sorry to see the liability of auditors extended any further
than in In re London and General Bank , (1895) 2 Ch. D. 673. Indeed,
I only assented to that decision on account of the inconsistency of the
statement made to the directors with the balance-sheet certified by
the auditors and presented to the shareholders. This satisfied my
mind that the auditors deliberately concealed that from the share
holders which they had communicated to the directors. It would be
difficult to say this was not a breach of duty. Auditors must not be
made liable for not tracking out ingenious and carefully laid schemes
of fraud when there is nothing to arouse their suspicion, and when
those frauds are perpetrated by tried servants of the company and are
undetected for years by the directors. So to hold would make the posi
tion of an auditor intolerable. The appeal will be allowed.
“* * * It is said that it is easy to be wise after the event. In former
years when the stock journal was correctly entered the alterations in
value in a year were frequently very considerable. The increase in the
years now in question did not excite any suspicion in the directors.
W hy should it in the auditors? They had no reason to distrust the
manager. Moreover, he had, or was supposed to have, taken the
stock which was actually on the premises at the date to which the
balance-sheets referred. The auditors could not do this. The only book
from which they could obtain information as to the quantities re
ceived in the year, other than the stock journal, was a book called
the ‘invoice guard book,’ in which were pasted the invoices received
with goods supplied. But this was not necessarily accurate. Invoices
received might have been omitted. Goods might in some cases have
been received without invoices. Were the auditors bound to enter
upon an investigation which could not bring out an accurate result in
order to test the truth of a statement by the manager which no one
had any reason to discredit?”

In the Kingston Cotton Mill Company case it was held that it is
no part of an auditor’s duty to take stock. This holding was made
in reference to a set of facts in which the auditor had no reason
to suspect dishonesty on the part of the manager who certified
the amount of stock-in-trade, and in which the auditor clearly
showed in the balance-sheet that the figures for the value of the
inventory were obtained from the manager. It was also held that,
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in the absence of suspicion of dishonesty, the auditor has no duty
to check by means of book figures the value of inventories as given
by a competent officer of the business.
There are important dicta in one of the opinions in the decision
with respect to the auditor’s duty to use care. An auditor, accord
ing to the dicta, is charged with a duty to perform his work with
such care, skill and caution as a reasonably careful and cautious
auditor would use in the particular circumstances. The auditor is
not expected to enter upon his work with suspicion or a foregone
conclusion that there is something wrong. He is, according to this
case, entitled to rely upon employees who have been trusted by his
client, provided the auditor takes reasonable care. The opinion
doubtless does not mean that the auditor should accept blindly
statements of trusted employees of the client. The auditor would
be derelict in his duty if he should accept his client’s trusted em
ployee’s certificate of a cash count where it was at all feasible for
the auditor to count the cash. A reasonable amount of care would
require a thorough investigation of circumstances which ordinarily
would excite suspicion.
The Kingston Cotton Mill Company case is sound in principles;
it has been followed in other decisions; and it should be followed
in future decisions in similar circumstances, even where the audi
tor’s duties arose only from contract.36
The professional attitude of public accountants towards assum
ing responsibility for the showing of the value of inventories has
been expressed as follows: 37
“The Bradford Chartered and Incorporated Accountants at a joint
meeting * * * resolved:
“ ‘( I ) That this meeting is of opinion that professional accountants
are unable to express reliable opinions upon the market values of
stock-in-trade.
“ ‘(2) That it is not within the functions of a professional account
ant or auditor to value stocks, and therefore those practising ac36 Note: A holding in agreement with In re Kingston Cotton Mill Company is to
be found in Henry Squire, Cash Chemist, Ltd., v. Ball, Baker & Co. (C.A., 1911)
106 L. T. 197, 28 T. L. R. 81.
37 Grainger, W. H., “The Duties, Obligations, and Liabilities of Auditors,” The
Accountant, 1923, volume 68, p. 521.
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countants represented at this meeting are not prepared to undertake
responsibilities of this nature, or to give certificates as to the value
of the said stocks, which might deprive auditors of the protection
to which they are entitled under judicial ruling laid down in the
Kingston Cotton Mills case.’ ”

When a client hires an auditor to review his books, generally he
does not expect that the auditor will take stock. Auditors generally
do not have the specialized knowledge of merchandise requisite
to a proper valuation of a stock of goods. Besides, the client, in
most instances, would be unwilling to pay the fees necessary to
justify the auditor’s taking stock.
The auditor should be required to take stock only in case he
expressly agreed to do so. In the usual auditing contract, it would
be unreasonable to require the auditor to take stock. If the implica
tions of law should place upon the auditor the duty to take stock,
an onerous burden would be thrust upon him; the cost of safe
guards would be too great as compared to his compensation. The
auditor is entitled to assume a reasonable amount of risk of error
with respect to the value of inventories in comparison with the
utility of his compensation.38
D uty of the P ublic A ccountant to V erify the I nventory of
Securities

The common-law liability of the public accountant to verify the
inventory of securities for his client was set forth by the English
court of appeal, In re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co., Ltd.,39
1924. The facts of the case follow:
The City Equitable Fire Insurance Co., carrying on a large
international business in fire and marine insurance, had occasion
to buy and sell securities in great amounts through Ellis & Co., a
brokerage firm. The company’s managing director, Bevan, was
also a partner in the brokerage firm of Ellis & Co., and he caused
enormous sums of the company’s money to be kept on deposit
with the firm for the purpose of dealing in securities. During 1921
and the two preceding years the accounts the company maintained
38 N ote: See page 6, ante.

39 (1925) Ch. 407, 40 T. L. R. 853, 94 L. J. (Ch.) 445, 133 L. T . 520.
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with Ellis & Co. showed much larger amounts of money and
securities than were really with the firm. Bevan had improperly
taken the funds through his brokerage firm, and had concealed
his dishonesty through a false showing of the company’s accounts
with Ellis & Co. In auditing the company’s records for 1921 and
the two preceding years the auditors, Lepine and partner, made
no further investigation of the securities supposed to be in the
custody of Ellis & Co. than to obtain a certificate of custody from
one of the firm partners. At the close of each of the three years the
figures as thus certified were in agreement with the company’s
accounts and were used in the company’s balance-sheet certified by
the auditors. Soon after 1921 the company went into bankruptcy;
and the receiver brought an action for negligence against the audi
tors to recover a huge loss sustained from dealings with Ellis &
Co. The court refused judgment to the receiver under a provision
in the company’s charter relieving company officers from liability
to the company for unwillful negligence. The court’s decision on
the propriety of the auditors’ acceptance of Ellis & Co.’s certificate
of securities held for the company follows:
“* * * Banks in ordinary course do hold certificates of securities
for their customers; it is part of their business to do so, and therefore
certificates in the hands of bankers are in their proper custody, and
if a bank is a reputable bank, you may legitimately accept the certifi
cate of that bank, because it is a business institution in whose custody
you would expect both to find and to put securities, and also it is
respectable; but the fact that it calls itself a bank does not seem to me
to conclude the matter either one way or the other. On the other
hand, it may be said that it is the duty of an auditor not to take a
certificate as to possession of securities, except from a person who is
not only respectable—I should prefer to use the word ‘trustworthy’—
but is also one of that class of persons who, in the ordinary course of
their business, do keep securities for their customers. It may be said
that a stockbroker does not, in the ordinary course of his business,
keep securities for his customers, and therefore he is ruled out, be
cause the auditor ought not to accept, from a person of that class,
whether he be respectable or not, a certificate that he has securities
in his hands. Now, accepting the rule as so stated, that it is right to
find the securities in the hands of a bank, whose business it is to hold
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securities, and applying the proviso that the bank must be one that is
trustworthy, it seems to me that the rule may, prima facie, be a right
one to follow; but it is going too far to say that, under no circum
stances, may you be satisfied with a certificate that securities are in
the hands of a stockbroker, because it seems to me that, in the
ordinary course of business, you must, from time to time, and you
legitimately may, place in the hands of stockbrokers securities for
the purpose of their dealing with them in the course of their business.
W ith a large institution like the City Equitable Co., with a very
considerable number of investments to make and securities to sell,
it may well be that, for the convenience of all parties, it may have
been a useful method of business, even if it be examined with the
most exiguous care, for the directors to have decided that they would,
in the interests of their business, leave securities of a considerable
amount in the hands of their stockbrokers, who, I suppose, at that
time held a position not less trustworthy or respected than the City
Equitable Co. itself. I do not wish in any way, by anything that I say,
to discharge the auditors from their duties as laid down in the Kings
ton Cotton Mill case; far less do I wish to discharge them from their
duty of seeing that securities are held, and accept the certificate that
they are so held from a respectable, trustworthy and responsible
person, be that person a bank or an individual; but in applying my
mind to the facts of this case, I am not content to say that, simply
because a certificate was accepted otherwise than from a bank,
therefore there was necessarily so grave a dereliction of duty as to
make the auditors responsible. In my opinion it is for the auditor to
use his discretion and his judgment, and his discrimination as to
whom he shall trust; indeed that is the right way to put a greater
responsibility on the auditors.
“If you merely discharge him by saying he accepted the certificate of
a bank because it was a bank, you might lighten his responsibility.
In my view, he must take a certificate from a person who is in the
habit of dealing with and holding securities, and whom he, on reason
able grounds, rightly believes to be, in the exercise of the best judg
ment, a trustworthy person to give such a certificate. Therefore, I
by no means derogate from the responsibility of the auditor—I rather
throw a greater burden upon him; but at the same time, I throw a
burden upon him in respect of which the test of common sense and
business habits can be applied, rather than impose on him a rigid
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rule which is not based on any principle either of business or com
mon sense.
“So we come to the responsibility which the learned judge finds,
and I think rightly, falls upon Mr. Lepine. Now what is that? He
finds that, in respect of these securities, Mr. Lepine did what he
ought not to have done, by accepting from Ellis & Co. a statement
of the securities which they, at that time, declared that they held.
The learned Judge says: ‘In my judgment, not only did Mr. Lepine
commit a breach of his duty in accepting, as he did, from time to
time the certificate of Ellis & Co. that they held large blocks of the
company’s securities, but he also committed a breach of his duty in
not either insisting upon those securities being put in proper custody,
or in reporting the matter to the shareholders.’ As I have said, the
learned judge also finds that, in what he did Mr. Lepine acted
honestly and in all good faith, ‘holding the mistaken belief as to what
his duty was.’ I agree with the learned judge. It seems to me that
Mr. Lepine has made a mistake, and a grave mistake. In justification
of him it may be said that every artifice was brought into play in
order to deceive him, and to maintain the apparent responsibility and
trustworthiness of Ellis & Co. But that does not discharge him from
having put aside what I described to counsel for the appellant as the
rule of the road applied with the proviso as to business rules and
common sense. Therefore Mr. Lepine would, prima facie, be liable
in respect of that dereliction of duty.”

The City Equitable Fire Insurance Company case placed upon
the auditor with respect to verification of the inventory of securi
ties in the hands of a custodian for the client no further duty than
to obtain from the custodian a certificate that he has in his posses
sion certain securities belonging to the auditor’s client, provided
the custodian ordinarily keeps securities for customers and is trust
worthy. Banks will generally meet the requirements for such custo
dians. Stock-brokerage firms or other institutions may meet the two
qualifications. If the auditor uses less care in proving the inventory
of securities in the hands of another person than that involved
in obtaining a certificate of possession from a person who is in
the habit of dealing with and holding securities, and whom the
auditor, on reasonable grounds, rightly believes to be, in the exer
cise of the best judgment, a trustworthy person to give such cer
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tificate, the auditor may be held liable to his client for loss result
ing proximately from the auditor’s negligence.
The responsibility placed upon auditors by the City Equitable
Fire Insurance Company case is reasonable. The case has been
followed in other decisions; and it should be followed in future
decisions under like conditions.
D uty of the P ublic A ccountant to V erify C ash

The earliest English case dealing directly with the auditor’s
duties in regard to ascertaining the validity of cash payments was
decided by the court of appeal in 1899. This case, Thomas v. The
Corporation of Devonport,40 was an action in which Thomas
sought compensation for audit services rendered in his character
of elective auditor of the borough and also for audit services ren
dered to the sanitary authority of that town. The opinion reads:
“But language was used [in the lower court] which, in my view,
suggests too narrow a judgment of what the proper duties of the
elective auditor are. I do not subscribe to the doctrine that his
sole duty is to see whether there are vouchers, apparently formal
and regular, justifying each of the items in respect of which the
authority seeks to get credit upon the accounts put before the audi
tors for audit. I think that is an incomplete and imperfect view of
the duties of the auditors. I think an auditor is not only entitled,
but justified and bound to go further than that, and by fair and
reasonable examination of the vouchers to see that there are not
amongst the payments so made payments which are not authorized
by the duty of the authority, or contrary to the duty of the authority,
or in any other way illegal or improper. If he discovers that any such
improper or illegal payments appear to have been made, his duty will
certainly be to make it public by report to the authority itself, and
the burgesses who create that authority.”

Unquestionably it is the duty of an auditor in a review of cash
disbursements to scrutinize the paid vouchers to ascertain whether
the payments were properly authorized or not. In the absence of
circumstances indicating wrongful conduct on the part of the
authority to whom has been delegated the power to approve dis40 (1900) I Q. B. 16.
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bursements, the auditor would not be negligent in accepting as
correct payments evidenced by properly signed vouchers. On the
other hand, if circumstances should be such as to excite suspicion
that the executive authorized to approve the payments of vouchers
had abused his power, or if the circumstances would seem to in
dicate that the executive’s approval of disbursements had in par
ticular instances been fraudulently procured, the auditor would be
required to report the matter to the proper authority—a failure to
do so would constitute negligence on the part of the auditor.
While the facts of Thomas v. The Corporation of Devonport
are peculiar, the principles of the decision are sound and have
been applied in other decisions concerned with auditors’ duties in
the verification of disbursements.41
Fox and Son v. Morrish, Grant, and Co.42 is the most recent
English case on the auditor’s duty to verify cash. The case was
reviewed by the king’s bench division in 1918. Justice A. T.
Lawrence, delivering the opinion, said:
“The liability of the defendants turned on what they were em
ployed to do. It had been urged by the defense that Mr. Grant was
not employed to audit the accounts, and was therefore not responsible
for the documents which he prepared. It was true that he was not
employed as auditor fully and generally, but he was employed under
a specific engagement, as the result of an interview between the
plaintiffs and the defendants under which he was to check the books,
and it was understood that it was not to be a full audit. There was no
requirement on the part of the plaintiffs that the defendants should
verify everything. The question was whether Mr. Grant was wanting
in due care and skill in the performance of his duty, in not having
in any way checked the amounts appearing in the cashbook as ‘cash
in hand’ and ‘at the bank.’ He made out his balance-sheets without
taking any steps to ascertain whether those figures were correct. It
turned out that Cranston, a dishonest clerk of the plaintiffs, ingeni41 The English court of appeal in Cuff v. Condon and County Land and Building
Company, Limited, (1912) I Ch. 440, 81 L. J. (Ch.) 426, 19 Mans. 166, 106 L. T.
285, (1912) W. N. 40, 28 T. L. R. 218, seemed to imply that, where auditors
in auditing the books of a real-estate company failed to investigate the counterfoils
of rent receipts issued to tenants, the auditors would be liable for negligence.
42 35 T. L. R. 126, 63 S. J. 193.

L iability

for

N egligence, F raud

and

L ibel

41

ously seeing that the bank passbook was not investigated, took ad
vantage of that and played upon it.
“The eminent accountants who had been called as witnesses on
both sides endeavored to give evidence as favorable as possible to the
defendants. They had tried to mitigate the severity of the standard
laid down by Mr. Matthews; but they did not achieve complete suc
cess. They had to admit that in the preparation of balance-sheets the
cash at the bank and in hand must be stated, and in stating it one
must either look at the passbook or get a certificate from the bankers;
or if that was not done the client must be told that had not been done.
That was the real gravamen of the case as far as the defendants were
concerned. Mr. Grant did not tell the plaintiffs that he was not doing
this. He frankly admitted that he never had, as he was not bound
to do so under the retainer. As to that, he was wrong. He agreed
that the object of having a balance-sheet drawn up was that Mr.
Fox might know what his business position was; and it was im
possible for him to know how matters stood without knowing what
was the result in cash. All business was conducted for the purpose of
producing cash. There was not a single word in the retainer, or
anything which passed between the parties, which relieved Mr. Grant
from seeing that the cash was accurately stated in the balance-sheet.
If the passbook had been looked at it would have been found that
what was stated to be at the bank was not at the bank; and if the bank
passbook had been examined it would have been found that the figures
in the books had been inserted by Cranston.
“There was a clear default of duty on the part of Mr. Grant;
though it was natural and easy for him to slip into it at the time.
But there was nothing in the arrangement made which discharged
him from the duty of seeing that when he made a statement on his
balance-sheet there was a foundation for it. It was a positive state
ment which was intended to be acted upon.”

Fox and Son v. Morrish, Grant, and Company held that an
auditor in undertaking a balance-sheet audit is duty bound to
exercise reasonable care to verify the amount of cash on hand and
in the bank. The auditor is derelict in duty if he states in his
client’s balance-sheet that “cash at the bank” is a certain amount
without having ascertained the correctness of the figures from a
bank certificate or from an investigation of the client’s passbook.
Likewise, the auditor is negligent if he states in his client’s balance-
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sheet that “cash on hand” is a certain amount without having taken
ariy steps to ascertain the correctness of the figures. Though the
decision does not so state, the auditor or one of his employees
should count the “cash on hand.” The auditor is not justified in
accepting the cashbook figures for cash, nor in accepting from his
client’s employee figures for the count of “cash on hand”—unless,
of course, the auditing contract expressly provided that the auditor
would not be required to verify the showing of cash, and the
balance-sheet clearly showed that the figures for “cash on hand”
had not been verified. Dicta in the case imply that the auditor
might have been relieved of liability had he stated in the balancesheet that cash had not been verified. The underlying principles
of the decision are sound and should be followed in future deci
sions involving similar facts.
The leading American case on the liability of the public accoun
tant for negligence in failing to detect embezzlement is the famous
City of East Grand Forks v. Steele 43 case decided by the supreme
court of Minnesota in 1913. This case was an action for breach of
an auditing contract to conduct a skillful and diligent investiga
tion of the plaintiff’s records to disclose any defalcations which
might have existed. The opinion reads in part as follows:
“The defendants, representing themselves to be expert accountants,
and able to detect any irregularities in the transactions of the city
officers, contracted with the city to investigate and audit the books,
accounts and financial transactions of the city and of its officers for the
year 1908, and especially the books, accounts, and financial trans
actions of the city clerk, for the sum of $150. The city clerk, in addi
tion to his ordinary duties as clerk, was also employed to collect
money due the city for electric lights, water and sewer assessments
and licence fees and had given a surety bond to secure the faithful
performance of these additional duties. The investigation of these
collections, and of whether they had been properly accounted for,
was included in the duties of the defendants. They made the investi
gation and audit, and in February, 1909, reported to the city that all
books and accounts had been correctly kept and all funds properly
43 141 N. W. 181, 121 Minn. 296, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 205, Ann. Cas. 1914 C,
720. See Smith v. London Assurance Corporation, (1905) 96 N. Y. S. 820, 109
App. Div. 882.
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accounted for. Plaintiff, believing they had made a correct report and
had properly performed their work, paid them the full contract price
therefor.
“In December, 1909, defendants again contracted with the city to
make a similar investigation and audit, concerning both the years
1908 and 1909, for the sum of $500. They made such an investigation
and audit and reported the result thereof. Plaintiff, still believing that
they had made a correct report and had properly performed their
work, paid them the full contract price for this second audit. In fact,
the clerk had embezzled the sum of $1,984.26 during the year 1908,
and the further sum of $5,339 during the year 1909 and prior to the
investigation made by the defendants. The defendants failed to dis
cover and disclose these defalcations, by reason of incompetence and
negligence. They were discovered and disclosed by an investigation
made by the state examiner immediately after defendants had com
pleted their second audit. If in making their first audit defendants
had discovered and reported the defalcation then existing, it could
have been recovered from the surety company, and the clerk would
have been removed from office, and his subsequent embezzlement
could not have occurred. The surety company became insolvent be
fore the investigation made by the state examiner, and the amount
of the defalcations of the clerk has been wholly lost to the city.
“This is not an action in tort, but an action to recover damages
for breach of contract. As said by Justice Mitchell in Whittaker v.
Collins, 34 Minn. 299, 25 N . W. 632, 57 Am. Rep. 55 (an action
brought to recover for the negligence of a physician): ‘Where the
action is not maintainable without pleading and proving the con
tract, where the gist of the action is the breach of the contract, either
by malfeasance or nonfeasance, it is in substance, whatever may be
the form of the pleading, an action on the contract. * * * The founda
tion of the action is the contract, and the gravamen of it its breach.’
“The rule governing liability for breach of contract is given in the
syllabus to Sargent v. Mason, 101 Minn. 319, 112 N. W . 255, as
follows: ‘In an action for damages for breach of contract, the de
faulting party is liable only for the direct consequences of the breach,
such as usually occur from the infraction of like contracts, and within
the contemplation of the parties when the contract was entered into
as likely to result from its nonperformance.’
“To recover damages, not naturally and necessarily resulting from
a breach of the contract, on the ground that such damages were within
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the contemplation of the parties when making the contract, it is said
in Liljengren F. & L. Co. v. Mead, 42 Minn. 420, 44 N. W. 306,
that ‘there must be some special facts and circumstances, out of which
they naturally proceed, known to the persons sought to be held liable,
under such circumstances that it can be inferred from the whole
transaction that such damage was in the contemplation of the parties,
at the time of making the contract, as the result of its breach, and
that the party sought to be charged consented to become liable for
it.’ This rule is well established.
“The damages claimed on account of the losses resulting from
the defalcations of the clerk and the insolvency of his surety are too
remote to be recovered, without showing the existence of special
circumstances, known to defendants, from which they ought to
have known that such losses were likely to result from a failure to
disclose the true condition of affairs. Such losses are neither the
natural nor the proximate consequences of the failure of defendants
to make a proper audit. Neither are any facts shown from which it
may be inferred that a loss from either of these causes was or ought
to have been contemplated, when the contract was made, as likely to
result from a breach of duty on the part of defendants.
“If, at the making of the contract and in the light of the knowledge
then possessed by them, the parties had taken thought as to what
consequences might reasonably be expected to result from its breach,
there is nothing set forth in the complaint from which we can say
that they ought to have foreseen or to have contemplated that the
clerk was likely to commit a crime, or that his surety was likely to
become bankrupt, and thereby entail financial loss upon the city.
There may be circumstances under which the negligence of an expert
accountant may make him liable for losses, as where he is employed
to determine the amount that should be exacted from a surety for the
default of his principal; but the facts alleged in the complaint do not
bring this case within any such rule.
“Defendants represented themselves as expert accountants which
implied that they were skilled in that class of work. In accepting
employment as expert accountants, they undertook, and the plaintiff
had the right to expect that in the performance of their duties they
would exercise the average ability and skill of those engaged in that
branch of skilled labor. They were employed to ascertain, among
other things, whether any irregularities had occurred in the financial
transactions of the city clerk, and, if so, the nature and extent of
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such irregularities. If, from want of proper skill, or from negligence,
they did not disclose the true situation, they failed to perform the
duty which they had assumed and failed to earn the compensation
which plaintiff had agreed to pay them for the proper performance
of such duty.
“The work of an expert accountant is of such technical character
and requires such peculiar skill that the ordinary person c a n not
be expected to know whether he performs his duties properly or
otherwise, but must rely upon his report as to the thoroughness and
accuracy of his work. The full contract price having been paid in
the belief, induced by defendants’ report, that such report disclosed
fully and accurately the condition of the city’s accounts, the city is
entitled to recover back the amounts so paid, upon proving that,
through the incompetence or the negligence of defendants, the report
was in substance misleading and false.”

In the City of East Grand Forks n. Steele case it is possible that
the judge, when he held that the auditor was incompetent and
negligent in failing to disclose the defalcations of the city clerk,
had in mind specific acts or omissions committed by the auditor
in the course of the audit of cash collections. But, in view of the
context of the opinion, it is more probable that the judge found
the existence of negligence from the fact that the auditor con
tracted to bring to his task that degree of professional skill and
diligence necessary to uncover defalcations and then failed to dis
close the irregularities of the city clerk. When a public accountant
as such enters into an auditing contract he expressly or impliedly
agrees to give to his client such skill and diligence as reasonably
prudent, skillful, and diligent public accountants would give in
the circumstances.44 After having entered into such a contract,
the auditor would be guilty of negligence if he should fail to
exercise the care, skill and diligence which other professional ac
countants normally would have furnished in the circumstances.
The auditor contracted to investigate and audit the client’s books
for the purpose of discovering any irregularities that may have
existed during the audit period. The auditor’s negligence in failing
to discover the defalcations amounted to nothing more than an
44 Smith v. London Assurance Corporation, 96 N. Y. S. 820, 109 App. Div. 882,
would seem to support the holding in City of East Grand Forks v. Steele.
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invasion of the client’s rights which had been created solely by the
auditing contract. The auditor’s negligence was not an invasion of
any right of the client, created by implications of the law. Hence,
the gist of the cause of action was a breach of the contract, and by
well-established law the remedy had to be limited to an action in
contract. Since the cause of action could be in contract only, the
damages, in accordance with well-settled legal principles, had to be
limited to such losses as the contracting parties, at the time of mak
ing the agreement and in the light of the knowledge then pos
sessed by them, might have reasonably contemplated would follow
naturally from a breach of the contract. The court held that the
defendant in the light of knowledge possessed at the time of the
making of the contract was not chargeable with ability to foresee
losses resulting from embezzlement by the city clerk and bank
ruptcy of the surety company subsequent to the audit, and, therefore,
was not liable for such losses. The court held that the only dam
ages resulting directly from the auditor’s breach of contract were
the loss of the service fees which had been remitted to the auditor.
If the auditor’s negligent conduct had been a breach of a duty
implied by law and the action had been brought in tort, the dam
ages would have been such losses as the auditor might reasonably
have foreseen, at the time of the commission of negligence and in
the light of circumstances existing at that moment, would result
naturally and directly.45 Though the case was decided on the basis
of a breach of contract, the court stated that the loss resulting
from the defalcation of the clerk and the insolvency of his surety
subsequent to the audit was neither the natural nor the proximate
consequence of the failure of the defendant to make a proper audit.
Had the cause of action been brought in tort for negligence, it
would seem that the proper inference to be drawn from the opin
ion would lead to the conclusion that the court would have held
the defendant’s negligence not to constitute a reasonably dis
cernible or direct cause of the loss from defalcation of the clerk
and bankruptcy of the clerk’s surety, both of which occurred sub
sequent to the audit. Without knowledge of the clerk’s dishonesty
and without information relative to the financial condition of the
45 Burdick’s Law of Torts, pp. 39-41.
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clerk’s surety a reasonably prudent, skillful and diligent auditor
would not have foreseen as resulting from his negligence losses
from defalcation of the clerk and insolvency of his surety.
The City of East Grand Forks v. Steele decision is based upon
well-settled legal principles. It has been followed in other cases;
and it may well be accepted as the law with respect to the particu
lar circumstances.
T he N ew Y ork Stock E xchange on the P ublic A ccountant’s
D uty to M ake a P roper V erification of C ash

On October 24, 1933, J. M. B. Hoxsey, executive assistant of the
New York Stock Exchange committee on stock list, addressed to
the governing committee of the exchange a letter which reads in
part as follows:
“Your committee is satisfied that the detailed scrutiny and verifica
tion of the cash transactions of large companies can most efficiently
and economically be performed by permanent employees of the
corporation, particularly today, when bookkeeping is to so large an
extent done by mechanical means, and that it would involve un
warranted expense to transfer such work to independent auditors
or to require them to duplicate the work of the internal organization.
Your committee, however, feels that the auditors should assume a
definite responsibility for satisfying themselves that the system of
internal check provides adequate safeguards and should protect the
company against any defalcation of major importance. Unless so
satisfied, the auditors should make clear representations on this point
—in the first place, to the management, and in default of action by
the management, to the shareholders. Your committee also suggests
that this limitation on the scope of the audit, though an entirely
proper one, should be specifically mentioned in the common form of
audit report.”

In the absence of an express contract relieving the auditor of the
detailed scrutiny and verification of cash transactions, it is ex
tremely doubtful that courts would excuse an auditor from such
verification work, even in large companies where bookkeeping is
done chiefly by mechanical means and where the auditor has used
reasonable care in satisfying himself that the system of internal
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check provides adequate safeguards against defalcations. The com
mon law, in a detailed audit, places upon the auditor the duty to
make the detailed scrutiny and verification of all cash receipts and
disbursements necessary to uncover irregularities and defalcations,
and to ascertain the correctness of the cash balance. The common
law, in a balance-sheet audit, places upon the auditor the duty to
prove the correctness of the figures for the cash balance by means
of a count of the “cash on hand,” and an investigation of the client’s
bank pass-book, or of the bank’s certificate, showing the client’s
“cash at the bank.” 46 The limitation of the scope of the cash audit
as suggested by the New York Stock Exchange could be made
safely only where the auditing contract expressly provides for such
limitation and where the audit report clearly mentions the limited
extent of the verification of cash.
D uty

of th e

P ublic A ccountant R elative

to

S ecret R eserves

The American courts have not ruled on the public accountant’s
liability with respect to secret reserves. There are two outstand
ing English cases on the point. One case, Newton v. Birmingham
Small Arms Company, Limited,47 dealt with the auditor’s duty to
his client, the stockholders, in regard to hidden reserves. This case
is reported below. The other case which involved the criminal
liability of the auditor of the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company is
given later under the subject “Criminal liability of the public
accountant for fraud.”
The stockholders of the Birmingham Small Arms Company in
February, 1906, passed a resolution which authorized the directors
to set aside out of profits a secret reserve fund which the directors
could invest as they saw fit. The directors were bound to disclose
the particulars of this inner reserve fund to the company auditors;
but the company auditors were prohibited from revealing any in
formation whatever about the secret fund to the stockholders or
otherwise. Newton, the plaintiff stockholder in this case, sought a
court order to prevent the enforcement of such resolution. After
46 Note: See “Duty of the Public Accountant to Verify Cash,” page 39, ante.
47 (1906) 2 Ch. 378, 1906 W. N. 146.
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reviewing the English companies acts and ruling that secret reserve
funds could be maintained under such acts, the court held:
“The special resolutions in the present case provide that the balancesheet shall not disclose the internal reserve fund. It must, therefore,
omit on the assets side of the balance-sheet the assets which make up
the amount standing to the credit of that fund and the contra item—
namely, the credit balance of the fund—on the liability side. The
result will be to show the financial position of the company to be not
so good as in fact it is. If the balance-sheet be so worded as to show
that there is an undisclosed asset, whose existence makes the finan
cial position better than that shown, such a balance-sheet will not, in
my judgment, be necessarily inconsistent with the act of parliament.
Assets are often, by reason of prudence, estimated, and stated to be
estimated, at less than their probable real value. The purpose of the
balance-sheet is primarily to show that the financial position of the
company is at least as good as there stated, not to show that it is not
or may not be better. The provision as to not disclosing the internal
reserve fund in the balance-sheet is not, I think, necessarily fatal to
these special resolutions. The act, however, provides that the auditors
shall report to the shareholders on the accounts examined by them.
These auditors will examine, amongst others, the accounts of the
internal reserve fund. A principal question in this case, I think, is
whether it is a compliance with these words of the act that the
auditors shall report that they have examined the accounts as to the
internal reserve fund, that they are satisfied with them, and that the
funds have been employed in the manner authorized by the company’s
regulations, or whether there will be default in complying with the
act if they do not go on to say how the fund has been employed. In
my judgment such a report would be a sufficient report within the
act if the auditor is bona fide satisfied that in making this report,
and nothing further, he is truly reporting as to ‘the true and correct
view of the state of the company’s affairs.’ But the special resolutions
do not stop there. They provide that it shall be the duty of the auditor
not to disclose any information with regard to this fund to the share
holders or otherwise. It is, I think, inconsistent with the act of
parliament that the auditor shall be bound, even when he thinks that
the true state of the company’s affairs is affected by facts relating to
the internal reserve fund, to withhold all information with regard to
the same from the shareholders. If, for instance, the directors had in

50

R esponsibilities

and

R ights

of

A ccountants

vested the internal reserve fund upon investments which might involve
the company under certain circumstances in enormous loss, the act, I
think, requires that the auditor shall be at liberty and be bound to
report that fact. In reporting upon the accounts submitted to them
the auditors do not, of course, report as to the details of accounts to
which they find no cause to take exception. Their duty is to call
attention to that which is wrong, not to condescend upon all the
details of that which is right. It is, I think, competent to the statutory
majority of the shareholders to say that as to particular items of their
business it is to the interest of the corporation that there shall be
secrecy, and that the auditors, who must for the purposes of their
audit know all such details, shall not, unless their duty under the
statute requires it, disclose such details to the members. There is no
suggestion in this case that these clauses are intended to be used
for any other than a legitimate purpose. Those who are engaged in
commerce are familiar with the fact that undue publicity as regards
the details of their trade, or as to their financial arrangements, may
often be very injurious to traders, having regard to the rivalry of com
petitors in trade, to complications sometimes arising from strained
relations between capital and labor, and the like. There are legitimate
reasons for ensuring secrecy to a proper extent. It is not, I think,
necessary, nor, having regard to the great utility of these acts, is it
desirable, to expose persons who trade under these acts to the neces
sities of a publicity from which their competitors are free, unless
such publicity is required to ensure commercial integrity. I am not
disposed to look too closely for reasons why I should find clauses
such as these to be inconsistent with the act if I see that the true
purpose of the act is satisfied. I think, however, these special resolu
tions go too far. Any regulations which preclude the auditors from
availing themselves of all the information to which under the act
they are to make as to the true and correct state of the company’s
affairs, are I think, inconsistent with the act.”

The Newton v. Birmingham Small Arms Company case held
that under the company act of 1900 the company auditor was
not required to show in the balance-sheet items which the directors
desired to keep secret from the stockholders, provided the auditor
stated in his certificate that he had examined the accounts as to
the internal reserve fund, and that he was satisfied with them.
But it was held that if the auditor, through his investigation of
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internal reserve accounts, found that the directors had abused the
privilege of managing the secret fund, the auditor was obligated
to report that which was wrong. The court relieved the auditor
of the duty to disclose secret reserves on the theory that such
secrecy is often essential to the proper management of the com
pany. The allowance of secret reserves was based on the proposition
that a disclosure of inner reserves might reveal to competitors of
the business information which would be injurious to the client,
or that such a disclosure might inspire labor to strike for higher
wages. While no case has ruled on secret reserves under the com
panies acts passed subsequent to the act of 1900, since all the
subsequent acts, including the consolidating companies act of
1929, have required the company auditor to state whether or not
the balance-sheet shows the true and correct financial position of
the company and have not expressly prohibited secret reserves, it
would appear that the decision of the Newton v. Birmingham Small
Arms Company case could have been rendered under any of these
subsequent acts as well as under the act of 1900.
It would seem that the court was in error in holding that an
auditor may fail to disclose a secret reserve in the balance-sheet
and yet comply with the company act of 1900 which required that
the auditor should state whether the balance-sheet exhibited a cor
rect view of the condition of the company’s financial affairs. Such
a compliance with the act can not logically be explained by the
proposition that “the purpose of the balance-sheet is primarily to
show that the financial position of the company is at least as good
as there stated, not to show that it is not or may not be better.”
The London and General Bank case, supra, and several other deci
sions have held that a balance-sheet showing assets at a higher
value than their real worth does not present truly the financial
condition of the business. Showing less than the real value of the
property is as far from the truth as showing more than the real
value of the property.
There is some justification for permitting secret reserves on the
ground that it may become necessary for the corporate manage
ment to follow a conservative program with respect to the pay
ment of dividends, and that the withholding of the payment of
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dividends becomes well nigh impossible where the stockholders
know the full worth of the business. Yet, under American common
law the managing director of a corporation may work great loss
to stockholders through the maintenance of secret reserves. Accord
ing to the majority view of American courts a director may pur
chase from a stockholder shares of stock in the company without
revealing to the shareholder secret reserves.48 There would be much
less risk of loss to stockholders through the maintenance of secret
reserves under the minority view of the American courts, which
holds that a corporate director is a quasi-trustee of the stockholders
and under obligation to disclose inner reserves to a stockholder
prior to purchasing shares of the corporation from such stock
holder.49 This minority view has the support of eminent author48 “Directors’ Liability to Individual Shareholders and to the Corporation,” 45
Harvard Law Review 1389 (1931); Board v. Reynolds, 44 Ind. 509 (1873);
Deaderick v. Wilson, 8 Baxter 107 (Tenn., 1874).
49 Note: The minority view was clearly set forth by the supreme court of Georgia
in 1903 in the following language: “All the authorities agree that he (director)
is trustee for the company, and in his capacity as such he serves the interests of
the entire body of stockholders, as well as those of the individual shareholder, who
usually can not sue in his own name for wrongs done the company by the officer.
. . . No process of reasoning and no amount of argument can destroy the fact that
the director is, in a most important and legitimate sense, trustee for the stock
holder. . . . Not a strict trustee, since he does not hold title to the shares, not
even a strict trustee who is practically prohibited from dealing with his cestui que
trust, but a quasi-trustee as to the shareholder’s interest in the shares. If the market
or contract price of the stock should be different from the book value, he would
be under no legal obligation to call special attention to that fact, for the stockholder
is entitled to examine the books, and this source of information, at least theo
retically, is equally accessible to both. It might be that the director was in posses
sion of information which his duty to the company required him to keep secret;
and, if so, he must not disclose the fact even to the shareholder, for his obligation
to the company overrides that to an individual holder of stock. But if the fact so
known to the director can not be published, it does not follow that he may use
it to his own advantage and to the disadvantage of one whom he also represents.
The very fact that he can not disclose prevents him from dealing with one who
does not know and to whom material information can not be made known. If,
however, the fact within the knowledge of the director is of a character calculated
to affect the selling price, and can, without detriment to the interest of the com
pany, be imparted to the shareholder, the director, before he buys, is bound to
make a full disclosure. In a certain sense the information is a quasi-asset of the
company, and the shareholder is as much entitled to the advantage of that sort of
an asset as to any other regularly entered on the list of the company’s holding.
If the officer should purposely conceal from a stockholder information as to the
existence of valuable property belonging to the company and take advantage of this
concealment, the sale would necessarily be set aside. The same result would logi
cally follow where the fact giving value to the stock was of a character which
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ity; 50 and it is thought by no less an authority on corporation law
than Dean I. P. Hildebrand of the University of Texas law school
that the doctrine making a director a quasi-trustee of stockholders
will be accepted by the majority of American courts within a
decade.
But the wisdom of allowing inner reserves or the duty to reveal
such reserves to stockholders of the American corporation is no
business of the public accountant—under common law. Certainly,
if a director is not, by the weight of authority, a quasi-trustee of
stockholders under obligations to disclose to them secret reserves
prior to the purchase of their shares, the auditor who contracts
independently with the directors would have no fiduciary relation
ship with the stockholders and would not be obligated to disclose
secret reserves to them by means of the balance-sheet prepared from
his audit. Even if courts should follow the minority view, making
a director a quasi-trustee under obligations to disclose secret re
serves to a stockholder prior to the purchase of his shares, the audi
tor would owe no common-law duty to a stockholder to reveal
secret reserves in the balance-sheet prepared from an audit of the
company. If the minority view should be followed, in the absence
of circumstances indicating that a director intended to use the
auditor’s report to induce a stockholder to sell shares of stock to the
director for himself or for the corporation, the auditor would not
be charged with negligence in failing to report secret reserves. It
has been held—City of East Grand Forks v. Steele, supra—that
an auditor is not chargeable with ability to foresee dishonest con
duct on the part of a trusted employee of a business.
could not formally be entered on the record. Where the director obtains the
information giving added value to the stock by virtue of his official position, he
holds the information in trust for the benefit of those who placed him where this
knowledge was obtained, in the well-founded expectation that the same should be
used first for the company and ultimately for those who were the real owners of the
company. The director can not deal on this information to the prejudice of the
artificial being which is called the corporation, nor, on any sound principle, can
be permitted to act differently towards those who are not artificially but actually
interested.” ( Oliver v . Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S. E. 232.) See also: Strong v.
Repide, 213 U. S. 419 (1909); Stewart v. Harris, 69 Kan. 498, 77 P. 277, 66
L. R. A. 261 (1904).
50 A. A. Berle, “For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees,” 45 Harvard Law
Review 1365 (1932).
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The burden of showing no negligence is placed upon the auditor
where the client has proved damages to have resulted from an
incorrectly stated balance-sheet, according to the case, In re Re
public of Bolivia Exploration Syndicate, Limited,51 decided by
Justice Astbury of the English chancery division in 1913. The opin
ion in part reads:
“Now, there are some legal matters which an auditor must obvi
ously know, as there are others which it is equally obvious he could
not be held responsible for not knowing, and it may not always be
easy to say in which category any particular case falls. I think that
auditors of a limited company are bound to know or make them
selves acquainted with their duties under the articles of the company
whose accounts they are appointed to audit and under the companies
acts for the time being in force; and that when it is shown that audited
balance-sheets do not show the true financial condition of the com
pany and that damage has resulted, the onus is on the auditors to
show that this is not the result of any breach of duty on their part.
The authorities, however, are not very clear as to what, if any, is the
liability of auditors of a limited company for including or passing
in accounts audited by them sums paid by the company or its direc
tors prior to the audit, and which, by reason of the want of author
ity in the regulations of the company or non-compliance with some
statutory provision of the companies acts, ought not in the particular
circumstances to have been paid, nor, if any liability would other
wise exist, what is sufficient by way of warning or identification in
the audited accounts for the necessary information to be expressly
conveyed by the auditors to the company in order to free them from
further responsibility.”

In this case, where the plaintiff
an incorrect balance-sheet prepared
financial loss resulting therefrom,
circumstances that negligence not

liquidator had merely proved
by the defendant auditor, and
the court inferred from such
only existed but also resulted

directly in the loss w hich was the basis of com plaint. Negligence

is regularly inferred from proof of injury in a certain class of cases
51 (1914) I Ch. D. 139, (1913) W. N. 329, 30 T. L. R. 78, 58 S. J. 321, 83
L. J. (Ch.) 235, 2I Mans. 67, 109 L. T. 741, 110 L. T. 141.
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where the defendant has been required by contract or statute to do
something safely. This rule of presumption of negligence, res ipsa
loquitur, on the part of the defendant is ordinarily limited to cases
of absolute duty, or an obligation practically amounting to that of
an insurer. Wherever the defendant is required to exercise the
highest care and skill with regard to the safety of some one else,
res ipsa loquitur (the thing speaks for itself) applies—negligence
and the injury resulting directly therefrom are presumed.52 Thus,
when a common carrier’s passenger is injured the common car
rier is presumed to have caused the injury through negligent con
duct. The common carrier may rebutt the inference of negligence by
proof that the injury arose from an accident which the utmost
skill, foresight and diligence could not have prevented. As far as
proof of the existence of negligence and the loss resulting therefrom
is concerned, the Republic of Bolivia Exploration Syndicate,
Limited, case puts the company auditor in the class of persons
required by statute or contract to do a thing safely. While the
English companies acts place upon the company auditor a duty to
render a balance-sheet which gives the true financial position of
the company, according to the best of his information and the
explanations given him and as shown by the books, it would
seem that the court went too far in the present case in presuming
negligence merely from the failure to comply with the statute. In
the London and General Bank case, supra, after specific acts of
negligence in the preparation of the balance-sheet had been proven
by direct evidence, the court presumed that the defendant auditor’s
negligence was the proximate cause of the loss which resulted
from the declaration of dividends out of capital subsequent to the
circulation of copies of the balance-sheet among the stockholders
who declared the dividends. In the English case, Henry Squire,
Cash Chemist, Limited, v. Ball, Baker & Co., 106 L. T. 197, 28
T. L. R. 81, it was held that, where a money-lender hired an audi
tor to investigate a borrower’s books in order that the money
lender might ascertain the wisdom of advancing a loan to the bor
rower prior to the making of the loan which resulted in a loss
to the money-lender, the money-lender would have to prove specific
52 Burdick’s Law of Torts, pp. 514-516.
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negligence on the part of the auditor and that such negligence
was the proximate cause of the money-lender’s loss before he
could recover.
In rare instances negligence has been presumed where the de
fendant’s duty was not absolute but arose in the ordinary course
of business. In cases of this sort it is essential that it shall appear
that all the elements of the occurrence were within the exclusive
control of the defendant, and that the result was so far out of the
usual course that there is no fair inference that it could have been
produced by any other cause than negligence of the defendant.
For example, negligence was presumed where sparks escaped from
a fire pot (which was used in repairing a roof) and set fire to the
building.53 It would seem that an auditor is rarely, if ever, in such
exclusive control of the audit that he could be presumed to have
been negligent where his reports have been proven incorrect. The
client’s employees generally have access to the records during the
audit, and may change, substitute or otherwise manipulate the
records. The employees may divert cash deposits or securities so
as to render an incorrect showing of the client’s financial affairs.
The auditor does not assume the responsibility of verifying every
entry in the entire set of records, even in a detailed audit. It may
easily happen that the balance-sheet prepared from an audit is
incorrect through no lack of reasonable care and skill of the audi
tor. Inferring negligence on the part of the auditor merely from
an incorrect report is placing an onerous and unjustifiable burden
upon the auditor and should not be countenanced by the courts.
Where negligence in the preparation of a balance-sheet has been
proven by direct evidence, in some circumstances the inference
that the loss resulted proximately from such defective balancesheet may well be made. For example, where it has been proved
that an auditor was negligent in preparing a balance-sheet which
understated the worth of his client’s business, and the client imme
diately after such audit sold his business at a loss, a court would
be justified in inferring that the auditor’s negligence was the
proximate cause of his client’s loss.
53 Cooley on Torts, third edition, volume II, pp. 1415-1428.
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The supreme court of New York in 1925 rendered a strong deci
sion, Craig v. Anyon,54 which defines the responsibility of the
public accountant for negligence where the client is guilty of con
tributory negligence. In this case the defendant auditors had for
many years audited the books of the plaintiff brokerage firm. As
a part of their audit contract with the plaintiffs, the defendants had
originally agreed to calculate the indebtedness of customers on open
account, and to “supervise, superintend and send out” statements
of account to the customers of the plaintiffs. The defendants
never performed this part of their audit contract; and in failing to
do so, the court found, they were guilty of negligence. The plain
tiffs knew from year to year that the defendants had not lived up
to their agreement with respect to their audit of customers’ ac
counts, and did nothing about it. In fact, the plaintiffs refused to
allow statements of account to be sent to customers.
Furthermore, the plaintiffs entrusted the entire management and
control of the commodities department of their brokerage busi
ness to an employee named Moore. Moore had complete charge
of the records of the department; he was margin clerk, whose duty
it was to decide what margin should be maintained, and he had
full supervision of buying and selling for customers. The plain
tiffs took no trouble at all to investigate the work of Moore; they
simply relied upon him with an unquestioning faith to carry on
the work of the commodities department. The defendant auditors
also trusted Moore. In these circumstances Moore was able to
manipulate the account of a customer, Zabriskie, so as to effect
the loss. Zabriskie’s original margin with the firm was only $200;
but in the course of a few years under the direction of Moore the
plaintiffs paid out to Zabriskie $123,689.04 without once investigat
ing the credit position of Zabriskie or making an examination of
his account to see whether anything was due him. These payments
to Zabriskie were improper; and they constituted the loss which
the plaintiffs contended was a direct result of the negligence of the
defendant auditors. The defendants argued that the loss resulted
54 208 N . Y. S. 259, 212 App. Div. 55. (Affirmed in the court of appeals of

New York, 1926, 152 N. E. 431, 242 N. Y. 569.)
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from the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. A portion of the
opinion reads:
“There is no doubt in this case that plaintiffs could have prevented
the loss by the exercise of reasonable care, and that they should not
have relied exclusively on the accountants.
“We think the damages can not be said to flow naturally and
directly from defendants’ negligence or breach of contract. Plaintiffs
should not be allowed to recover for losses which they could have
avoided by the exercise of reasonable care.
“The plaintiffs, in effect, contend that defendants are chargeable
with negligence because of failure to detect Moore’s wrongdoing,
wholly overlooking the fact that although they were closely affiliated
with Moore, who was constantly under their supervision, they were
negligent in failing properly to supervise his acts or to learn the true
condition of their own business and to detect his wrongdoing.”

In the Craig v. Anyon case the court held that the defendant
auditors were excused from liability for their negligent audit be
cause of the contributory negligence on the part of the client
brokerage firm. The court held that the plaintiffs’ own contribu
tory negligence was a substantial cause of the loss resulting from
fraudulent payments to a customer of their brokerage firm. The
conduct of the plaintiffs amounting to negligence consisted of sev
eral specific acts of omission and commission. It was deemed by
the court that the plaintiffs failed to use reasonable care when
they placed the defalcator in complete charge of all the transac
tions and accounting for the commodities department of their
brokerage firm and later exercised no control or supervision over
him whatsoever. It was also thought by the court that there was a
lack of due precaution on the part of the plaintiffs in that they
refused to allow the defendant auditors to superintend and send
out certain statements of account to customers in accordance with
an auditing contract formed in prior years. Moreover, the plain
tiffs were aware of the fact that the defendants were not even cal
culating the liability of the customers on open contract, at the time
of each audit, and did nothing about it. This negligence of the
plaintiffs, the court held, was the direct cause of their loss. Had
the plaintiffs exercised due care, according to the opinion, the loss
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would not have occurred. In other words, the defendants’ negli
gent audit was not the direct cause of the plaintiffs’ loss. The chain
of causation between the defendants’ negligent audit and the plain
tiffs’ loss was broken by a criminal act—made possible by the
plaintiffs’ negligence—of the defalcator, so that there was not pres
ent that sequential relation between the negligent audit and the
plaintiffs’ loss which is required to make an act the direct cause
of an injury. The defendants were not expected to foresee that a
trusted employee of their clients would take advantage of their
negligent audit and effect their clients’ loss.
The tests for the existence of contributory negligence are the
same as those for the existence of negligence upon which it is
sought to establish a claim for damages. By the great weight of
authority in England and America “ ‘the onus of proving affirma
tively that there was contributory negligence, on the part of the
person injured, rests, in the first instance, upon the defendant,
and in the absence of evidence tending to that conclusion, the
plaintiff is not bound to prove the negative in order to entitle’
him to recover.” 55 Wherever contributory negligence is shown
to have been a substantial cause of the plaintiffs’ loss, it affords a
complete bar to the plaintiff’s recovery at common law. According
to the United States supreme court, “the general accepted and most
reasonable rule of law applicable to actions in which the defense is
contributory negligence may be thus stated: Although the defen
dant’s negligence may have been the primary cause of the injury
complained of, yet an action for such injury can not be maintained
if the proximate and immediate cause of the injury can be traced
to the want of ordinary care and caution in the person injured;
subject to this qualification, which has grown up in recent years,
that the contributory negligence of the party injured will not
defeat the action, if it be shown that defendant might, by the
exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the conse
quences of the injured party’s negligence.” 56 By this authority it is
possible for the plaintiff to defeat the defense of contributory
55 Burdick’s Law of Torts, pp. 520-521.
56Grand Trunk, Railway Co. v. Ives, 144 U. S. 408, 429, 12 Sup. Ct. 679, 36
L. Ed. 485 (1892).
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negligence by showing that no injury would have resulted from
his own negligence if the defendant had acted with reasonable care
and prudence. Such a showing would, of course, establish the fact
that the plaintiff’s negligence was not the proximate cause of his
injury.57
In the light of the well-settled law on contributory negligence
it must be concluded that the Craig v. Anyon case is correctly
decided. The finding of the existence of negligence on the part of
the plaintiffs, and the determination that the plaintiffs’ loss would
not have occurred except for their own negligence, i.e., that plain
tiffs’ and not defendants’ negligence was the proximate cause of the
plaintiffs’ loss, are sound conclusions of the court. The case should
be followed in future decisions in like circumstances.
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C onfidential C om m unications

Weld-Blundell v. Stephens,58 decided by the house of lords in
1920, appears to be the only case in England and America involv
ing a public accountant’s liability for negligent disclosure of a
confidential communication from his client. The plaintiff, WeldBlundell, had lent money to the Float Electric Company, Limited,
and, on being asked for a further advance, employed the defen
dant, Stephens, a chartered accountant, to look into the affairs of
the company. In a letter of instructions to Stephens, Weld-Blundell
reflected upon Lowe, the previous manager of the company, and
Comins, the auditor of the company. Stephens, upon receipt of the
letter, handed it to his partner, Swift, with instruction to go to the
Float Company’s offices and make certain inquiries. Swift acci
dentally dropped and left the letter in the manager’s room of the
Float Company’s offices. The manager, Hurst, read the letter and
communicated its contents to Lowe and Comins, who immediately
brought actions of libel against Weld-Blundell, and recovered dam
ages against him. Weld-Blundell then sued Stephens for breach of
an implied duty to keep secret the letter of instructions. Three of
57 Burdick’s Law of Torts, pp. 519-527.
58 9 B. R. C. 368, (1919) 1 K. B. 520, 88 L. J. K. N. S. 689, 120 L. T. N. S.
494, (1919) W. N. 46, 35 T. L. R. 245, 63 Sol. Jo. 301.
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the five judges held that the chartered accountant’s negligence was
not the proximate cause of Weld-Blundell’s loss from libelous con
duct; the other two judges gave dissenting opinions. The majority
view of the house of lords, as represented by a portion of Lord
Sumner’s opinion, follows:
“The crux of the present question was the intervention of Hurst
between the accountant and Lowe and Comins. Further, no want
of care had to be proved here against the defendant, for he accepted
the decision that he broke his contract by his partner’s omission to
be careful, though not by any deliberate, intentional or wanton
breach. That at once made it possible to lay aside large classes of
authorities. W hat a defendant ought to have anticipated as a reason
able man was material, when the question was whether or not he was
guilty of negligence, that is, of want of due care according to the
circumstances. That, however, went to culpability not to compensa
tion (Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks, 11 Ex., 781; Smith v. L. and
S. W. Rly., L., R., 6 C. P., 14, per Justice Blackburn). Again, what
ordinarily happened or might reasonably be expected to happen was
material, where a series of physical phenomena had to be investigated
and the remoteness of the damage or the reverse was to be decided
accordingly. * * *
“In general (apart from special contracts and relations and the
maxim: respondeat superior), even though A was in fault he was
not responsible for injury to C, which B, a stranger to him, deliber
ately chose to do. Though A might have given the occasion for B’s
mischievous activity, B then became a new and independent cause
(e.g., Cobb v. G. W. R., (1893) 1 Q. B. 459, 63 L. J. Q. B. 629;
Attorney-general v. Conduit Colliery, (1895) 1 Q. B. 301, 64 L. J. Q. B.
207). It was hard to steer clear of metaphors. Perhaps one might be
forgiven for saying that B snapped the chain of causation; he was
no mere conduit-pipe through which consequences flowed from A to
C, no mere moving part in a transmission gear set in motion by A;
in a word, that he insulated A from C. It was quite plain that when
Swift dropped the letter and found out his loss, the matter would have
ended there but for the idle hands of Hurst. He gave the letter a fresh
start and on his original impulse it came to be sued on. Precisely the
same result would have happened if the person who dropped the
letter in H u rs t’s office h ad previously got it by p ick in g S w ift’s pocket.

Again, the matter could not be worse for Stephens than if he had
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shown H urst the letter himself, that is, had published to him WeldBlundell’s original libel. .What then? Would the defendant have been
liable if Hurst had re-published it (as indeed he did) without author
ity from him and not in accordance with any intention or desire on
his part actual or imputable? Ward v. Week s (supra) said no. The
case was ninety years old and he (Lord Sumner) saw no reason to
doubt it. The repetition, said Chief Justice Tindal, was ‘the volun
tary act of a free agent, over whom the defendant had no control,
and for whose acts he is not answerable, and this repetition was
the immediate cause of the damage.’ Yet, taking men as one found
them, few things were more certain than the repetition of a calumny
confidentially communicated, even on an honorable understanding
of secrecy.
“* * * He (Lord Sumner) could not see that there was any evi
dence in law in either case, because he could not see that the mere
probability that actions might be brought for the libels could turn
H urst’s act into defendant’s act. It might be material if the want of
care were in -dispute, but it was not. Remoteness of damage was a
question of cause and effect—a different question. That a jury could
finally make A liable for B’s acts merely because they thought it was
antecedently probable that B would act as he did, apart from A’s
authority or intention, seemed to him to be contrary to principle
and supported authority.
“Lord Wrenbury (of majority holding) said that the relations be
tween Weld-Blundell and Stephens were such that the latter no doubt
owed a duty to the former and in that duty he was negligent. WeldBlundell’s liability to pay money to Lowe and Comins, however,
arose, not from that negligence but from his own wrongful act in
indulging in malicious libel. It bore no pecuniary relation to Stephens’
wrongful act. Stephens’ act was not the cause (whether with or
without the word ‘effective’) of his having to pay but was an act
without which possibly he would never have been called upon to pay.
It was not causa causans, but at most causa sine qua non.
“In discharging his liability to pay damages for malicious libel
Weld-Blundell suffered no damage at all. A man was not damnified
by being compelled to satisfy his legal obligation. * * *
“Assuming that it could be said that Stephens made publication
to Lowe of the libel on Comins and made publication to Comins
of the libel to Lowe, nothing resulted from this for: ( 1) Weld-Blundell
was not liable in respect of that publication which he had not author-
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ized, and (2) he was made liable not for that publication but for the
publication made by Weld-Blundell to Stephens, and the last-men
tioned publication had been made and its consequence incurred be
fore the events happened that Swift dropped the letter and Hurst
picked it up and wrongfully read it, and as a result Lowe and Comins
were informed. Nothing that Stephens did created the liability under
which Weld-Blundell lay. He (Lord W renbury) was quite unable to
follow the proposition that the damages given in the libel actions
were in any way damages resulting from anything which Stephens did
in breach of duty.”

In the Weld-Blundell v. Stephens case it was held that where a
chartered accountant received from his client a confidential letter
which contained matter reflecting upon two other persons, and
where he negligently permitted the letter to be published, through
the wrongful act of a third person, to the two injured persons, the
chartered accountant was not liable to the client because the client’s
loss resulted wholly from his own wrongful act in writing and
sending the libelous letter to the chartered accountant. The client
could not be excused from his libelous conduct on the basis of a
privileged communication between him and the accountant be
cause the client was guilty of malice in writing and sending the
letter. The accountant’s negligence could not have been the direct
cause of the publication of the libelous letter after it reached the
accountant, because the chain of causation extending from the
accountant’s negligent act was broken by the wrongful conduct of
the third person. Moreover, it was held that the accountant would
not have been liable to his client had the accountant authorized the
wrongful publication by the third person, or had himself given the
letter to one of the two injured persons in publication of the
wrongful statement of the other, because the client’s loss was due
to his own wrongful act.
In harmony with the usual English and the minority view in
America, the present case makes the continuous and unbroken effect
of defendant’s negligent conduct, regardless of ability to foresee
injury, the test of liability for negligence. According to this type
of holding, ability to foresee injury is merely a test to determine
the existence of negligence and is not a test to determine whether
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the negligent act was the direct cause of the alleged injury.59 It
would appear that the court might have arrived at the conclusion
that the accountant’s negligence was not the direct cause of the
publication by Hurst, on the ground that the accountant could not
have reasonably foreseen the wrongful conduct of Hurst. At any
rate, the conclusions of the case are sound; the accountant was
not liable, first, because his negligent act was not the direct cause
of the wrongful publication by Hurst, and, second, because the
client’s loss was due to his wrongful act and not to the instrumen
talities resulting in the exposure of his wrongful act.
The Weld-Blundell v. Stephens case does not involve the lia
bility which an auditor may incur from negligently disclosing his
client’s trade secrets learned during the course of an audit where
the client is guilty of no wrongful conduct. The negligent disclo
sure of such information would doubtless be interpreted by courts
as a breach of duty implied from the audit contract and would
subject the auditor to liability to his client if the client’s loss were
the proximate result of the accountant’s act (see page 197, post).
IV
LIABILITY OF T H E PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT TO HIS
CLIENT FOR LIBEL
“Libel is a false and unprivileged publication, which exposes any
person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes
him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure
him in his business.” 60 The publication may be effected by means
of writing, printing, pictures, images or anything that is the object
of the sense of sight, communicated to a third person. At common
law libel is generally a criminal offense as well as a private wrong
against the injured party. Where the defendant has delivered an
untrue and injurious writing to the plaintiff, or to a third person
at the request of the plaintiff, the defendant can not be held liable
for the defamatory writing. It is necessary to prove that the defama59 Note: See leading English case, In re Polemis and Furness, W ithy & Company,
3 K. B. 560, 90 L. J. K. B. 1353 (C. A., 1921).
60 Taylor v. Hearst, 40 P. 392, 107 Cal. 262, 269 (1895).
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tory writing was read by a third person and that publication of
the plaintiff was the intended or discernible result of the defen
dant’s acts before an action can be maintained for libel. The
defendant may not have intended or foreseen injury to the plain
tiff, but he must have either intended or foreseen publication of
the defamatory writing to a third person before an action can be
maintained for libel. The libelant may or may not have composed
the defamatory writing. It is enough that the defendant published
defamatory writing of the plaintiff to a third person in circum
stances from which it can be reasonably inferred that the defendant
intended or foresaw publication. Libel generally involves malice on
the part of the wrongdoer; sometimes it involves only negligence;
then, again it may involve only accident. The defendant may have
published injurious falsehoods with the intent to damage the plain
tiff; a newspaper may have negligently published another news
paper’s copy which was untrue and injurious to the plaintiff; or,
again, by mere accident the newspaper may have published libelous
matter, as where an article described a particular person as a “col
ored” rather than as a “cultured” gentleman.61
The occasions inviting libelous conduct on the part of public
accountants are extremely rare. Granted that a public accountant
does make an audit from which he prepares a false report which
is injurious to his client’s business, as where the report falsely
shows a condition of bankruptcy, his communication of that report
to his client would not amount to libel. Furthermore, if the ac
countant should, at the direction of his client, present to a third
person a false business report injurious to the client, no action for
libel could be maintained. If the public accountant should prepare
a false report injurious to his client’s business, and the report,
through no fault of the accountant, should be taken from his
(accountant’s) possession and read by a third person, the accountant
would not be held accountable for libel, since the communication
of his report would have been effected in circumstances from which
it could not be reasonably inferred that he intended or foresaw
61 Burdick’s Law of Torts, pp. 349-370; Harper on Torts, pp. 497-552; Cooley

on Torts, volume I, pp. 366-463.
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publication of the injurious report.62 Of course, if an auditor should
prepare a false report injurious to his client’s business, and cause a
third person to read the report, the auditor would be held ac
countable in an action for libel.

V
LIABILITY OF T H E PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT TO TH IRD
PARTIES FOR NEGLIGENCE AND FRAUD
T he P ublic A ccountant N ot L iable

to

T hird P arties

for

M ere N egligence

In 1919 the supreme court of Pennsylvania rendered the decision
in Landell v. Lybrand 63 as follows:
“Appellees, defendants below, are certified public accountants, and,
as such, audited the books and accounts of the Employer’s Indemnity
Company for the year 1911. The appellant, plaintiff below, averred
in his statement of claim that he had been induced to buy eleven
shares of the capital stock of that company, at the price of $200 per
share, on the strength of the report made by the appellees as to its
assets and liabilities at the close of the year 1911, the report having
been shown to him by someone who suggested that he purchase the
stock. A further averment was that the report was false and untrue,
that the stock purchased by him on the strength of it is valueless;
and for the loss he sustained he averred the defendants were liable.
To enforce this liability an action in trespass was brought against
them. In their affidavit of defense they averred that the statement
of claim disclosed no cause of action and asked that this be disposed
of by the court below as a matter of law, under the provisions of
section 20 of the practice act of May 14, 1915, P. L. 483. It was so
disposed of by the court below in entering judgment for the de
fendants.
“There were no contractual relations between the plaintiff and
defendants, and, if there is any liability from them to him, it must
arise out of some breach of duty, for there is no averment that they
made the report with intent to deceive him. The averment in the
62 Burdick’s Law of Torts, p. 352 (note 27).
63 107 A. 783, 264 Pa. 406, 8 A. L. R. 461.
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statement of claim is that the defendants were careless and negligent
in making their report; but the plaintiff was a stranger to them and
to it, and, as no duty rested upon them to him, they can not be guilty
of any negligence of which he can complain: Schiffer v. Sauer Com
pany et al., 238 Pa. 550. This was the correct view of the court below,
and the judgment is accordingly affirmed.”

The decision of the Landell v. Lybrand case that an auditor is
not liable to an investor in the shares of stock of the client corpora
tion for loss resulting from the accountant’s negligent audit is in
agreement with well-settled principles of common law. No case
has ever extended the ambit of negligence to include liability to
third parties in general. However, where two parties make a con
tract expressly for the benefit of a third person, that is, a donee or
creditor beneficiary, the law operates to create a privity between
the promisor and the third party.64 In such circumstances the
promisor would be liable to the third party for the negligent breach
of the contract. The principle is well illustrated by the case of an
abstractor: “Sound reasoning and the weight of modern authority
sustain the rule of liability for negligence resulting in injury to
the vendee, where the vendor is under duty, or assumes the obli
gation, to furnish such abstract for the use of the vendee, and the
person making the abstract on the vendor’s order has knowledge or
notice that the abstract is for such use—this on the ground that
in such circumstances the engagement of the abstractor by the
vendor is a contract made for the benefit of the vendee, and under
such engagement the abstractor owes the vendee, who is to use and
rely on the abstract, the duty of using care and skill in examining
the records affecting the title and making the abstract.” 65 It is
well-settled law that the promisor in a valid contract owes no duty
of care to an incidental beneficiary of the contract. By the great
weight of authority an abstractor is not liable to a third-party
beneficiary of the abstracting contract for negligent preparation of
the abstract, in the absence of a promise by the abstractor to the
vendor of the land to make the abstract for the benefit of the
64Meyerson v. New Idea Hosiery Co., 115 So. 94 (1927); I. P. Hildebrand,
Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties in Texas, 9 Tex. L. R. 125 (1931).
65 Shine v. Nash Abstract & I. Co., 217 Ala. 498, 117 So. 47 (1928).
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third-party vendee.66 The holding of the Landell v. Lybrand case
that a public accountant is not liable to an investor or a creditor
of the client for mere negligence in the audit of the client’s books,
in the absence of a provision in the auditing contract that the
audit be prepared for the investor or creditor, finds ample support
in the more recent case, Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, below.
T he P ublic A ccountant L iable to T hird P arties for F raud

The famous Ultramares case follows the ruling in Landell v.
Lybrand, supra, which denies liability of the public accountant to
third parties for mere negligence and defines the scope of fraud
for which the public accountant may be liable to third parties.
The opinion was delivered in 1931 by Chief Judge Cardozo of the
New York court of appeals. The facts of the case follow: 67
A corporation, Fred Stern & Co., Inc., was engaged in the im
portation and sale of rubber. To carry on its extensive operations
this corporation borrowed large sums of money from banks and
other lenders. To obtain the necessary loans in 1924 the Stern
company employed the defendant auditors, Touche, Niven & Co.,
who had conducted the Stern company’s audits for the three years
prior to 1923, to audit its books for 1923 and to prepare a balancesheet of the Stern company as of the close of that year. The audi
tors performed the audit, prepared a balance-sheet and certified
that the balance-sheet corresponded with the Stern company’s
records and that in their opinion the balance-sheet presented a cor
rect view of the financial condition of the Stern company as of
December 31, 1923. In accordance with agreement, the auditors
furnished the Stern company with thirty-two copies of the certified
balance-sheet; the auditors knew that the copies would be used
to obtain loans; but they did not know, and had no reason to
believe, that the balance-sheet would be used to obtain a loan from
the particular plaintiff, the Ultramares Corporation. However, the
Stern company, with the aid of that balance-sheet, was able to get
a loan of $165,000, only partly secured, from the Ultramares Cor66 Peterson v. Gales, 191 Wis. 137, 210 N. W. 407 (1926).
67 Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, 74 A. L. R. 1139, 255 N. Y. 170, 174
N. E. 441.
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poration. The balance-sheet having been found false and the Stern
company having been declared a bankrupt in 1925, the Ultramares
Corporation brought an action in a trial court of New York in
1926 for negligence and fraud against the defendant auditors to
recover the losses sustained from the loans to the Stern company.
In the trial court the charge of fraud was dismissed before the
jury hearing took place. On the charge of negligence the jury
rendered a verdict for the plaintiff; but the trial judge dismissed
the verdict. The case was appealed to the New York supreme
court, where judgment was given the plaintiff on the basis of negli
gence. The case was then appealed to the New York court of
appeals which denied to the plaintiff judgment on the basis of
negligence and granted a new trial on the ground of fraud.
A statement of the character of the audit which involved the
alleged elements of negligence and fraud is in order. No general
ledger posting had been performed on the Stern company’s books
since April, 1923. The defendant auditors assigned Siess, a junior
member of their staff, to the task of posting journal entries to the
general ledger. Siess finished his posting on Sunday, February 3,
1924. The balance of the accounts-receivable account at that time
was $644,758.17. Later, on that same day, Romberg, an employee
of the Stern company, who had general charge of the Stern com
pany’s records, debited the accounts-receivable account with a new
item of $706,843.07, which represented fictitious sales. Opposite the
entry Romberg placed a folio reference to the journal, but there
was no journal entry to support this charge to accounts receivable.
There were, however, seventeen fictitious sales-invoices designed to
support this new charge to accounts receivable. These sales-invoices
were different from the other sales-invoices; they had no shipping
number and no customer’s order number; they “varied in terms
of credit and in other respects from those usual in the business.”
“A mere glance” would have revealed “the difference.” Siess, think
ing that verification would be made by the staff later, accepted
and included in the balance of accounts receivable this new debit
of $706,843.07, entered by Romberg. It happened that neither the
junior accountant nor any one else of the staff ever investigated
this new charge to accounts receivable.
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In a statement of facts Chief Judge Cardozo of the court of
appeals expressed the opinion that an item of $113,199.60, due from
the Baltic Corporation and charged to accounts payable, ought to
have encited the suspicions of a reasonably prudent and careful
auditor, in view of the unsatisfactory explanations of the item given
by Romberg and Stern. Furthermore, the auditors discovered that
the inventory of $347,219.08 as stated by the Stern company was
overstated to the amount of $303,863.20. Chief Judge Cardozo
thought that the extent of this “discrepancy and its causes might
have been found to cast discredit upon the business and the books.”
Finally, the auditors found that the same accounts receivable “had
been pledged to two, three and four banks at the same time.”
Chief Judge Cardozo was of the opinion that these assignments
cast doubt upon the solvency of the business; he thought that, al
though Romberg made an explanation of the assignments, caution
and diligence required the auditors to press further their investi
gation.
The existence of negligence on the part of the auditors was
found by all the courts concerned with the case. The chief problems
with which the New York court of appeals was concerned had to do
with (1) the extension of the defendants’ liability for negligence to
incidental beneficiaries of the audit contract; (2) the scope and
meaning of fraud. The portions of the lengthy opinion directly in
point follow:
“The defendants owed to their employer a duty imposed by law
to make their certificate without fraud, and a duty growing out of
contract to make it with the care and caution proper to their calling.
Fraud includes the pretense of knowledge when knowledge there is
none. To creditors and investors to whom the employer exhibited
the certificate, the defendants owed a like duty to make it without
fraud, since there was notice in the circumstances of its making that
the employer did not intend to keep it to himself. * * * A different
question develops when we ask whether they owed a duty to these
to make it without negligence. If liability for negligence exists, a
thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to detect a theft or forgery
beneath the cover of deceptive entries may expose accountants to a
liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an
indeterminate class. The hazards of business conducted on these terms
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are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in
the implication of a duty that exposes to these consequences. We put
aside for the moment any statement in the certificate which involves
the representation of a fact as true to the knowledge of the auditors.
If such a statement was made, whether believed to be true or not,
the defendants are liable for deceit in the event that it was false.
The plaintiff does not need the invention of novel doctrine to help
it out in such conditions.
“Even an opinion, especially on opinion by an expert, may be found
to be fraudulent if the grounds supporting it are so flimsy as to lead
to the conclusion that there was no genuine belief back of it. Further
than that this court has never gone.
“Liability for negligence if adjudged in this case will extend to
many callings other than an auditor’s. Lawyers who certify their
opinion as to the validity of municipal or corporate bonds, with
knowledge that the opinion will be brought to the notice of the
public, will become liable to the investors, if they have overlooked
a statute or a decision, to the same extent as if the controversy were
one between client and advisor. Title companies insuring titles to a
tract of land, with knowledge that at an approaching auction the
fact that they have insured will be stated to the bidders, will become
liable to purchasers who may wish the benefit of a policy without
payment of a premium. These illustrations may seem to be extreme,
but they go little, if any, farther than we are invited to go now.
Negligence, moreover, will have one standard when viewed in rela
tion to the public. Explanations that might seem plausible, omissions
that might be reasonable, if the duty is confined to the employer,
conducting a business that presumably at least is not a fraud upon
his creditors, might wear another aspect if an independent duty to
be suspicious even of one’s principal is owing to investors. ‘Every
one making a promise having the quality of a contract will be under
a duty to the promisee by virtue of the promise, but under another
duty, apart from contract, to an indefinite number of potential bene
ficiaries when performance has begun. The assumption of one relation
will mean the involuntary assumption of a series of new relations,
inescapably hooked together.’
“Our holding does not emancipate accountants from the conse
quences of fraud. It does not relieve them if their audit has been so
negligent as to justify a finding that they had no genuine belief in its
adequacy, for this again is fraud. It does no more than say that, if less
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than this is proved, if there has been neither reckless misstatement
nor insincere profession of an opinion, but only honest blunder, the
ensuing liability for negligence is one that is bounded by the con
tract and is to be enforced between the parties by whom the contract
has been made. We doubt whether the average business man receiv
ing a certificate without paying for it, and receiving it merely as one
among a multitude of possible investors, would look for anything
more.
“The defendants certified as a fact, true to their own knowledge,
that the balance-sheet was in accordance with the books of account.
If their statement was false, they are not to be exonerated because
they believed it to be true. Hadcock v. Osmer, 153 N. Y. 604, 47
N. E. 923; Lehigh Zinc
Iron Co. v. Barnford, 150 U. S. 665,
673, 14 S. Ct. 219, 37 L. ed. 1215; Chatham Furnace Co. v. Moffatt,
147 Mass. 403, 18 N. E. 168, 9 Am. St. Rep. 727; Arnold v. Richard
son, 74 App. Div. 581, 77 N. Y. S. 763. We think the triers of the
facts might hold it to be false.
“Correspondence between the balance-sheet and the books imports
something more, or so the triers of the facts might say, than corre
spondence between the balance-sheet and the general ledger, un
supported or even contradicted by every other record. The corre
spondence to be of any moment may not unreasonably be held to
signify a correspondence between the statement and the books of
original entry, the books taken as a whole. If that is what the
certificate means, a jury could find that the correspondence did not
exist, and that the defendants signed the certificates without knowing
it to exist and even without reasonable grounds for belief in its
existence. The item of $706,000, representing fictitious accounts re
ceivable, was entered in the ledger after defendant’s employee, Siess,
had posted the December sales. He knew of the interpolation and
knew that there was need to verify the entry by reference to books
other than the ledger before the books could be found to be in agree
ment with the balance-sheet. The evidence would sustain a finding
that this was never done. By concession the interpolated item had no
support in the journal, or in any journal voucher, or in the debit
memo book, which was a summary of the invoices, or in anything
except the invoices themselves. The defendants do not say that they
ever looked at the invoices, seventeen in number, representing these
accounts. They profess to be unable to recall whether they did so
or not. They admit, however, that, if they had looked, they would
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have found omissions and irregularities so many and unusual as to
have called for further investigation. W hen we couple the refusal
to say that they did look with the admission that, if they had looked,
they would or could have seen, the situation is revealed as one in
which a jury might reasonably find that in truth they did not look
but certified the correspondence without testing its existence.
“In this connection we are to bear in mind the principle already
stated in the course of this opinion that negligence or blindness,
even when not equivalent to fraud, is none the less evidence to sus
tain an inference of fraud. At least this is so if the negligence is
gross. Not a little confusion has at times resulted from an undis
criminating quotation of the statements in Kountze v. Kennedy,
supra, statements proper enough in their setting, but capable of
misleading when extracted and considered by themselves. ‘Misjudg
ment, however gross,’ it was there observed, ‘or want of caution,
however marked, is not fraud.’ This was said in a case where the
trier of the facts had held the defendants guiltless. The judgment
in this court amounted merely to a holding that a finding of fraud
did not follow as an inference of law. There was no holding that the
evidence would have required a reversal of the judgment if the find
ing as to guilt had been the other way. Even Derry v. Peek , as we
have seen, asserts the probative effect of negligence as an evidentiary
fact. We had no thought in Kountze v. Kennedy, of upholding a
doctrine more favorable to wrongdoers, though there was a reservation
suggesting the approval of a rule more rigorous. The opinion of this
court cites Derry v. Peek , and states the holding there made that
an action would not lie if the defendant believed the representation
made by him to be true, although without reasonable cause for such
belief. ‘It is not necessary,’ we said, ‘to go to this extent to uphold
the present judgment, for the referee, as has been stated, found that
the belief of Kennedy * * * was based upon reasonable grounds.’
The setting of the occasion justified the inference that the representa
tions did not involve a profession of knowledge as distinguished
from belief. 147 N . Y. at page 133, 41 N . E. 414, 29 L. R. A. 360,
49 Am. St. Rep. 651. No such charity of construction exonerates
accountants, who by the very nature of their calling profess to speak
with knowledge when certifying to an agreement between the audit
and the entries.
“The defendants attempt to excuse the omission of an inspection
of the invoices proved to be fictitious by invoking a practice known
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as that of testing and sampling. A random choice of accounts is made
from the total number on the books, and these, if found to be regular
when inspected and investigated, are taken as a fair indication of the
quality of the mass. The defendants say that about 200 invoices were
examined in accordance with this practice, but they do not assert
that any of the seventeen invoices supporting the fictitious sales were
among the number so selected. Verification by test and sample was
very likely a sufficient audit as to accounts regularly entered upon the
books in the usual course of business. It was plainly insufficient,
however, as to accounts not entered upon the books where inspection
of the invoices was necessary, not as a check upon accounts fair
upon their face, but in order to ascertain whether there were any
accounts at all. If the only invoices inspected were invoices unrelated
to the interpolated entry, the result was to certify a correspondence
between the books and the balance-sheet without any effort by the
auditors, as to $706,000 of accounts, to ascertain whether the certi
fied agreement was in accordance with the truth. How far books of
account fair upon their face are to be probed by accountants, in an
effort to ascertain whether the transactions back of them are in
accordance with the entries, involves to some extent the exercise of
judgment and discretion. Not so, however, the inquiry whether the
entries certified as there are there in very truth, there in the form
and in the places where men of business training would expect them
to be. The defendants were put on their guard by the circumstances
touching the December accounts receivable to scrutinize with special
care. A jury might find that, with suspicions thus awakened, they
closed their eyes to the obvious and blindly gave assent.
“We conclude, to sum up the situation, that in certifying to the
• correspondence between balance-sheet and accounts the defendants
made a statement as true to their own knowledge, when they had,
as a jury might find, no knowledge on the subject. If that is so, they
may also be found to have acted without information leading to
a sincere or genuine belief when they certified to an opinion that the
balance-sheet faithfully reflected the condition of the business.
“Whatever wrong was committed by the defendants was not their
personal act or omission, but that of their subordinates. This does
not relieve them, however, of liability to answer in damages for the
consequences of the wrong, if wrong there shall be found to be. It
is not a question of constructive notice, as where facts are brought
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home to the knowledge of subordinates whose interests are adverse
to those of the employer.”

Chief Judge Cardozo, after much floundering about, in the
Ultramares case held:
(1) An auditor is liable on the basis of fraud to third parties to
whom the auditor might reasonably have foreseen loss resulting
from the auditor’s misrepresentation in making a positive statement
of facts, even though the auditor believed his statement to be true.
This ruling, however, was made in view of a set of circumstances
from which Chief Judge Cardozo seemed to think that a trier of
facts would be justified in inferring consciousness of misrepre
sentation on the part of the defendant auditor. In Kountze v.
Kennedy, which was reviewed in the Ultramares case, the New
York court of appeals, in circumstances that justified an inference
of innocence on the part of the defendant, held that fraud could
not exist without consciousness of wrongdoing. In all of the four
cases which Chief Judge Cardozo cited to support his proposition
in the case that a public accountant would be liable in an action
for deceit for making an honest but false representation of a
material fact, the defendants had intended that their representation
should be acted upon by the particular plaintiffs. But in the Ultra
mares case the defendant did not know that the plaintiff would
use his audit report. Except for the fact that there must have been
a consciousness of wrongdoing on the part of the defendant auditor,
the Ultramares opinion goes further than other courts have gone
in treating honest misrepresentation as fraud. Courts have uni
formly restricted the application of the rule that fraud may include
innocent but false representations to cases where the defendant had
intended that the representation should be relied upon by the par
ticular plaintiff. While the scope of fraud as thus restricted would
not make the public accountant liable to the world in general for
an honest blunder, yet it would be more logical and satisfactory
to treat innocent but negligent misrepresentations as negligence
rather than as fraud. The subject is fully discussed under the title,
below, “The extension of the ambit of negligence rather than that
of fraud to cover the public accountant’s liability to third parties
for innocent but negligent misrepresentation.”
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(2) The public accountant is not liable to third parties for mere
negligence in making a statement of opinion. This ruling is sound
and should be followed.
(3) The public accountant is liable to third parties on the basis
of fraud for conscious misrepresentation in making a statement of
opinion. Consciousness of misrepresentation may be inferred if the
grounds supporting the opinion are so flimsy as to lead to the con
clusion that there was no genuine belief back of the opinion. This
ruling is also based upon sound principles. It is in agreement with
the conservative interpretation of the meaning of fraud as laid down
by the famous English case, Derry v. Peek.68 A full discussion of
the subject appears under the topic, below, “Meaning of fraud.”
L iability

of the

P ublic A ccountant

to

T hird P arties

for

M is

representation UNDER THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES A cT

The United States securities act of 1933, as amended in 1934, has
made the public accountant liable to third parties for both negli
gence and fraud.
Under this act no “person” is allowed to use the mails or inter
state transportation facilities to sell a security unless the security is
properly registered with the securities and exchange commission,
or exempted from registration by the act. In regard to the civil
liabilities of the accountant who prepares or certifies the financial
statements of the “issuer” for the purposes of registration with the
commission, a number of sections of the securities act of 1933, as
amended in 1934, are relevant. These sections follow:
“Sec. 2. W hen used in this title, unless the context otherwise
requires—
“ (1) The term ‘security’ means any note, stock, treasury stock,
bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or
participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certifi
cate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share,
investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for
a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas or other mineral
rights or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a
‘security’, or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary
68 14 App. Cas. 117 (1889).
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or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of or warrant or right
to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
“(2) The term ‘person’ means an individual, a corporation, a part
nership, an association, a joint-stock company, a trust, any unincor
porated organization, or a government or political subdivision thereof.
As used in this paragraph the term ‘trust’ shall include only a trust
where the interest or interests of the beneficiary or beneficiaries are
evidenced by a security.
“(3) The term ‘sale’, ‘sell’, ‘offer to sell’, or ‘offer for sale’ shall
include every contract of sale or disposition of, attempt or offer to
dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy a security or interest
in a security, for value; except that such terms shall not include
preliminary negotiations or agreements between an issuer and any
underwriter. * * *
“(4) The term ‘issuer’ means every person who issues or proposes
to issue any security; except that with respect to certificates of de
posit, voting-trust certificates or collateral-trust certificates, or with
respect to certificates of interest or shares in an unincorporated in
vestment trust not having a board of directors (or persons perform
ing similar functions) or of the fixed, restricted management or unit
type; the term ‘issuer’ means the person or persons performing the acts
and assuming the duties of depositor or manager pursuant to the
provisions of the trust or other agreement or instrument under which
such securities are issued; except that in the case of an unincorporated
association which provides by its articles for limited liability of any
or all of its members, or in the case of a trust, committee or other
legal entity, the trustees or members thereof shall not be individually
liable as issuers of any security issued by the association, trust, com
mittee or other legal entity; except that with respect to equipmenttrust certificates or like securities, the term ‘issuer’ means the person
by whom the equipment or property is or is to be used; and except
that with respect to fractional undivided interests in oil, gas or other
mineral rights, the term ‘issuer’ means the owner of any such right or
of any interest in such right (whether whole or fractional) who
creates fractional interests therein for the purpose of public offering.
“Sec. 7. * * * If any accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or any
person whose profession gives authority to a statement made by him,
is named as having prepared or certified any part of the registration
statement, the written consent of such person shall be filed with the
registration statement. If any such person is named as having prepared
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or certified a report or valuation (other than a public official docu
ment or statement) which is used in connection with the registration
statement, but is not named as having prepared or certified such report
or valuation for use in connection with the registration statement,
the written consent of such person shall be filed with the registration
statement unless the commission dispenses with such filing as im
practicable or as involving undue hardship on the person filing the
registration statement. * * *
“Sec. 8 (a) The effective date of a registration statement shall be
the twentieth day after the filing thereof, except as hereinafter pro
vided, and except that in case of securities of any foreign public
authority, which has continued the full service of its obligations in
the United States, the proceeds of which are to be devoted to the
refunding of obligations payable in the United States, the registra
tion statement shall become effective seven days after the filing
thereof. If any amendment to any such statement is filed prior to the
effective date of such statement, the registration statement shall be
deemed to have been filed when such amendment was filed; except
that an amendment filed with the consent of the commission, prior
to the effective date of the registration statement, or filed pursuant
to an order of the commission, shall be treated as a part of the regis
tration statement.
“Sec. 11. (a) In case any part of the registration statement, when
such part became effective, contained an untrue statement of a
material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated
therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading,
any person acquiring such security (unless it is proved that at the time
of such acquisition he knew of such untruth or omission) may, either
at law or in equity, in any court of competent jurisdiction, sue—
“(1) every person who signed the registration statement;
“ (2) every person who was a director of (or person performing
similar functions) or partner in the issuer at the time of the filing of
the part of the registration statement with respect to which his
liability is asserted;
“(3) every person who, with his consent, is named in the registra
tion statement as being or about to become a director, person per
forming similar functions or partner;
“ (4) every accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or any person whose
profession gives authority to a statement made by him, who has with
his consent been named as having prepared or certified any part of
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the registration statement, or as having prepared or certified any
report or valuation which is used in connection with the registration
statement, with respect to the statement in such registration state
ment, report or valuation, which purports to have been prepared or
certified by him;
“(5) every underwriter with respect to such security. If such person
acquired the security after the issuer has made generally available to
its security holders an earnings statement covering a period of at least
twelve months beginning after the effective date of the registration
statement, then the right of recovery under this subsection shall be
conditioned on proof that such person acquired the security relying
upon such untrue statement in the registration statement or relying
upon the registration statement and not knowing of such omission,
but such reliance may be established without proof of the reading of
the registration statement by such person.
“ (b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) no person,
other than the issuer, shall be liable as provided therein who shall
sustain the burden of proof—
“(1) that before the effective date of the part of the registration
statement with respect to which his liability is asserted (A ) he had
resigned from or had taken such steps as are permitted by law to
resign from, or ceased or refused to act in every office, capacity or
relationship in which he was described in the registration statement
as acting or agreeing to act, and (B) he had advised the commission
and the issuer in writing that he had taken such action and that he
would not be responsible for such part of the registration statement;
or
“(2) that if such part of the registration statement became effective
without his knowledge, upon becoming aware of such fact he forth
with acted and advised the commission, in accordance with para
graph (1), and, in addition, gave reasonable public notice that such
part of the registration statement had become effective without his
knowledge; or
“ (3) that * * * (B ) as regards any part of the registration state
ment purporting to be made upon his authority as an expert or
purporting to be a copy of or extract from a report or valuation of
himself as an expert, (i) he had, after reasonable investigation,
reasonable ground to believe and did believe, at the time such part of
the registration statement became effective, that the statements therein
were true and that there was no omission to state a material fact
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required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements
therein not misleading, or (ii) such part of the registration statement
did not fairly represent his statement as an expert or was not a fair
copy of or extract from his report or valuation as an expert; and
(C ) as regards any part of the registration statement purporting to
be made on the authority of an expert (other than himself) or pur
porting to be a copy of or extract from a report or valuation of an
expert (other than himself), he had no reasonable ground to believe
and did not believe, at the time such part of the registration state
ment became effective, that the statements therein were untrue or that
there was an omission to state a material fact required to be stated
therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading,
or that such part of the registration statement did not fairly represent
the statement of the expert or was not a fair copy of or extract from
the report or valuation of the expert; * * *
“(c) In determining, for the purpose of paragraph (3) of sub
section (b) of this section, what constitutes reasonable investigation
and reasonable ground for belief, the standard of reasonableness shall
be that required of a prudent man in the management of his own
property. * * *
“(e) The suit authorized under subsection (a) may be to recover
such damages as shall represent the difference between the amount
paid for the security (not exceeding the price at which the security
was offered to the public) and (1) the value thereof as of the time
such suit was brought, or (2) the price at which such security shall
have been disposed of in the market before suit, or (3) the price at
which such security shall have been disposed of after suit but before
judgment if such damages shall be less than the damages representing
the difference between the amount paid for the security (not exceed
ing the price at which the security was offered to the public) and the
value thereof as of the time such suit was brought: provided that, if
the defendant proves that any portion or all of such damages repre
sents other than the depreciation in value of such security resulting
from such part of the registration statement, with respect to which
his liability is asserted, not being true or omitting to state a material
fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements
therein not misleading, such portion of or all such damages shall not
be recoverable. * * *
“ (f) All or any one or more of the persons specified in subsection
(a) shall be jointly and severally liable, and every person who becomes
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liable to make any payment under this section may recover contribu
tion as in cases of contract from any person who, if sued separately,
would have been liable to make the same payment, unless the person
who has become liable was, and the other was not, guilty of fraud
ulent misrepresentation.
“ (g) In no case shall the amount recoverable under this section
exceed the price at which the security was offered to the public.
“Sec. 13. No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability
created under section 11 * * * unless brought within one year after
the discovery of the untrue statement or the omission, or after such
discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable dili
gence. * * * In no event shall any such action be brought to enforce
a liability created under section 11 * * * more than three years after
the security was, bona fide, offered to the public, * * *.
“Sec. 14. Any condition, stipulation or provision binding any per
son acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of
this title or of the rules and regulations of the commission shall be
void.
“Sec. 16. The rights and remedies provided by this title shall be in
addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at
law or in equity.
“Sec. 19. (a) * * * No provision of this title imposing any liabil
ity shall apply to any act done or omitted in good faith in conformity
with any rule or regulation of the commission, notwithstanding that
such rule or regulation may, after such act or omission, be amended
or rescinded or be determined by judicial or other authority to be
invalid for any reason.”

Under the securities act every issuer of securities must have filed
a registration statement of his business before any “person” can
use the mails or interstate commerce facilities to effect the sale of
such securities. Among other data the registration statement must
contain statements of the financial condition of the issuer. If the
registration statement names an accountant as having prepared or
certified the financial statements (balance-sheet and profit-and-loss
statement) of the issuer for registration purposes, the written con
sent of the accountant for the issuer or other person so to use the
financial statements must be filed with the securities and exchange
commission; but if the registration statement does not name the
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accountant as having prepared or certified the financial statements
of the issuer for registration purposes, then the commission may
dispense with the filing of the written consent of the accountant
so to use the financial statements where such filing would be im
practicable or work hardship upon the person filing the registration
statement. The rights and obligations arising out of the act do not
become effective until the lapse of twenty days after the proper
filing of the registration statement.
If an investor purchases a security after the effective date of the
registration of such security, he may bring suit against the account
ant for misrepresentation of any material fact in the financial state
ments used in the registration statement. The investor may sue the
accountant upon showing a misrepresentation of a material fact in
the accountant’s financial statements used in registration and evi
dence of having purchased the security after the effective date of
registration. Of course, to recover, the investor must prove loss;
but he need not prove that the loss resulted from the misrepre
sentation, nor need he prove that he relied upon the misrepresenta
tion unless he bought the security after the issuer made generally
available to security holders financial statements of the issuer’s
business as of a year or more subsequent to the effective date of
the registration.
The accountant will be liable to the investor provided the investor
establishes his cause of action in the manner indicated above unless
the accountant sustains the burden of proving one of the following
defenses:
(1) Prior to the effective date of registration the accountant gave
written notice to the commission that he would not be responsible
for financial statements filed with his client’s registration statement.
(2) Where the accountant’s financial statements became effective
with his client’s registration statement, without the accountant’s
knowledge, upon learning the fact the accountant forthwith re
quested the commission to withdraw his authority for the accuracy
of the statements and gave reasonable publication that the financial
statements became effective without his knowledge.
(3) The accountant had, after reasonable investigation, reason
able ground to believe and did believe, at the time his accounting
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statements became an effective part of the registration statement,
that such accounting statements were true, that there was no omis
sion to state a material fact required to be stated therein or neces
sary to make the statements not misleading.
(4) The financial statements filed with the commission were not
fair copies of the financial reports which the accountant prepared
or certified for his client.
(5) Where the accountant’s false representation, contained in his
client’s registration statement, purported to have been accepted
from an expert other than himself, the accountant had no reason
able ground to believe and did not believe, at the time his repre
sentation became an effective part of the issuer’s registration state
ment, that the representation of the expert was untrue.
(6) The investor knew the falsity of the accountant’s representa
tion at the time the investor bought the security.
(7) The action to enforce liability under the act was sought
more than a year after the investor learned, or could have learned
with the exercise of reasonable diligence, that the accountant had
misrepresented the financial condition of the issuer’s business.
(8) The action to enforce liability under the act was brought
more than three years after the security was offered for sale to the
public, that is, more than three years after the security was offered
for sale to the public in accordance with the provisions of the act.
(9) In making the misrepresentation the accountant acted in
good faith in conformity with some rule or regulation of the com
mission even though such rule or regulation was, after the effective
date of the misrepresentation, declared invalid by judicial authority
or was amended by congress.
(10) The investor’s loss resulted from causes other than the
accountant’s misrepresentation. If the accountant can prove that the
loss complained of was due partly to causes other than the account
ant’s misrepresentation, then the accountant’s liability will be
mitigated to the extent of such portion of the investor’s loss as was
due to causes other than the accountant’s misrepresentation.
If the accountant should become liable under the act, he could
recover contribution from any other person who might also be
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liable for the same loss under the act, unless the accountant had
been guilty of fraud and such other person had not.
The amount of recovery provided by the act may be the differ
ence between the price paid for the security (in no case greater
than the price at which the security was offered to the public) and
(1) the value of the security at the time the suit was brought, or
(2) the price at which the security was sold before the commence
ment of the suit, or (3) the price at which the security was sold
after suit but before judgment, if such damage is less than the
difference between the purchase price (not exceeding the price at
which the security was offered to the public) and the value at the
time of the bringing of the suit. The recovery that may be obtained
under this act is in addition to any and all other recoveries which
may be obtained at law or in equity.
To supplement the main provisions of the act relative to the
liabilities of accountants, some comments upon these provisions
are appropriate:
The requirement that the accountant’s statements should present
the true financial condition of the business on the effective date,
twenty days after such statements have been filed with the com
mission, clearly should not be enforced literally. The accountant’s
responsibility should be as of the time he certified to the financial
condition of the issuer.
The meaning of a misrepresentation of a material fact as con
templated by the act deserves consideration. The American Law
Institute in its Restatement of the Law of Contracts has stated that:
“where a misrepresentation would be likely to affect the conduct
of a reasonable man with reference to a transaction with another
person, the misrepresentation is material.” 69
In regard to the defenses that may be established under section
II (b) it should be noted that the act casts the burden of proof
upon the defendant, contrary to the usual court procedure in tort
actions. In tort cases at common law the plaintiff in order to estab
lish his cause of action must, ordinarily, prove that the defendant’s
tortious conduct was the direct cause of the plaintiff’s loss. This
69 Spencer Gordon, “Accountants and the Securities Act,” The Journal of Account
ancy, New York, 1933, volume 56, p. 440.

L iability

for

N egligence, F raud

and

L ibel

85

common-law rule guards against oppression in litigation. It is much
more difficult to prove a cause of action than it is to defend alleged
charges, the amount of evidence available and the other conditions
of proof for the litigants being equal. The act should place upon the
plaintiff investor the burden of proving his cause of action against
the accountant. In other words, the investor should be required to
prove that the negligent or fraudulent conduct of the accountant
was the direct cause of the investor’s loss before the investor would
be permitted to obtain judgment against the accountant.
As to the dependence of the accountant’s liability upon the
reasonableness of his conduct, it should be noted that the reason
ableness of a prudent man in the management of his own property
is the standard set by the act. The law would have been more
definite in respect to the care and skill required of the accountant
had the framers of the act stated that the defendant accountant
must have exercised such reasonableness of conduct as a reasonably
skillful accountant would have exercised if such accountant had
made the financial statements for his own use in purchasing the
security.
In providing for the liabilities of accountants and other persons,
the act makes no distinction between negligence and fraud, except
in the case of one defendant recovering contribution from another
person who might have been liable for the same loss under the act.
Either negligence or fraud, or both, may be involved in the
liabilities provided in the act. There are inherent differences between
the two kinds of causes of action, which an act should recognize.
Fraud involves consciousness of misrepresentation and renders the
defendant liable for injury to any one of that class of persons
(investors) whom, the defendant intended, should, and did, rely
upon his misrepresentations; while negligence merely involves
innocent but unreasonable conduct and makes the defendant liable
for injury only to such plaintiffs as those to whom he owed a duty
of care. The law should require the accountant to state as a matter
of fact whether or not the balance-sheet and profit-and-loss state
ment show the true and correct financial position of the issuer’s
business on the date when the accountant gave his written consent
to have his financial statements used with the registration statement.
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The law should make the accountant liable on the basis of fraud
for conscious misrepresentation in the financial statements of the
issuer to any investor who, as a result of reliance upon such mis
representation, sustained losses from the purchase of a security of
the issuer. Only where the accountant intended that particular
security purchasers should rely upon his statements and where such
investors did rely upon his statements to their loss in the purchase
of securities of the issuer should the law make the accountant liable
to the investors on the basis of negligence for losses resulting from
the accountant’s innocent but negligent misrepresentation of the
financial condition of the issuer’s business. If these changes in
the statute were made, an honest blunder would not render the
accountant liable to that host of investors who, as a result of reli
ance upon the accountant’s misrepresentation, happened to sustain
losses from the purchase of securities. For a detailed discussion of
the essential differences in fraud and negligence, see: “Extension of
the ambit of negligence rather than that of fraud to cover the
accountant’s liability for innocent but negligent misrepresentation,”
below.
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Under the United States securities exchange act of 1934, designed
to control the organized security exchanges of the country, securities
can not be bought and sold in such markets without the proper
registration of the issuer with the securities and exchange commis
sion. Among other data required in such registration are balancesheets and profit-and-loss statements of the issuer. The accountant
who prepares or certifies the accuracy of such balance-sheets and
profit-and-loss statements may be held liable under the act to
investors who sustain losses from fraudulent misrepresentation in
such statements. A portion of the act follows:
“Sec. 18. (a) Any person who shall make or cause to be made
any statement in any application, report or document filed pursuant
to this title or any rule or regulation thereunder, which statement was
at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it was
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made false or misleading with respect to any material fact, shall be
liable to any person (not knowing that such statement was false or
misleading) who, in reliance upon such statement, shall have pur
chased or sold a security at a price which was affected by such state
ment, for damages caused by such reliance, unless the person sued
shall prove that he acted in good faith and had no knowledge that
such statement was false or misleading. A person seeking to enforce
such liability may sue at law or in equity in any court of competent
jurisdiction. In any such suit the court may, in its discretion, require
an undertaking for the payment of the costs of such suit and assess
reasonable costs, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, against either
party litigant.
“ (b) Every person who becomes liable to make payment under this
section may recover contribution as in cases of contract from any
person who, if joined in the original suit, would have been liable to
make the same payment.
“(c) No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created
under this section unless brought within one year after the discovery
of the facts constituting the cause of action and within three years
after such cause of action accrued.”

From the context of section 18 of the securities exchange act, it
appears that in order for an investor to maintain an action against
an accountant for misrepresentation of a material fact in the finan
cial statements of the issuer of securities traded on a national
exchange, the investor in the security would have to prove that the
accountant’s statements were false or misleading at the time and in
the light of the circumstances in which they were made and that
the investor’s loss was the result of such misrepresentation. The
accountant may defeat the suit by proving that he acted in good
faith and had no knowledge of the falsity of the statement, that is,
that he was not guilty of fraud. The accountant might have been
negligent, but as long as he was not conscious of misrepresentation
he would not be liable under the securities exchange act of 1934.
Furthermore, the accountant could set up an effective defense by
showing that the action was not brought before the lapse of a year
after discovery of the cause of action, or that the action was not
brought within three years after the cause of action arose. The
accountant’s liability for damages may be mitigated through re
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covery from other persons liable for the same loss under the act—
that is, if the accountant has been required to pay the whole
damage, he can recover contribution from such other persons as
would be liable for the same loss under the act. In respect to the
liability of the accountant to investors for conscious misrepresenta
tion the securities exchange act appears to be just.
VI
EXTENSION OF T H E AMBIT OF NEGLIGENCE RATHER
T H A N T H A T OF FRAUD TO COVER T H E PUBLIC
ACCOUNTANT’S LIABILITY TO TH IR D PARTIES
FOR IN NO CEN T BUT NEGLIGENT
MISREPRESENTATION
M eaning of F raud

In 1887 the supreme court of the United States gave a definition
of fraud, which is in agreement with the usual meaning attached
to the word by both eminent legal authority and laymen: “In order
to establish a charge of this character the complainant must show,
by clear and decisive proof, first, that the defendant has made a
representation in regard to a material fact; secondly, that such
representation is false; thirdly, that such representation was not
actually believed by the defendant, on reasonable grounds, to be
true; fourthly, that it was made with intent that it should be acted
on; fifthly, that it was acted on by complainant to his damage;
and, sixthly, that in so acting on it the complainant was ignorant
of its falsity and reasonably believed it to be true.” 70 There have
been deviations from the conception of fraud as set forth in this
decision of the supreme court of the United States. In fact, the
majority of American courts do not adhere strictly to this definition
of fraud. The deviations in which the public accountant is par
ticularly concerned involve the knowledge or consciousness of
wrong on the part of the defendant. The majority opinion in
America has taken the view that fraud may exist where there is no
70 Southern Development Co. v . Silva, 125 U. S. 247, 8 S. C. Rep. 881, 31
L. Ed. 678. For a discussion of the nature of negligence, see page 4, ante.
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consciousness of wrong on the part of the defendant, as where the
defendant has made an innocent but negligent misrepresentation.
A number of decisions have gone so far as to hold that fraud may
exist, not only in the absence of knowledge of wrongdoing, but
also in the absence of negligence, on the part of the defendant.
According to this theory, mere innocent misrepresentation may
amount to fraud. It is worth while to devote detailed attention to
these three views of fraud which will be considered in reverse
order.
A substantial number of cases has adopted the view that an
action for deceit for misrepresentation may be upheld where the
misrepresentation involved no negligence or dishonesty on the part
of the defendant. A few excerpts from some of these opinions will
help in forming an understanding of this concept of fraud. The
supreme court of Massachusetts in speaking of an action for deceit
in representing a horse to be sound held: 71
“It is not always necessary to prove that the defendant knew that
the facts stated by him were false. If he states, as of his own knowl
edge, material facts susceptible of knowledge, which are false, it is
fraud which renders him liable to the party who relies and acts upon
the statement as true, and it is no defense that he believed the facts to
be true. The falsity and fraud consists in representing that he knows
the facts to be true, of his own knowledge, when he has not such
knowledge.”

Then, again the Massachusetts supreme court held: 72
“The fraud consists in stating that the party knows the thing to
exist when he does not know it to exist; and if he does not know it to
exist, he must ordinarily be deemed to know that he does not. Forget
fulness of its existence after a former knowledge, or a mere belief of
its existence, will not warrant or excuse a statement of actual knowl
edge.”

The same court, in a later decision, held: 73
“Due diligence to ascertain the truth in regard to statements made
as of matters of fact within one’s own knowledge is not enough to
71 Litchfield v. Hutchinson, 117 Mass. 195.
72 Chatham Furnace Co. v. Moffatt, 147 Mass. 403.

73 Huntress v. Blodgett, 206 Mass. 318.
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relieve the maker of them of liability if they are false and relied upon
as true, and the person to whom they are made suffers loss thereby.”

The supreme court of Michigan held: 74
“That the doctrine is settled here, by a long line of cases, that if
there was in fact a misrepresentation, though made innocently, and its
deceptive influence was effective, the consequences to the plaintiff
being as serious as though it had proceeded from a vicious purpose,
he would have a right of action for the damages caused thereby either
at law or in equity.”

Many other American decisions have gone as far or nearly as
far as the above cases in holding a defendant liable, irrespective of
good or bad faith, for making a positive false statement as to which
he had special means of knowledge.75 The doctrine set forth in
these cases has been limited “to cover only cases where the profit
of the misrepresentation inures to the benefit of the defendant, or he
is a party to a contract with the plaintiff induced by the misrepre
sentation.” 76 In all of these cases the circumstances were such that
it could reasonably be inferred that the defendant, though he did
not intend to deceive, must have intended that his representation
should be relied upon by the plaintiff. According to Professor
Bohlen, those courts which have treated honest and careful state
ments of fact capable of knowledge as fraud have created a new
type of warranty but have erred in calling the cause of action fraud
and in allowing action for deceit to give warrantual effect to such
statements.77
Incidentally, it may be said that public accountants, like other
professional men, are not insurers of the accuracy of their work.
In the absence of negligence in making the audit and in preparing
the audit reports the public accountant would not be liable for
making an innocent misrepresentation in regard to the financial
74 Holcombe v. Noble, 69 Mich. 396.
75 Samuel Williston, “Liability for Honest Misrepresentation,” 24 Harvard Law
Review, 1910-1911, p. 429; Harry M. Harrington, “Torts— Liability for Negligent
Language,” 12 Texas Law Review, Dec., 1933, p. 67.
76 Samuel Williston, “Liability for Honest Misrepresentation,” 24 Harvard Law
Review, 1910-1911, p. 429.
77 F. H. Bohlen, “Should Negligent Misrepresentation be Treated as Negligence or
Fraud?” 18 Virginia Law Review 704, 1932.
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condition of his client’s business, unless, of course, he had expressly
stated in the auditing contract that he would guarantee the accuracy
of his work.
Some other courts have rejected the idea of treating a breach of
warranty as fraud, but have held that negligent, though innocent,
misrepresentation constitutes fraud. In 1903 the supreme court of
Nebraska held: 78
“We think, however, that the authorities are uniform in holding
that an action of deceit is an action separate and distinct in its nature
from an action for breach of warranty, and that it lies in cases where
there is a warranty as well as where there is none.
“We do not think that it is necessary to show actual knowledge
of a false representation by the defendant to sustain an action for
deceit, if the representations were actually false, and induced the
contract, and were relied upon by plaintiff, to his damage, as being
true. Under such conditions, defendants can not excuse themselves by
simply showing that they did not actually know the representations to
be false, for it was their duty to know them to be true before making
them.”

A decision similar to this was rendered in 1932 by the supreme
court of Texas.79 In that case the defendant was a banker and an
expert in verifying signatures. The defendant verified to the
plaintiff a signature on a note owned by the banker’s customer and
thus induced the plaintiff to purchase the note. At the time of the
transaction the defendant concealed from the plaintiff the fact that
the defendant received from the seller of the note $450 for securing
its sale. A portion of the opinion reads:
“The testimony brings him under another well settled rule, which
is more exacting, that an expert’s opinion as to a matter susceptible
of knowledge is regarded as a statement of fact, upon which reliance
may properly be placed and, if it is made scienter, that is, either with
knowledge of its falsity or in culpable ignorance of its truth, consti
tutes remediable fraud. * * * The rule is further well established in
this state that, where affirmative representations of fact are made
78 Hitchcock v. Gothenburg Water Power & Irr. Co., 4 Nebr. (unoff.) 620, 95
N . W . 638. See also Palmer v. Goldberg, 128 Wis. 103, 107 N . W . 478 (1906).
79 Wilson v. Jones, 45 S. W. (2d) 572.
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and designed to be acted upon by another and he does so believing
them to be true when they are false, one making the representations
is liable, regardless of his knowledge of falsity or intent to deceive.”

In these two cases, as in the other cases of this type, the defendant
had no knowledge of the falsity of his representations. He was
negligent; but he had no intention to deceive; he merely intended
that his representations should be trusted. The facts of these two
cases are typical of this class of cases. If the public accountant should
be held liable on the basis of fraud for innocent but negligent mis
representation, the holding doubtless would be limited to cases in
which the defendant had intended that his statements should be
relied upon by the particular plaintiff.
A few decisions in America have followed more closely than do
the above cases the English rule which restricts fraud to conscious
misrepresentation. New York, New Hampshire and Minnesota
courts have rendered a number of decisions in which the inherent
differences between fraud and negligence were clearly understood.80
In 1895 the New York court of appeals in the case of Kountze v.
Kennedy held: 81
“The principle has been obscured by the use by judges of the
phrase ‘legal fraud’, which has sometimes been interpreted as meaning
fraud by construction, and as indicating that something less than
actual fraud may sustain an action for deceit. The gravamen of the
action is actual fraud, and nothing less will sustain it. The represen
tation upon which it is based must be shown not only to have been
false and material, but that the defendant, when he made it, knew
that it was false, or, not knowing whether it was true or false, and
not caring what the fact might be, made it recklessly, paying no heed
to the injury which might ensue. Misjudgment, however gross, or
want of caution, however marked, is not fraud. Intentional fraud,
as distinguished from a mere breach of duty or the omission to use
due care, is an essential factor in an action for deceit. The man who
intentionally deceives another to his injury should be legally responsi
ble for the consequences. But if, through inattention, want of judg
ment, reliance upon information which a wiser man might not credit,
80 Harry M. Harrington, “Torts— Liability for Negligent Language,” 12 Texas
Law Review 67 (1933).
81147 N. Y. 124, 41 N. E. 414, 29 L. R. A. 360, 49 Am. St. Rep. 651.
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misconception of the facts or of his moral obligation to inquire, he
makes a representation designed to influence the conduct of another,
and upon which the other acts to his prejudice, yet, if the mis
representation was honestly made, believing it to be true, whatever
other liability he may incur he can not be made liable in an action
for deceit.”

In the Ultramares case, supra, Chief Judge Cardozo said in re
spect to the public accountant’s liability for fraud in the account
ant’s statement of opinion:
“Fraud includes the pretense of knowledge when knowledge there
is none. * * * Even an opinion, especially an opinion by an expert,
may be found to be fraudulent if the grounds supporting it are so
flimsy as to lead to the conclusion that there was no genuine belief
back of it. Further than that this court has never gone. * * * Our
holding does not emancipate accountants from the consequences of
fraud. It does not relieve them if their audit has been so negligent as
to justify a finding that they had no genuine belief in its adequacy,
for this again is fraud.”

Actual fraud is made of sterner stuff than an innocent misrepre
sentation negligently rendered. Lord Herschell in Derry v. Peek 82
held that a statement made “recklessly, careless whether it be true
or false,” is fraudulent. In Derry v. Peek and many other cases
conscious dishonesty is prerequisite to fraud.83 To the average
lawyer as well as to the layman the word fraud connotes conscious
ness of the falsity of representation or the lack of genuine belief in
the truth of a representation. If a person says he knows a state
ment is true when he merely believes that it is probably true, he
has not the sort of belief which would remove his case from the
realm of consciousness of false representation.84
If the scope of fraud be held to include innocent negligence, the
decisions would run counter to logic and the common understand
ing of the mass of mankind as to the meaning of fraud. It would
also follow that an accountant’s liability to third parties for negli82 14 App. Cas. 337.
83 Samuel Williston, “Liability for Honest Misrepresentation,” 24 Harvard Law
Review 430.
84 F. H. Bohlen, “Should Negligent Misrepresentation Be Treated as Negligence
or Fraud?” 18 Virginia Law Review 706, 712 (1932).
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gence in rendering service which results in gratuitous statements
to third parties would be treated like that arising from negligence
in the course of service performed for compensation, for, if the
defendant be guilty of fraud, it is immaterial whether the service
be gratuitous or for compensation. And finally, if the third party’s
action against the defendant public accountant for mere negligence
be treated as fraud, the defense of contributory negligence on the
part of the third party plaintiff will not be available to the defend
ant, for contributory negligence is never allowed as a defense where
the defendant is guilty of fraud.
T h e N egligence F ormula
A ccountant ’s L iability

to

as a
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If the ambit of the liability for mere negligence be extended so
as to make the public accountant responsible to third parties, it
will be necessary to define the limits of such liability; and unless
some limitation be placed upon such liability, an honest blunder on
the part of the public accountant might subject him to liability to
an indeterminate number of third persons. No such onerous burden
should be imposed by the courts so long as the public accountant’s
fees remain anything like as low as they are today. The public
accountant’s liability for mere negligence might well be limited to
those third persons who, the public accountant knows, will use his
statements as a basis for entering upon transactions with his client.
Furthermore, it would seem fair for the courts to require on the
part of the public accountant a less degree of care in rendering
gratuitous service to third parties than that owed to his client who
pays for the accountant’s service. And finally, the public accountant
would have available the defense of contributory negligence.
No case has ever extended the ambit of negligence so as to make
the promisor of a contract liable to third parties in general, i. e., to
incidental beneficiaries of the contract. The New York court of
appeals has rendered two decisions which tend in that direction.
Glanzer v. Shepard,85 the first of these two cases, was reviewed in
the Ultramares opinion. In that case the defendant, a public weigher,
85 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275 (1922).
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had agreed with the seller of beans to weigh the beans and render
certified copies of weights to both the seller and buyer. The seller
paid for the service. The public weigher was negligent in the
performance of his undertaking; and as a result of such negligence
the buyer sustained losses. In an action brought by the buyer
against the public weigher the court held the defendant liable for
negligence. There was almost a contractual relation between the
defendant and the third-party buyer of beans. Though the services
were paid for by the seller, they were for the benefit of both seller
and buyer. Furthermore, the defendant intended that his repre
sentations should be relied upon by the particular plaintiff. This
holding certainly restricts the defendant’s liability for an honest
blunder in making a positive statement of fact to a determinate lot
of third parties. If the public accountant’s liability for negligence
in making positive statements of fact be limited to third parties
who, the accountant intended, should use and did use the false
statements, such liability would not exceed that imposed upon the
public weigher in the Glanzer v. Shepard case.
In the other case, the Celotex Company, a manufacturer of
insulating material for hot and cold air ducts, negligently made
false representations to some engineers that the celotex material
was fit for insulating hot and cold air ducts. The engineers bought
some of the celotex material from a middleman and used it in the
reconstruction of a heating system for the owner of a house. The
engineers represented to the house owner that the material was fit
for use in the reconstruction. Due to defects in the heating system
as reconstructed by the engineers the house burned; and the owner
brought suit against the engineers for negligently recommending
the use of celotex material in his heating system. The defendant
engineers made a motion to bring in as party defendant, and to
take judgment over against, the Celotex Company. While the court
refused to take judgment over against the Celotex Company, under
a New York statute designed to prevent circuity of action, because
of the lack of identity of the Celotex Company’s representations
and those of the engineers, the court did rule that the Celotex
Company would be liable to the engineers for the loss resulting
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from the false representations of the Celotex Company. The most
significant portions of the opinion follow: 86
“* * * In other words, the only representations made by the
Celotex Company were that ‘celotex’ was an insulating material fit
for the covering of hot air and cold air ducts and was better than
other insulating materials. The defendants (engineers) do not say
that ‘celotex’ was recommended to them as fit for insulating the ducts
and pipes designed and planned by these engineers. The complaint
says that the engineers claimed that ‘celotex’ was not inflammable and
was an adequate insulator for hot air ducts and pipes as planned and
designed by them. * * *
“* * * There is no claim in this complaint that the ‘celotex’ manu
factured by the company was defective or improperly manufactured
or inherently dangerous. The cause of action, if any, is rather based
upon the recent doctrine of negligence in the spoken word and liability
for carelessness in making statements upon which others were ex
pected to rely and upon which they did act to their damage. A negli
gent statement may be the basis for recovery of damage. * * *
“The recommendations relied upon by the defendants in this case
do not amount to warranties, as there was no sale. No purchases
were made of the Celotex Company by the defendants or their agents.
Therefore, any express or implied warranty is not in the case. The
utmost that has been pleaded are recommendations or representations,
statements, carelessly and negligently made, upon which recommenda
tions the engineer defendants acted, it is said, to their loss. We think
that if the Celotex Company recommended to the engineers ‘celotex’
as a fit and proper covering for the duct and pipes as used and
planned for the plaintiff’s house in New Jersey, or for such a like or
similar use, and the defendants acted upon the representations and
statements, and will suffer damage in consequence, that then the
Celotex Company may be liable for its careless and negligent words
and representations, if, in fact, they are false and untrue.”

In the Nichols case the misrepresentations were spoken directly
to the ones injured (the engineers); hence, the court did not de
termine the manufacturer’s liability, if any, to parties to whom
such misrepresentations might be repeated by the engineers. There
was no contractual relation between the engineers and the Celotex
86 Nichols v. Clark, MacMullen & Riley, 261 N. Y. 118, 184 N. E. 729 (1933).
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Company; but the Celotex Company intended that the engineers
should rely upon its negligent representations, and the Celotex
Company expected that it would be benefited, as it was, through
increased sales from the representations. It would seem that the
Celotex Company’s liability would not have been different had it
made those same representations in writing and handed the writing
to a dealer of the celotex material with the intention that the dealer
should give the writing to the particular engineers in order to get
the engineers to rely upon the representations and purchase celotex
material, as the engineers did. This last situation would be anal
ogous to the case where an accountant sent his negligent audit
report to his client with the intention that the client should give
the report to a particular third person in order that the third person
might use the report. In this case the auditor would not only have
intended that the third person should rely upon his report, but
would have expected a benefit from the third person’s use of the
audit report, because such use would have been an inducement to
the client to employ the auditor.
The chief value of the Nichols case to the public accountant
lies in the fact that “the recent doctrine of negligence in the spoken
word and liability for carelessness in making statements upon which
others were expected to rely and upon which they did act to their
damage” was adopted by the New York court of appeals. With
such a doctrine courts could keep within the bounds of conservatism
and establish a rule making the defendant public accountant liable
to third parties for honest but negligent misrepresentations where
the statements were intended by the accountant for specific third
parties even though not delivered directly to them. Where the
public accountant knew that his client would pass a copy of the
audit report to a particular third party for that third party’s use,
and such third party did use the negligent report to his loss, the
public accountant should be deemed to have intended that the third
party should rely upon his audit report.
Let us turn now from that phase of the negligence formula which
limits liability to the particular persons who, the defendant in
tended, should rely upon his statement, to that limitation of liabil
ity arising from the fact that the defendant’s service to the plaintiff
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was gratuitous but coupled with a benefit. No court has decided
whether the defendant is liable for misrepresentation of a financial
matter given gratuitously but negligently.87 There is a dictum in
Glanzer v. Shepard, supra, to the effect that there would be no
such liability. However, in the Nichols case the representations
were made not purely as a gratuity. The manufacturer expected an
ultimate benefit from the representations concerning the insulating
material, in the way of sales through middlemen handling that
product. Likewise, the public accountant derives an ultimate benefit
from the use of his statements by third parties. Without the use of
such statements by third parties clients would have little need of
employing auditors to prepare statements of their business enter
prises.
Logically, then, what degree of care should be required of the
public accountant rendering a gratuitous service coupled with a
benefit? In the lending of a chattel as a pure gratuity the owner is
bound only to warn of hidden defects of which he knows. If the
owner of the chattel is paid for its use by the borrower, the owner
must exercise reasonable diligence to discover the condition of the
chattel and is liable for injuries caused by defects of which he
should have known. It would seem that if the owner should lend
a chattel as a gratuity but coupled with a benefit, the owner would
owe some duty to the borrower to discover and report to him
defects. From this analogy, then, it would appear that the public
accountant for a gratuitous service coupled with a benefit should
exercise some care to ascertain the truthfulness of his positive
statements of fact. The public accountant would not owe to the
third party for a gratuitous service coupled with a benefit as high
a degree of care and skill as that owed to his client for “paid-for”
service; yet, he would owe to such third party a duty to exercise
some degree of care and skill to ascertain the truthfulness of his
accounting certificate. It would seem that the public accountant’s
duty to the third party—to exercise some care in rendering a
gratuitous service, coupled with a benefit, to determine the accuracy
of the statements—should apply merely to the public accountant’s
87 F. H. Bohlen, “Should Negligent Misrepresentation Be Treated as Negligence
or Fraud?” 18 Virginia Law Review 707 (1932).
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positive statements of fact. It would seem that as long as the public
accountant merely expressed his opinion in respect to the results
of his audit, he should not owe in the way of ascertaining the
accuracy of such opinion any duty to third parties for gratuitous
service even though coupled with a benefit. Thus, where public
accountants were employed to do less than a detailed audit they
could free themselves from liability to third parties by merely mak
ing their certificates in the form of opinion. Unless the public
accountant can in some way restrict his liability to third parties he
will be reluctant to undertake any audit less than a detailed audit.
The usual tort defense of contributory negligence would be an
other antidote to the fear of extending too far the public account
ant’s liability for negligence, by including a duty owed to third
parties to exercise care and skill in the preparation of an audit.
There has been no case holding that where a misstatement, is merely
negligent the plaintiff is barred by his failure to use obvious means
to determine its accuracy.88 The reason is probably due to the
failure of many courts to distinguish clearly between deceit and
negligence in making a positive statement of fact, for contributory
negligence has never been a defense to an intentional injury.89
By restricting the public accountant’s liability to such third parties
as those who, the public accountant intended, should use the state
ments; by limiting the degree of care owed such third parties when
the service was gratuitous but coupled with a benefit, and by
making available the defense of contributory negligence, it would
seem that there is no basis for the fear of extending too far the
public accountant’s liability for mere negligence in making positive
statements of fact. The public accountant’s liability for an honest
blunder in certifying merely his opinion as to the results of his
audit should not extend to third parties. The expression of opinion
should put third parties on notice that they should be cautious in
the use of the statements; and at the same time the public account
ant would be free to undertake audits involving less than a complete
review of all the records.
88 F. H. Bohlen, “Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence, or Warranty,” 42
Harvard Law Review 733 (1929).
89 Harry M. Harrington, “Torts—Liability for Negligent Language,” 12 Texas
Law Review 72 (1933).
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The recent doctrine of liability for negligence in making state
ments upon which others were expected to rely and upon which
they did act to their damage is sound in principle and will probably
produce the most satisfactory results that can be reached. The negli
gence formula will take the place of the action of deceit in cases
based upon honest but negligent misrepresentations. The action of
deceit will still be available where there is consciousness of wrong
doing on the part of the defendant. However, it may well be ex
pected that the courts will be slow in adopting the new doctrine
of negligence.
VII
CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF T H E PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT
FOR FRAUD
C ase L aw on the P ublic A ccountant’s L iability for F raud

An exhaustive search has revealed not a single American case in
which a public accountant has been held liable in a criminal suit
for fraud. An English case furnishes a precedent.
In 1931 the central criminal court (Old Bailey) of London,
England, a court of first instance, tried on criminal charges of
fraud 90 the chairman and the official auditor of the Royal Mail
Steam Packet Company.91 Lord Kylsant, the chairman of the com
pany, was sentenced to imprisonment for one year; and his con
viction was upheld by the English court of criminal appeal.92
Morland, the company auditor, was acquitted in the central crimi
nal court.
The Royal Mail Steam Packet Company case has attracted world
wide interest. The company was one of the largest and most im
portant in England; it was a holding company of some thirty-five
leading shipping companies of the kingdom. The auditor charged
was a partner of one of the largest firms of accountants in the
90 The criminal charges of fraud were brought under a statute which made it
a criminal offense for an officer of a company to perpetrate fraud upon shareholders
or investors of the company.
91 Rex v. Kylsant and Morland, The Accountant, London, 1931, volume 85, p.
109.
92 Rex v. Kylsant, 48 T. L. R. 62, 23 criminal appeal reports 83.
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world.93 Some of England’s greatest legal talent was involved in
the case. As a matter of furnishing a legal precedent for the ac
counting profession it is unfortunate that the auditor’s case did not
reach the English court of criminal appeal. However, the case is
valuable for the light thrown upon the accountant’s legal duties in
respect to the form and content of accounting reports and the nature
of secret reserves. Only that portion of the trial having to do with
Morland, the company auditor, is given here.
It was alleged in the charges against Morland that he was guilty
of fraud in certifying false financial statements of the Royal Mail
Steam Packet Company for the years 1926 and 1927, whereby the
company chairman, Lord Kylsant, was enabled to sell a large issue
of the company’s debenture stock to stockholders and the general
public at a price greatly in excess of their true value.
Quite in harmony with the usual English accountancy practice,
the statements in question consisted of a balance-sheet in the form
of an account, with the liabilities and proprietorship appearing on
the left and the assets on the right side. Just below the balancesheet columns followed the certificates of Lord Kylsant and Mor
land respectively. Following these certificates was a brief profitand-loss account in which the distribution of profits was placed on
the left and the incomes on the right side of the account. The
alleged fraud resulted from the showing of some surplus reserves
on the right side of this profit-and-loss account under such titles as
would lead stockholders and the public, it was alleged, into believ
ing such surplus reserves were current income items for the years
1926 and 1927. Thus, it was claimed, the chairman, Lord Kylsant,
was able to show prospective purchasers large operating incomes
rather than huge losses for the years 1926 and 1927 and to effect
the sale of a large issue of the company’s debenture stock.
The facts as presented by Sir William Jowitt, attorney-general,
were in substance as follows:
The Royal Mail Steam Packet Company experienced a period of
unusual prosperity during the world war. It was during this period
93 Henry Morgan, “The Auditor’s Responsibility in Relation to Balance-sheet and
Profit-and-loss Accounts,” International Congress on Accounting, 1933, London,
Gee & Co., p. 11.
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that many reserves were built up and expanded beyond the needs
for which they were set aside. Among these was a large excessprofits reserve which was not needed for taxes after 1921. A war con
tingency reserve was created to cover possible claims of officers for
the differences in the salaries the company had been paying regu
larly and the salaries such officers were receiving while they were
in the British navy. This claim never materialized. It had been the
practice of the company during the war to write off excessive de
preciation charges. Many of the company’s ships were destroyed;
and the insurance money received for the losses far exceeded the
book value of such ships. This excess provided another earnedsurplus reserve account. Another large earned-surplus reserve was
that for income taxes, the amount of which continued to be aug
mented after 1921, when losses were being sustained and no taxes
were being paid to the government, by making deductions from
dividends and carrying such deductions into the income-tax reserve
account. An idea of the magnitude of all these earned-surplus
reserves may be obtained from the fact that their amounts ranged
from £ 725,000 to £1,600,000 for 1921.
Said the attorney-general, Sir William Jowitt, “To give the
R. M. S. P. Co. a good showing in its profit-and-loss account for
1921, bonus stock was issued by the subsidiary companies over
several years. There was nothing improper, but it was utilizing
for one year’s purpose something which in the very nature of things
did not relate only to that year, except that it was paid in that
particular period.”
An actual operating loss of £135,000 was sustained in 1922; but
by including in the profit-and-loss account some non-recurring
income items a net profit of £725,000 was shown. These non
recurring income items were made up of a total of £860,000 from
the special earned-surplus reserves and profit on the sale of steamers.
In the year 1923 there was transferred from the special surplusreserve accounts into the profit-and-loss account total credits amount
in g to £ 8 0 0 ,0 0 0 so as to tu r n a n e t lo ss in to a p r o fit o f £779,114
for the period. This particular item in 1921 and 1922 had been
called “profit for the year”; but in 1923 it was called “balance for
the year.”
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A similar showing was made for 1924. Reserve credits amount
ing to £870,000 were transferred to profit-and-loss so as to change
an operating loss into a “balance for the year including dividends
on share in allied and other companies, less depreciation, etc.,” of
£ 772,829.
During 1925, beside the usual reserves which were transferred to
profit-and-loss, non-recurring profit resulting from the excess of
receipts from the winding-up of one of the subsidiaries over the
holding company’s book value of its investments in the subsidiary
was shown as a part of the profit-and-loss. The profit-and-loss
account for 1925 showed “balance for the year, including dividends
on shares in allied and other companies, adjustment of taxation
reserves, less depreciation of fleet, as £731,103.”
In 1926 the profit-and-loss account showed as such a credit of
£150,000 taken from the surplus-reserve accounts. But there was one
credit entitled, “Balance for the year, including dividends on shares
in allied and other companies, adjustment of taxation reserves,
less depreciation of fleet, etc.” of some £439,212. This item of
£439,212 resulted from a current net loss of £272,000 and a transfer
of £711,212 from the surplus-reserve accounts. The auditor certified
that he had compared the statements with the company books, and
that in his opinion the statements were properly drawn and gave
a correct view of the state of the company’s affairs as shown by
the books of the company.
A similar report was prepared by Mr. Morland for 1927.
The prosecution contended that the reports for 1926 and 1927
were misleading to the average investor and that the auditor who
approved them was criminally liable for fraud.
Justice W right’s summing-up is reported in part as follows:
“* * * Then there was the question of the auditor. The law
required the appointment of an auditor who was the servant of the
company, and his duty was to report on the accounts which the
directors were going to present to the shareholders. The law did not
impose an impossible burden on auditors. It did not make them
insurers; it did not require skill and vigilance beyond their power,
but it did require from the auditor a careful examination of the
accounts and for him to give a certificate saying that the accounts
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had been properly drawn up so as to exhibit a true and correct view
of the state of the company’s affairs, according to the best of his
knowledge and the information given to him.
“* * * If the accounts on which the dividends were being paid or
the expenses were being met were being fed by undisclosed reserves,
it seemed very difficult to see how an auditor could discharge his
duty of giving a true and accurate view of the state of the company’s
affairs without drawing attention to that fact, which was vitally
important. No doubt an auditor in his delicate duties had to use a
certain amount of discretion, but he had to remember that he was
under a statutory duty and that he might come under the penalties
of the law if he failed in that duty in any specific way.
“* * * In the present case the jury would remember that they were
not dealing with a company to which the companies act applied, but
with one which was formed as a corporation and had the privilege of
limited liability, the corporation being governed by the terms of a
royal charter. The Royal Mail Steam Packet Co. was a very old one,
having been formed in September, 1839, and there were certain con
ditions which governed the keeping of accounts; prior to the annual
meeting a report had to be prepared and the assets and debts of the
corporation set out for the purposes of the meeting. The directors
also had to give such other information to put before the share
holders as might seem necessary, and the accounts had to be signed
by one of the auditors of the corporation. T hat was an obligation
on the court of directors to prepare and lay before the meeting in
each year an account of the debts and assets of the corporation and an
account of the profits made every year. In 1904 it was decided to alter
certain conditions, because in the old days the auditor was not a
professional auditor but perhaps a member of the company. Then
professional auditors were appointed, but that did not alter the
provision requiring the directors to give an account of the profits
which had been earned. The law provided that the auditor had to sign
a certificate stating whether his requirements had been complied
with and to make a report on the accounts and then to state in that
report whether in his opinion the report was properly drawn up.
“The profit-and-loss account contains information for the benefit
of the shareholders. We are not concerned with the question of
policy, as to whether a dividend is properly or improperly declared,
but if there is something in the accounts to which the attention of
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the shareholders should be drawn, the question at issue is whether
that information is correctly given. * * *
“* * * So far as I know, in those charters there is no provision for
the maintenance of any secret reserve. There may be, but it has not
been pointed out to me, and I have been unable to discover it.
The question to be decided here is not whether the two defendants
or either of them has committed any breach of his duty to the com
pany, either as chairman or as auditor, but whether he has com
mitted a breach of this section (meaning section 84 of the larceny
act of 1861).
“If there has been any breach or negligence of anything for which
the directors or auditor may be liable to the company, that is a
matter entirely beyond your (the jury’s) purview or consideration.
You are not here dealing with questions of civil liability, for civil
liability can be settled by action for damages. But when a matter
comes before this court, it comes as a matter of criminal liability; it
comes before this court because something has been done, some
breach of the law which goes beyond the purview of civil liability,
which may not be answered by damages, but which amounts to a
crime against the state and for which there is provided for the party
convicted an appropriate sentence by the court. One sometimes hears it
said in a criminal case that questions of public policy, questions of
public morality, questions, it may be, of financial purity are involved,
but these are not questions which you have to decide in arriving at
your decision. You have to decide on the facts and on the evidence
in this special case, and therefore those considerations to which I have
referred are not your considerations.
“The section involves three things, a false written document, knowl
edge of the falsity—that means the recognition, the understanding, the
realization of the falsity by the person who publishes it and puts it
forward—and thirdly, the intent to deceive. The intent to deceive is
quite a separate thing. You may have a false document, and you
may have published it knowingly, and yet there may not be circum
stances which justify the finding that there was an intent to deceive.
In fact, in one of the sections under the new act—I think it was in
one of the earlier companies acts as well—you have a definition of the
offence or misdemeanor, of publishing a false document, knowing it
to be false, but with no reference to the intent to deceive. It is left
out, just as in some other criminal offences, the intention is not a
necessary ingredient.
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“Here the intention to deceive is a necessary ingredient as regards
a man who deceives shareholders, and in regard to a prospectus to
deceive a possible investor. * * *
“Here again, in the case of Mr. Morland, the jury must be satis
fied that the statement which he signed was false, and false to his
knowledge, was published by him with knowledge of its falsity,
with an appreciation of its falsity, and with the intention that it
should deceive the shareholders.
“There were many differences, of course, on any view of the case,
between Mr. Morland’s position- and that of Lord Kylsant. Mr.
Morland was an accountant and the auditor of the company. He had
the accounts put before him, but not until they had passed the court
of directors. He had nothing to do with the preparation of the
accounts and nothing to do with the declaration or decision to declare
dividends. He had nothing to do with the general policy of the
company. He had no knowledge—except incidentally with regard to
the Meat Transport—of the subsidiary companies and their position.
All he knew was the dividends which from time to time he had to
deal with as representing the profits coming from those companies.
He had, so far as could be seen, no motive at all for deceitful in
tention.
“But, of course, it might be said against Mr. Morland that he did
in fact add the sanction of his name as auditor to a document which,
taking those two years 1926 and 1927, was false and misleading. As
he had pointed out in another connection, however, it was not a
question of whether or not Mr. Morland did something less than
what could be expected as the full duty of a conscientious, careful
auditor. He had to come honestly, according to his skill and under
standing, to the conclusion that the accounts of the company pre
sented a true state of the company’s accounts. That was what he
signed—that it was a true and correct view of the company’s affairs.
If he was not satisfied that he could give that certificate, his duty was
either to qualify that certificate or to ask to have the accounts altered
in such a way that he could sign them without qualification. It was
obvious enough that in the year 1926, when the accounts for 1925
were being dealt with, he was not satisfied with the position, because
he thought that some words ought to be added to intimate to the
shareholders that moneys which were being used were being used
in order to produce the balance which appeared. That being so, it was
admitted that without some qualification in some form or another,
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he ought not to give a certificate, and the qualifications which he put
in were those words which the jury must almost be tired of hearing
about—adjustment of taxation reserves. Those were the words which
Lord Plender had turned into plain English.94 Mr. Morland had said
that that had satisfied his doubts. He thought then that he had done
enough to cure the defective character of the balance-sheet and
profit-and-loss account with those words. If he was right in that, if
he discharged his duty sufficiently and properly, it seemed that in
any view of the matter, there was an end of the case against him,
and he was not guilty. If on the other hand he was wrong in this
sense, that in a civil action against him for not showing due care and
skill, he would be held liable as a defendant because he had broken
his duty and had not discharged his office, then again his liability
would be a civil liability. That was assuming against him that he
ought to have done something else and taken some more drastic,
some more effective steps in order to bring to the mind of the share
holder the true position of the company’s affairs. It might be that
he did not discharge his duty sufficiently and properly. It might well
be that an auditor in his position, standing as he did between the
directors and the shareholders, to protect the interests of the share
holders against any possibility of their being misled by the directors
—it might well be that he took an imperfect view, an inadequate view
of the very grave duties which rested upon auditors.
“The profession of accountancy, as you know, is very distinguished
and very honourable, and a very essential profession in the com
mercial affairs of this country. Great trust must be reposed on the skill
and the judgment and the honor of accountants. It may well be that
on occasion, through error of judgment, one of them may fail to do
all that the requirements of his high office demands. But again we are
not concerned here with any question of civil liability or breach of
duty. What you have to determine is whether, assuming that Lord
Kylsant was guilty of the offence, there was any deliberate and con
scious act on the part of Mr. Morland in carrying out that design by
putting his hand to a certificate which he knew was not justified by
the facts and he knew did not correspond with his duty.9
94 Note: Lord Plender, internationally known public accountant, testifying as an
expert witness said: “The definition of ‘adjustment’ is this: The difference between
the sum or sums reserved or set aside to meet maturing obligations whose precise
ascertainment is not known at the time such provisions are being made, and the
amount of the actual liability when it is ascertained and settled.”
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“The prosecution alleged that the true and accurate view of the
state of the company’s affairs was not given. Did Mr. Morland know
that, and did he give the statement which had been published cur
rency and validity by means of his certificate, and did he do so with
criminal and wicked intent?
“Three accountants had said in the witness box that they would
have signed the certificate in the same form. He supposed that they
would say that they would do so, in the same circumstances as Mr.
Morland. It might be so, or not, he did not know. He was quite
sure that they believed what they had said, but that did not relieve
the jury of deciding whether the certificate was one which Mr. Mor
land ought to have signed if he really appreciated his duty. They
would have to say to themselves did he appreciate that he was doing
something wrongful, or did he honestly believe that he had discharged
his duty by putting into the balance-sheet those mystic words?
“Supposing that Mr. Morland honestly thought that that was
enough, the jury on any view of the case would not find him guilty
of fraudulent intent. However mistaken a man might be, however
unfortunate the consequences of his mistake might be, that did not
constitute a criminal offence or criminal intent.
“He had looked through Mr. Morland’s evidence very carefully
and he did not know that he could help the jury by going through
it at any further length. They would recollect that Mr. Morland did
not dispute that he was not satisfied with the accounts for 1925 in
the form in which they were presented to him.”

Mr. Morland was acquitted; Lord Kylsant was sentenced to im
prisonment for one year.
In the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company case it was held that
a company auditor was not guilty of fraud under an English statute
providing for criminal punishment of company officers who have
committed fraud upon stockholders or investors in the company,
where the auditor had merged surplus reserves into the current
profit-and-loss account under the caption “Balance for the year, in
cluding dividends on shares in allied and other companies, adjust
ment of taxation reserves, less depreciation of fleet, etc.,” and stock
holders had sustained losses as a result of relying upon the statement
of profit-and-loss. The court applied the orthodox test of one element
of fraud, namely, consciousness of wrongdoing and found that the
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auditor did not have, at the time of the preparation of the audit,
knowledge that laymen would be deceived by the sort of report he
made.
The court was apparently correct in finding no fraudulent intent
on the part of the auditor. The court was also correct in the dicta
holding that the auditor was guilty of negligence. It certainly ought
to be the duty of an auditor to show plainly on his reports what
the figures represent.
T he P ublic A ccountant’s C riminal L iability for F raud under
Statutes

Nearly half of the states of the union have statutes making public
accountants liable criminally for fraud.95 In Texas the public ac
countancy statutes limit such liability to certified public account
ants.96
A public accountancy statute of Arizona is typical of such state
laws. The Arizona statute follows: 97
“If any person practising in this state under this act as a certified
public accountant or a public accountant, or who is in the practice of
public accountancy as a certified public accountant, or a public ac
countant or otherwise, shall wilfully falsify any report or statement
bearing on any examination, investigation or audit made by him, or
under his direction, he shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and
upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not less than
three hundred dollars, nor more than one thousand dollars, or shall
be imprisoned in the county jail for a term of not less than three
months nor more than one year, or by both such fine and imprison
ment for each time he may so have falsified such report, statement
or audit.”

The United States securities act of 1933 also provides for the
criminal liability of accountants and other persons who have been
willfully guilty of misrepresentation relative to the registration
95 Certified Public Accountant Laws of the United States, American Institute
Publishing Co., Inc., New York, 1930.
96 Ibid.

97 Laws of Arizona, regular session 1933, chapter 45, section 8.
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statement of an issuer of securities. Section 24, which was not
amended in 1934, reads as follows:
“Any person who willfully violates any of the provisions of this
title, or the rules and regulations promulgated by the commission
under authority thereof, or any person who willfully, in a registration
statement filed under this title, makes any untrue statement of a
material fact or omits to state any material fact required to be stated
therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading,
shall upon conviction be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.”

A public accountant may be criminally liable under the United
States securities exchange act of 1934 for having willfully made a
false representation of a material fact in the balance-sheets and
profit-and-loss statements filed with the securities and exchange
commission pursuant to the provisions of the act. Section 32 of the
act reads as follows:
“Any person who willfully violates any provision of this title, or
any rule or regulation thereunder the violation of which is made un
lawful or the observance of which is required under the terms of this
title, or any person who willfully and knowingly makes, or causes to
be made, any statement in any application, report, or document re
quired to be filed under this title or any rule or regulation there
under, which statement was false or misleading with respect to any
material fact, shall upon conviction be fined not more than $10,000,
or imprisoned not more than two years, or both, except that when
such person is an exchange, a fine not exceeding $500,000 may be
imposed; but no person shall be subject to imprisonment under this
section for the violation of any rule or regulation if he proves that
he had no knowledge of such rule or regulation.”

As long as the public accountant acts with honest intentions he
need have no fear of punishment for misrepresentation under the
tate and federal statutes.

C hapter 11

LAW AND THE CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT’S
CERTIFICATE
I ssuance of C ertified P ublic A ccountant’s C ertificate

a broad way the statutes of the District of Columbia and the
forty-eight states set forth the requirements for the issuance of
the certified public accountant’s certificate, namely, the training and
experience prerequisite to the examination and the fields covered
in the examination. However, in the main the requirements for the
certified public accountant’s certificate are left to the discretion of
the board of public accountancy. In a number of jurisdictions cases
have arisen in which the courts have defined the powers of the
board of public accountancy. Under appropriate topics those cases
are discussed in this chapter.
Among our American decisions only one appeal case deals
directly and exclusively with the power of the board of public
accountancy to lay down rules for the issuance of the certified
public accountant’s certificate. That case arose in 1925 in the ap
pellate division of the supreme court of New York.1 The court
upheld the rule of the regents of the University of the State of
New York 2 requiring applicants for the certified public account
ant’s certificate to have had at least two years of accounting practice
under the employ of a certified public accountant. A portion of
the decision reads:

I

n

“The regents have the right to make and interpret their own rules.
The court can not, in construing the regents’ rules, in effect, pre1 Davis v. Sexton, 207 N. Y. S. 377, 211 App. Div. 233.
2 Note: Chapter 261, article 57 of the laws of New York, 1929, provides for
the creation of the board of certified public accountant examiners. This board is
appointed by the board of regents of the university of the state of New York.
Though it is the function of the board of certified public accountant examiners to
carry on the practical conduct of examinations, whatever rules may be established
by this board are subject to the approval of the board of regents of the university
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scribe a different rule from that duly enacted by the regents. If the
conduct of the regents in the application of this rule to the petitioner’s
case has not been arbitrary and capricious, surely the court can not
command the issuance of a certificate. The power to fix the profes
sional requirements has been granted to the regents by the legislature.
The rule has been uniformly applied. The rule itself as interpreted
by the regents is not arbitrary and capricious. It has a basis in reason.
The reason assigned by the regents is that the integrity and high
standard of the group of public accountants who are to be certified
by the regents as worthy of this honorable rank in their profession,
justifies the test of a substantial period of experience as an employee
of one who has been certified and who will feel a personal and pro
fessional responsibility as the employer of such candidate. A coem
ployee has no such direct responsibility for the character and quality
of the candidate’s work and has no power to select him or discharge
him. Proper supervision and training of the candidate are more likely
to be secured if the employer is a certified accountant for the reason
that ‘he is responsible professionally as well as personally for the acts
of the candidate and is bound to exercise a much greater degree of
supervision than would be exercised by any mere employee. His own
self-interest demands it.’ These are the reasons for the rule assigned by
the regents in their opposing affidavits. We accept them as true and
reasonable.”

The fact that the candidate for a certified public accountant’s
certificate had worked two years under the supervision of two
coemployees who were certified public accountants, the supreme
court of New York held was not sufficient to comply with the
regents’ rule that the candidate must have had two years of practice
in the employ of a certified public accountant. Neither the rule nor
the requirement of strict compliance with the rule was unreason
able in the opinion of the court. The court took the position that
rules for the issuance of a certificate are technical and should, as
long as such rules do not appear to the court to be unreasonable
and arbitrary, be left to the discretion of those responsible for the
issuance of the certificate. The court, also, required uniformity of
application of the rules. Were the rules not uniformly applied, per
sons discriminated against would in effect be deprived of the right
to pursue an honorable profession, and the favored few would be
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given a virtual monopoly on the practice of public accountancy.
The sanction of such a condition would clearly be violative of the
due process and equal protection clauses of the federal and state
constitutions.3 The fourteenth amendment to the constitution of
the United States provides: “Nor shall any state deprive any person
of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
The discrimination could not be upheld under the state’s police
power since the effect of the discrimination would not be in the
interest of the public welfare.
While Davis v. Sexton is the only American case dealing with
the statutory power of a public accountancy board to lay down
reasonable rules for the issuance of a certified public accountant’s
certificate, the opinion is consistent with the reasoning set forth in
other cases dealing with the powers of accountancy boards to carry
out their duties. The logic of the case is sound; and doubtless the
case will be followed in future decisions in similar circumstances.
R ecognition of a C ertified P ublic A ccountant’s C ertificate
I ssued by another State or a F oreign C ountry

The District of Columbia and nearly all the states of the union
have placed within the discretion of their respective state boards of
public accountancy the power to register the certificate of any certi
fied public accountant who is the lawful holder of a certified public
accountant’s certificate issued under the laws of another state, pro
vided the state that issued the original certificate grants similar
privileges to the certified public accountants of the registering state.
A few states extend that reciprocal recognition to foreign countries.4
Several court decisions have been rendered, defining the public
accountancy statutes of some of the states, and laying down the
attitude of the courts toward recognition of the certified public
accountant’s certificate which has been issued by another state or a
foreign country.5
3 Willoughby on the Constitution, volume II, sec. 759.
4 Certified Public Accountant Laws of the United States, American Institute Pub
lishing Co., Inc., New York, 1930.
5 Note: For the power of a board of public accountancy to refuse to register
certified public accountants’ certificates from other states that do not recognize
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The supreme court of North Carolina in 1926 rendered such a
decision.6 The plaintiffs in this case, Respess v. Rex Spinning
Company, were certified public accountants of Georgia but not of
North Carolina. In Atlanta the plaintiffs entered into an auditing
contract with the agents of the defendant corporation of North
Carolina. The plaintiffs assigned a senior accountant and several
others to the task of preparing the working papers from the records
at the defendant’s mill in North Carolina. After spending several
weeks on this job the senior accountant and his staff returned to
Atlanta with the audit “in the rough with pencil.” The reports
were made up in Atlanta. The plaintiffs later brought an action to
recover compensation for their services. The defense was set up that
the plaintiffs were unlawfully holding themselves out as certified
public accountants in North Carolina and also were doing business
in North Carolina without having obtained the legally required
licence. (It is a well-settled principle in the law of contracts that
an agreement is unenforceable if made in the course of transactions
which are prohibited unless the required licence is obtained.) A
portion of the opinion reads:
“* * * C. S., 7008 et seq. section 7023, provides that if any person
shall practise in this state as a certified public accountant without
having received such certificate he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor;
and section 7020 defines a public accountant as one ‘actively engaged
and practicing accounting as his principal vocation during the busi
ness period of the day.’ The revenue act, schedule B, imposed on
public accountants the sum of five dollars as a licence tax for the
privilege of carrying on their business and made it unlawful for any
person to carry on any business for which a licence was required
without having the licence or a duplicate thereof in his actual posses
sion at the time. Laws 1921, ch. 34, secs. 31, 88; laws 1932, ch. 4,
secs. 29, 95. * * * It is no doubt true that as a rule a contract will not
be enforced if it rests upon a consideration which contravenes good
morals, public policy or the common or statute law. * * *
“To practise a profession or to carry on a business usually signifies
the regular pursuit of such profession or business as an occupation—
certificates issued by the board see Goldsmith v. Clabaugh (1925) 55 App. D. C.
346, 6 F. (2d) 94.
6 Respess v. Rex Spinning Company, 133 S. E. 391, 191 N. C. 809.
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to make a practice of it or actively to engage in it customarily or
habitually. This is not without exceptions. As the legislature may
prohibit a general practice until prescribed conditions are complied
with, it may attach the same conditions to a single transaction of a
kind not likely to occur otherwise than as an instance of general prac
tice. * * *
“In these circumstances we are of the opinion that the plaintiffs did
not practise or carry on the business of certified public accountants in
this state within the meaning of the statutes. To carry on the business
of a public accountant or to practise as a certified public accountant
is much more than is implied in the series of detached acts done by
the plaintiff’s representatives in acquiring information upon which to
base their report. W e are the more inclined to this view because the
statutes are penal and should be construed strictly against the offender
and liberally in his favor. * * *”

The question under consideration in Respess v Rex Spinning
Company was whether the preparation of working papers meant
the practice of public accounting under the North Carolina statute,
which prohibited the practice of public accounting without the
required licence, and the practice of public accounting as a certified
public accountant without proper registration with the board of
public accountancy of North Carolina. The court held that a single
instance, a single audit, would constitute practice of accounting,
but that preparing merely the working papers in North Carolina
did not amount to practice of accounting in that state. Every trained
accountant knows full well that the collection of data known as the
accountant’s working papers does not require as high an order of
skill as does the rendition of the audit reports. The working data,
though indispensable, are only a part of the practice of public
accountancy.
Only one other American case deals with the question of whether
the preparation of working papers constitutes practice of public
accounting, Haskins & Sells v. Kelly, 93 P. 605, 77 Kan. 155. The
Haskins & Sells v. Kelly case held that merely preparing working
papers in Kansas was not doing business in that state. Doubtless
the courts in similar circumstances will follow these precedents in
the future.
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The public accountancy statutes of the remaining states and the
District of Columbia are similar to those of North Carolina in
requiring a certified public accountant of another state to register
as such with the public accountancy board of the state into which
the accountant comes to practise as a certified public accountant. It
follows from the decision that the preparation of working papers
only does not constitute the practice of public accounting, that under
the present statutes of the states and the District of Columbia a
certified public accountant of one state may, without obtaining
recognition of his certificate from the board of public accountancy
of another state, be permitted as a certified public accountant to
prepare working papers, and nothing more, for clients in such other
state. This privilege would not be altered by the fact that after the
certified public accountant returned to his office in the state where
his certificate was registered he made up the audit reports and
certified them in the capacity of a certified public accountant.
The matter of recognition and registration of a certified public
accountant’s certificate was set forth in 1927 for the state of
Louisiana in the case of Thoman v. State Board of Certified Public
Accountants as follows: 7
“(Quoting from the Louisiana statutes) ‘The state board of certi
fied public accountants may, in its discretion, register the certificate
of any certified public accountant who is the lawful holder of a certi
fied public accountant’s certificate issued under the law of another
state, * * * provided that the state issuing the original certificate
grants similar privileges to the certified public accountants of this
state. * * *’
“All that we mean is that the board must treat alike all applicants
similarly situated and may not arbitrarily discriminate between them.
“Relator alleges that he is the lawful holder of a certificate as
certified public accountant issued to him by the state of Mississippi;
that the state of Mississippi recognizes and registers similar certificates
issued by the state of Louisiana; that he presented his said certificate
to the defendant board and made application to it to recognize and
register the same; that the board denied his said application without
giving any reason for its said refusal; wherefore he prays that a
7 113 So. 757.
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mandamus issue commanding said board to recognize and register his
said certificate.
“* * * Moreover, defendant * * * stands squarely on the proposition
that relator has no right of action because the board may ‘in its
discretion’ refuse to register any such certificate for any reason or
for no reason at all. And that proposition, as we have said, is un
sound.”

In 1931 the supreme court of Louisiana in reviewing the retrial
of Thoman v. State Board of Certified Public Accountants further
defined the powers of the state board of public accountants: 8
“* * * On the other hand, we have no right to substitute our
judgment for that of the board of certified public accountants, as to
whether the relator is worthy of a C.P.A. certificate. All that we
have to decide in such cases is whether the board discriminated
arbitrarily against the applicant for a certificate, or exercised its
discretion fairly and impartially. Whether the board’s judgment was
exercised wisely or unwisely is not for us to decide. * * *”

Thoman v. State Board of Certified Public Accountants holds that
a statute which gives power to the board of certified public account
ants to register, in its discretion, certified public accountants of
other states is limited to reasonableness. The statute, in itself, was
held valid; but the board was not allowed, in the application of the
statute, to refuse to register a certificate on purely arbitrary and
whimsical grounds under the cloak of acting within its discretion.
In reviewing acts of administrative boards, courts inquire into
the reasonableness, and not the wisdom, of such acts. Under the
police powers of a state statutes may expressly or impliedly grant
authority to the public accountancy board to refuse to recognize all
certified public accountants’ certificates issued in another state.
Such a policy on the part of the board might be unwise because of
retaliations; yet, because of the reasonableness, and the uniformity
of the application of the rule, courts would not interfere.
The Thoman case is in accord with the weight of authority on
the rule that under the due process and equal protection clauses of
8 172 La. 262, 134 So. 85.
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our constitutions an administrative board can not perform its duties
in an arbitrary and discriminative manner.9
Another Louisiana case, Eberle v. State Board of Certified Public
Accountants,10 decided in 1930, deals with the powers of a public
accountancy board to refuse to register a certified public account
ant’s certificate issued by another state. In this case the plaintiff,
a resident of New Orleans, held a certified public accountant’s
certificate from the state of Mississippi, and made application for
the registration of his certificate with the defendant board of
Louisiana. The defendant board refused to register the certificate
on the ground of moral unfitness of the applicant. Mandamus pro
ceedings were instituted to compel the defendant board to register
the certificate. The supreme court held:
“* * * The legislature has seen proper to create the board and to
vest it with the power to determine to its satisfaction whether the
applicant for a certificate as a certified public accountant, or simply
as a public accountant, possesses the required qualifications, including
the qualifications of good moral character. When the qualification of
the applicant as to good moral character is regularly determined, and
in determining it he is not deprived of his legal rights or of the law
of the land, the ruling of the board is final, and its finding of fact
must be considered correct, for it is not the courts that are vested
with the power to determine whether in truth the applicant’s char
acter is good, but it is the board that is vested with that power, and
it is only upon legal questions involved that the appeal lies to the
courts. Under the clear wording of subsection 1 of section 2 of the
act, unless the applicant satisfies the board of his good moral char
acter, he is not entitled to the certificate.”

Quite in agreement with the Thoman case, Eberle v. State Board
of Certified Public Accountants held that moral unfitness of the
applicant was a sufficient reason for refusing to register a certificate
issued in another state. The power to determine facts, such as the
moral fitness or the skill of the applicant, is a prerogative of the
board rather than of the court. The courts will not interfere with
actions of the board as long as the ruling of the board does not
9 Willoughby on the Constitution, volume II, sec. 759.
10 171 La. 318.
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deprive the applicant of his constitutional rights. The holding of
the Eberle case is consistent with the other cases in point.
An important case, James v. State Board of Examiners of Public
Accountants,11 relating to the registration of a certified public ac
countant’s certificate came before the supreme court of South Caro
lina. In this case the plaintiff, a non-resident of South Carolina, was
a certified public accountant of Georgia, Tennessee and North
Carolina. The plaintiff made application to have his certificate
registered with the state board of examiners of public accountants
of South Carolina. His application was rejected mainly because the
plaintiff did not maintain an office in South Carolina. In regard to
the plaintiff’s petition to compel the state board of examiners of
public accountants to issue plaintiff a certificate the court held:
“Our examination of the statutes fails to disclose any requirement
contained therein that a non-resident certified public accountant,
properly qualified in all other respects to practise the profession, must
maintain an office in this state. It appears, therefore, that the respond
ents have placed an additional requirement upon non-residents which
is not in harmony with statutory provisions. We do not regard this
additional requirement as a reasonable one. A certified public ac
countant may do his work without the necessity of maintaining an
office of his own in South Carolina. In fact, his work is most usually
done at places of business of his clients.
“The purposes of the statutes under consideration, as we view
them, were to protect real certified public accountants from the com
petition of persons engaged in accounting business who were not
certified public accountants, and to protect the people generally from
having audits made by persons who were not certified public ac
countants when it was desired to have such audits by only that class
of accountants. We find nothing in the law which would justify us in
holding that a non-resident certified public accountant, duly qualified
in all respects to practise his profession in our state, must actually
maintain an office in South Carolina. If the statute had a requirement
of that kind therein, it might result in a holding that the enactment
contravened the provisions of the constitution of the United States
for the reason that it discriminated against citizens of the United
States who happened not to be residents of this state. * * *”
11155 S. E. 830.
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James v. State Board of Examiners of Public Accountants held
that the requirement that a non-resident certified public accountant
must maintain an office in South Carolina in order to qualify for
registration as a certified public accountant in South Carolina was
unreasonable, arbitrary and discriminative. This decision is unques
tionably fair. If public accountants doing interstate business could
not gain recognition of their certificates in other states without
maintaining offices in such other states, interstate practitioners
would have an unreasonable burden placed upon them. The re
quirement laid down by the board was certainly unreasonable and
arbitrary, and hence violative of the due process and equal protec
tion clauses of our constitutions.12 The opinion is in harmony with
the well-recognized rulings on the point.
Had the requirement that non-resident accountants maintain
offices in South Carolina in order to obtain recognition of their
certificates been statutory rather than a rule of the public account
ancy board, doubtless the statute would have been held invalid for
the same reasons that the administrative rule was not upheld.
I llegal I ssue

and

I llegal A ssum ption

A ccountant ’s C ertificate

or

of th e

C ertified P ublic

M embership

in an

E stablished A ccounting F raternity

In both England and the United States the law is well established
that a person can not falsely hold himself out as being a certified
public accountant or a member of a professional accounting
organization.
In the English case, Society of Accountants and Auditors v.
Goodway and London Association of Accountants, Ltd.,13 the
chancery division held:
“So far as I am aware, there is no case, and no case has been cited
to me, in which the question has been decided whether an incor
porated body, such as the society here, can be regarded as suffering
a legal injury by reason of a person who is not a member of that body
representing himself to be a member of it; but a case of that nature
did come before the court of session in Scotland in Society of Ac12 Willoughby on the Constitution, volume II, sec. 759.
13 (1907) W. N. 45, (1907) 1 Ch. 489.
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countants in Edinburgh v. Corporation of Accountants, Ltd., 20 R.
750. * * * The plaintiffs were three chartered societies of accountants
in Scotland, one in Edinburgh, one in Glasgow and one in Aberdeen.
Their members were accustomed to use as their professional designa
tion the letters ‘C. A.’ after their names, indicating ‘chartered ac
countants.’ It was established that those letters, when used after a
person’s name, denoted that the person so using them was a member
of one or other of those three societies. The defendants were a limited
company called the Corporation of Accountants, and (and this was
the point) used the letters ‘C. A.’ as an abbreviation of ‘corporate
accountant.’ The lord ordinary and the lords in the inner house
unanimously came to the conclusion that the chartered societies were
entitled to prevent the defendants from using the letters ‘C. A.’ or
any similar designation which would lead people to believe that they
were members of one or other of those chartered societies.
“* * * In the case before me there seems to be little difficulty in
coming to that conclusion, for the reason that it is established by
evidence that membership of the society confers a status, a valuable
privilege, on its members. It is, therefore, a matter of pecuniary
interest to the society that it should have as many members as
possible. Obviously the possession of this definite status arising from
the fact of membership is an inducement to persons to become mem
bers, and anything which would reduce the value of that status would
tend to remove some of the inducements which would actuate persons
in becoming members of the society. Looked at in that way, it seems
to me that the society has a pecuniary interest in preventing persons
who are not its members, and are not entitled to the status which
its membership confers, from representing that they are its members
and are entitled to that status. It seems to me, therefore, both on
the authority of the case to which I have referred and on principle,
that the unauthorized use of the designation ‘incorporated accountant’
representing, as on the facts I think it does, that the person using
it is a member of the society, does inflict a legal injury on the society,
in respect of which it is entitled to relief.”

In the Society of Accountants and Auditors v. Goodway and
London Association of Accountants, Ltd., case the chancery division
of England upheld an injunction to restrain an accountant from
using a title which would lead the public to believe that he was a
member of the Society of Accountants and Auditors when, in fact,
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he was not. The reason given for the court’s decision was purely
on the grounds of protecting the financial interests of the Society
of Accountants and Auditors. The chief income of this society was
derived from membership fees. Hence, practice such as the false
assumption of membership in the society would make less desirable
membership in that honorable body and in that way reduce the
volume of membership fees. It was impossible to make an accurate
measure of damages in the continuous false assumption of member
ship in the Society of Accountants and Auditors, hence equity pro
ceedings became available.
In 1918 the chancery division of England in the case of the
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales v. Hard
wick 14 upheld an injunction to prevent an accountant who had
been expelled from the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Eng
land and Wales from representing himself through the use of
letter-paper headed “Honors, final, Institute of Chartered Account
ants” to be a member of that professional accountants’ organization.
The injunction in this case was sustained in order to protect the
Institute of Chartered Accountants from damage resulting from
the expelled member’s representing to the public that he was still
a chartered accountant.
While the injunctive process against persons falsely assuming
the certified public accountant’s degree or membership in a profes
sional accountants’ organization has never been sought in the
American appeal courts, the controlling principles in the two Eng
lish cases are sound; and it is most probable that the injunction may
be granted in similar circumstances in our American courts,
wherever it can be shown that the criminal statutes on the point
do not afford an adequate remedy.
The statutes of the forty-eight states and the District of Columbia
make it a criminal offense for a person who has not received a
certified public accountant’s certificate from the state board of
public accountancy or who has had his certified public accountant’s
certificate revoked to hold himself out to the public as a certified
public accountant by the use of the letters, “C. P. A.,” “C. A.,” or
1434 T. L. R. 584, 62 S. J. 702.
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similar letters, or by any other device.15 The penalty is generally a
fine, not exceeding two hundred dollars, or imprisonment for one
year, or both.
The passage of these statutes forbidding the unfair assumption of
the certified public accountant’s designation was not accidental.
The illegal issuance of the certified public accountant’s degree was
flagrantly practised by the National Association of Certified Public
Accountants, Incorporated, Washington, D. C. In 1923 the story of
the debacle was graphically revealed by Chief Justice Smyth of the
District of Columbia court of appeals in the case of the National
Association of Certified Public Accountants v. United States 16 as
follows:
“In its brief the corporation admits it was formed under section
599 of the code of the district. This section authorizes citizens of the
United States, a majority of whom being also citizens of the district,
who desire to associate themselves for benevolent, charitable, educa
tional, literary, musical, scientific, religious or missionary purposes,
and societies formed for mutual improvement or for the promotion
of the arts to form a corporation by filing in the office of the
recorder of deeds a certificate in writing, which shall state the name
adopted, the term for which the corporation is organized, its par
ticular business and objects, and the number of its managers for the
first year of its existence. There is nothing in the section which says
that the corporation thus formed shall have the power to confer
degrees, or admit its members to degrees, or to issue to its members
a certificate pertaining to degrees. No mention whatever of the degrees
is made in it. The certificate, however, which was filed by the organ
izers of the corporation, provides that when the members of the
corporation shall present ‘satisfactory evidence of knowledge in the
theory and practice of accounting, and shall have satisfactorily passed
the prescribed qualifying examination of the association’, the cor
poration shall have power ‘to admit said members to the degree of
certified public accountant, and to issue to such members the associa
tion’s formal certificate to that degree pertaining.’ The corporation
claims the right to do these things, and admits that it has done them
in many instances.
15 Certified Public Accountant Laws of the United States, American Institute P ub
lishing Co., Inc., New York, 1930.
16 292 F. 668, 53 App. D. C. 391.
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“According to the bill the corporation admitted one of its members
to the degree of certified public accountant (usually indicated by the
letters ‘C.P.A.’) on his own unsupported statement as to his qualifica
tions, without any instruction or examination by the corporation or
any of its representatives. Persons residing in California, desiring
to test the methods employed by the corporation, presented to it an
application for a certificate as a certified public accountant in the
name of one Duarfy. The certificate was issued on the recommenda
tion alone of persons wholly unknown to the corporation. Later it
developed that Duarfy existed only in the minds of those who had
arranged the test. In other words, he was a fictitious person. Other
instances are given in which the corporation granted degrees without
any examination or test of the applicant. All these allegations are
admitted by the answer. In no place does the answer assert that any
other or different test of an applicant’s fitness for a degree was em
ployed by the corporation. * * *
“It is urged that, because the corporation provided, in the certificate
which it filed with the recorder of deeds, that one of its purposes
was to admit members to the degree of certified public accountant
and to issue certificates to that effect, the corporation has the power
to do these things. But this can not be admitted. By making the
statement in the certificate it did not acquire a right not granted by
the section. It might have taken less than the section gave, but not
more. The section measures the maximum power which a corpora
tion organized under it can exercise. * * *”

The injunction against the issuance of certified-public-accountant
certificates by the National Association of Certified Public Account
ants was upheld for two reasons:
( 1) In America a corporation has no powers but those expressly
conferred on it, and such incidental powers as may be reasonably
necessary to carry those expressly granted into effect.17 Even a
power granted in a charter, not expressly provided in a statute, will
not be upheld, unless such power is reasonably necessary to carry
out the powers expressly conferred by statute. In this case the power
to grant degrees was not expressly conferred by the statutes under
which the defendant was incorporated. Furthermore, it was not
reasonably necessary for the defendant to confer degrees in order
17 Thomas v. Railroad Co., 101 U. S. 71, 82, 25 L. Ed. 950.
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to carry out the powers expressly authorized by the statutes under
which the defendant corporation was created.
(2) Even where a corporation has a power expressly granted by
statute the corporation will not be permitted to abuse such power.
Selling degrees for ten dollars each, as was done in this case, would
certainly be an abuse of the power to confer educational degrees.
The two controlling principles upon which the case was decided
have been evolved to protect the public from corporate abuses.
These principles are supported by the great weight of American
authority.18
A short time before the District of Columbia court of appeals
granted a permanent injunction prohibiting the National Associa
tion of Certified Public Accountants from conferring degrees, the
supreme court of New York permanently enjoined the National
Association of Certified Public Accountants from conferring cer
tified public accountants’ or similar degrees in the state of New
York, and laid down the following rule in the case, People v.
National Association of Certified Public Accountants:19
“It is entirely clear from sections 80 and 81 of the general business
law above quoted, that no person may hold himself out as a certified
public accountant, or use the abbreviation ‘C.P.A.’ or any similar
words, letters or figures to indicate that the person using the same
is a certified public accountant, except upon the authorization of the
regents of the university of the state of New York.

While at common law an injunction may not be granted in the
interest of the public welfare where a criminal statute prohibits the
wrongful act, in the present case the National Association of
Certified Public Accountants was enjoined from conferring degrees
under a New York statute which provides for the use of the in
junctive process to restrain an unlawful act. The court definitely
established that it is a misdemeanor under the statutes of New York
not only for anyone except the regents of the University to confer
the certified public accountant’s certificate, but also for anyone to
hold himself out as a certified public accountant in New York
except upon the authorization of the regents of the university
18Independent Medical College v. People, 55 N. E. 345, 346, 182 Ill. 274.
19197 N . Y. S. 775, 204 App. Div. 288.
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(board of certified public accountant examiners under authority of
the regents of New York university). It was stated by the court
that the activities of the National Association of Certified Public
Accountants were in opposition to the educational policy of New
York. It is apparent that to permit a foreign corporation or anyone
else to practise the abuses exemplified in the operations of the
National Association of Certified Public Accountants would foster
the perpetration of deceit upon the uninformed public. The holding
of this case is based upon reason and justice and is supported by a
number of cases involving similar facts.
In 1923 a member of the National Association of Certified Public
Accountants advertised himself in the city of New York as a “Cer
tified public accountant, (N. A.).” In a criminal prosecution of this
member, the court of special sessions of the city of New York
held that such an act renders the wrongdoer punishable for
misdemeanor.20
During the year 1924 two cases came before the Texas court of
criminal appeals, in which the defendants were charged with un
lawfully advertising themselves as certified public accountants.21
The defense in each case was that the defendant was a member
of the National Association of Certified Public Accountants, In
corporated, Washington, D. C. The convictions were upheld.
In view of the fact that over twenty-five hundred persons obtained
their certified public accountant’s degree from the National Asso
ciation of Certified Public Accountants chiefly through the payment
of a ten dollar fee, it is surprising that not more cases arose for
litigation.22
Another case involving the false issue of the certified public
accountant’s certificate came before the supreme court of North
Carolina. The North Carolina state board of accountancy shortly
after the world war adopted the practice of holding its regular
certified public accountants’ examination in Raleigh and two weeks
later holding a duplicate examination in Washington, D. C. for the
convenience of North Carolinian applicants who were in Wash20 People v. Marlowe, 203 N. Y. S. 474, 40 N. Y. Cr. R. 448.
21 Henry v. State, 260 S. W. 190, 97 Tex. Cr. R. 67. Crow v. State, 260 S. W.
573, 97 Tex. Cr. R. 98.
22 Nat. Ass’n. of C. P. A.s v. U. S., 292 F. 668, 53 App. D. C. 391.
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ington. As a matter of fact, North Carolinians traveled from
Raleigh to Washington to take the duplicate examination. The
supreme court of North Carolina in this case, McCullough v.
Scott,23 enjoined the state board of accountancy from holding its
certified public accountants’ examination outside the state of North
Carolina. A portion of the opinion reads:
“The state in the lawful exercise of its police power has created
the state board of accountancy and required examinations of applicants
to safeguard the public against incompetent accountants. Every citizen
of the state is in a certain sense injured when the duties of the board
are performed in such a manner as to let down the bars and lower the
standards of the profession. There is an especial injury to properly
accredited members of the profession who have met the conditions im
posed by law, in the manner prescribed by law. Poor Richard says,
‘He who hath a trade hath an estate.’ A man’s profession is his
capital. The state has set standards for entrance into this profession,
and those who have entered in the manner prescribed by law are
entitled to the protection of the state to the extent, at least, that they
shall not be unjustly discriminated against by admission of others into
the profession in any other way than that prescribed by law.”

In McCullough v. Scott the court based its judgment largely on
three principles:
(1) That the state board of accountancy was a quasi-public cor
poration and was prevented from holding its examinations in
Washington under a state statute which makes ultra-vires acts of
corporations illegal.
(2) That the giving of examinations was not a mere incidental
or ministerial duty such as might be delegated by the state board
of accountancy to others, but was a judicial or quasi-judicial duty
required to be performed by the members themselves. Hence, the
board was not permitted to hold its examinations outside North
Carolina for the reason that by well-settled law the place of sitting
of a court must be limited to the territory of its jurisdiction.
(3) That the act of the board in letting down the bars to the
issuance of certificates was detrimental to the interests of the public
and the certified public accountants who had met the legal require23109 S. E. 789, 182 N. C. 865 (1921)
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ments for their certificates. It is well-settled law that an abuse of
discretionary power of a public officer, resulting in favoritism to a
few and discrimination against others is contrary to the due process
and equal protection clauses of our constitutions.
The principles set forth in the present case are supported by the
great weight of authority.24
Another case, State v. De Verges,25 involving the false assump
tion of the certified public accountant’s certificate, arose in Louisi
ana. The supreme court of that state in 1923 held:
“It is important to note that the law does not purport to prevent
or punish the practising of accountancy without a licence or certifi
cate from the board, but only the holding of one’s self out to the
public as possessing the certificate which it is authorized to issue
under the provisions of the act, the practising as a certified public
accountant, and the using of the abbreviation ‘C.P.A.’, or similar
letters or designation, to deceive the public into believing that the
person so acting is a certified public accountant under the law, with
out first undergoing the examination by the state board of accountants
as required by said statute and otherwise complying therewith. In
other words, any one is at liberty to practise as an accountant, not
withstanding this law, so long as he does not represent himself to be a
certified public accountant, as defined thereby, or use the abbreviation
‘C.P.A.’ or similar letters or device to indicate that he is a certified
public accountant.
“It is true that neither morals, health nor safety of any one is
jeopardized by the practising of this profession, public accounting,
however incompetent a person may be, but the power of the state in
matters of this sort is not confined to professions involving such con
sequences. It may also act whenever the general welfare requires to
protect the public in the skilled trades and professions against igno
rance, incompetence and fraud.”

State v. De Verges held that the state was in the lawful exercise
of its police power in prohibiting the false assumption of the certi
fied public accountant’s designation. In the interest of public welfare
a state is empowered to protect the public from ignorance, incom
petence and fraud resulting from the false assumption of the
certified public accountant’s title.
24 W illoughby on the Constitution, volum e II, sec. 759.
25 95 So. 805, 153 La. 349, 27 A. L. R. 1526.
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Only one American case, Goldsmith v. Jewish Press Publishing
Company,26 deals with the publisher’s responsibility for falsely ad
vertising a person as a certified public accountant. This case, decided
by the New York supreme court in 1922, set forth dicta to the
effect that under the New York penal law relating to untrue and
misleading advertisements a publisher is an accessory to a misde
meanor if he publishes, after notice, an advertisement which falsely
represents one as a certified public accountant.
This New York case was not a criminal action. Had it been, the
publisher, who printed the advertisement falsely representing the
accountant as being certified, doubtless would have been held crim
inally liable.
The public accountancy statutes of the District of Columbia and
all of the states of the union are silent on the liability of a pub
lisher who prints a false advertisement of a public accountant. It is
probable, however, that the general statutes covering false advertise
ments would in most of the other jurisdictions of our union, as
in the state of New York, make it a misdemeanor for a publisher
to advertise falsely for any one the certified public accountant’s title.
In the present case a public accountant certified in New York
sought to enjoin the defendant publisher from publishing the false
advertisement. The court refused to uphold the injunction because
the plaintiff had not showed any financial loss as a result of the
false advertisement. It is a fundamental rule in equity that an in
junction restraining a criminal act will never be given merely be
cause the act would be a crime.27 Protection of the public from
crimes by punishment under the criminal law is the normal and
usual means by which organized society guards against the anti
social conduct of its members. But where the criminal law will
not afford an adequate relief a court of equity will enforce the
injunction.
Though the legal principles upon which the case is founded are
sound, it seems that the judge underestimated the financial loss that
26 195 N . Y. S. 37, 118 Misc. Rep. 789.
27 W alsh on Equity, sec. 39.
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may come to bona-fide certified public accountants as a result of
competitors’ falsely holding themselves out as certified public ac
countants. Proof of substantial competition between the plaintiff
and the accountants whose false advertisements were printed should
be sufficient grounds for restraining the publisher from continuing
the false advertisements. It is quite conceivable that a fine assessed
upon the publisher may not be sufficient to cause him to discontinue
the printing of the false advertisements.
The court’s interpretation of the New York penal law making
it a misdemeanor to publish untrue and misleading advertisements
is correct. But courts in the future should allow the injunction to
prevent the publication of advertisements falsely representing per
sons as certified public accountants where the only evidence of
financial loss sustained by the plaintiff is proof of substantial com
petition between the plaintiff and the accountants falsely advertis
ing themselves as certified in the area of competition.28
C ancellation

of a

C ertified P ublic A ccountant ’s C ertificate

All the states and the District of Columbia provide in their
statutes for the cancellation of the certified public accountant’s cer
tificate by a governmental body of properly constituted authority.
Most of the states vest that power in the board of public account
ancy, a few in the state university, some in the courts of competent
jurisdiction and others in the governor.29 The usual provision is for
the revocation to be effected upon proof of bad moral character,
dishonesty, conviction of crime, incompetency or unprofessional
conduct.
Court decisions have upheld the statutes empowering the state
board of public accountancy to revoke certified public accountants’
certificates. In 1922 the supreme court of Alabama was asked to
grant an injunction in the case of Lehmann v. State Board of
Public Accountancy 30 to prevent the Alabama state board of public
28 N ote: For a treatm ent of the ethics of professional advertising by the public
accountant, see, on pages 226 and 227, sections 11 and 12 of the “rules of profes
sional conduct of the American Institute of Accountants.”
29 Certified Public Accountant Laws of the United States, American Institute
Publishing Co., Inc., N ew York, 1930.
30 94 So. 94, 208 Ala. 185. (Affirmed by United States supreme court, 44 S. Ct.
128, 263 U. S. 394, 68 L. Ed. 354.)
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accountancy from hearing charges preferred by other public ac
countants against one Lehmann, a certified public accountant. The
injunction also sought to prevent the board of public accountancy
from cancelling Lehmann’s certificate. The court held:
“* * * Hence there is no equity in the bill, for the reason that a
court of equity will not enjoin a board or commission vested with
quasi-judicial and administrative authority from acting as to matters
within their jurisdiction and power merely because it is apprehended
that they may decide erroneously. This is not a bill to restore to
complainant his right to a certificate or licence of which he has been
unlawfully deprived, nor to compel the issuance to him of a licence
or certificate to which he is entitled, but it is, essentially, a bill to
prevent the hearing of charges preferred against complainant.”

In Lehmann v. State Board of Public Accountancy the court
held that by the same authority—police power—under which the
state made provision by statute for the issuance of the certified
public accountant’s certificate the state was justified in making
provision by statute for the cancellation of certificates so issued.
The court held that the complainant accountant could not accept
the benefits of the public accountancy statute without bearing the
burdens or inconveniences imposed by it. The court further held
that the board of public accountancy is a quasi-judicial body whose
function it is to pass judgment upon the revocation as well as upon
the issuance of a certified public accountant’s certificate. It should
be remembered that in a case such as Lehmann v. State Board of
Public Accountancy the decision of the board is subject to review
by the courts of the particular jurisdiction, and if the board is
found to have acted arbitrarily and unreasonably, the courts will
overrule the board’s judgment.
That a state may enact and enforce statutes for the cancellation
of certified public accountants’ certificates and that a public account
ancy board may sit as a judicial or quasi-judicial body are wellestablished laws.
The supreme court of Alabama in the case of Miller v. Alabama
State Board of Public Accountancy 31 laid down the law that in
a trial to revoke a certified public accountant’s certificate members
31 98 So. 893, 212 Ala. 619 (1925).
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of the state board of public accountancy can not act both as pros
ecutors and as judges. A portion of the opinion follows:
“For the sake of brevity, we summarize the grounds of disqualifica
tion as follows: That appellees as individuals and also as members of
the social organization known as the Alabama Society of Certified
Public Accountants, of which they are members, contributed money
to the prosecution of the charges against appellant, then pending be
fore the board; that they had been active, personally and profession
ally, against appellant and were biased and prejudiced against him;
that they had theretofore taken an active part in procuring his ex
pulsion from said Alabama Society of Public Accountants, and which
expulsion appellees, sitting as members of the board, without notice
to appellant, had determined was sufficient cause for revocation of the
certificate; that ‘one or more’ members of the board had stated that,
in the hearing of this proceeding against appellant, the board would
revoke his certificate, irrespective of any proof or defense, and that,
so far as the board was concerned, ‘such certificate now stood as
revoked.’
“That the rule of disqualification applicable to judges extends also
to every tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions is
established by the decided weight of authority. * * *
“* * * Under the averments appellees are charged with a direct
interest in the proceedings against him and are both prosecutors and
judges in the same cause. The averments, for the present purposes,
being considered as admitted, we think, very clearly place appellees
within the influence of the rule of disqualification.”

It is a well-established principle of common and constitutional
law that a person who is personally interested in the outcome of a
trial is incapacitated to sit as a judge in the trial.32 Even the lay
man’s sense of justice would be averse, it would seem, to permitting
the members of a quasi-judicial board of public accountancy to
sit as judges in a case which the members had been actively
prosecuting.
In the Miller v. Alabama State Board of Public Accountancy
case it was argued by the defendant board that the doctrine of neces
sity should cause the court to refuse the mandamus petition to
compel the board members to recuse themselves from sitting as
32 15 R. C. L. 526.
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judges in the trial. It is an established rule of law that the dis
qualification of judges must yield to the demands of necessity, as,
for example, in cases where, if applied, it would destroy the only
tribunal in which relief could be had. But in the Miller case no
great necessity for a speedy settlement of the controversy existed,
since the public was not primarily concerned and the appellant
(accountant) could continue the practice of his profession until the
legislature made provision for the appointment of new members
of the board to sit in the trial.33
For the reasons given above, the court was justified in overruling
the lower court’s order sustaining the demurrer to the petition for
a writ of mandamus. In other words, the court rightly held that
the board members in the admitted circumstances would be dis
qualified to sit in the trial.
T he R eissuance of a C ertified P ublic A ccountant’s C ertificate
W hich H as B een C ancelled

The states differ in their laws relative to the reissuance of the
certified public accountant’s certificate after the certificate has been
lawfully cancelled. The statutes of Florida, Mississippi, New York
and Rhode Island specifically empower the boards of public ac
countancy 34 of those states to issue a new certified public account
ant’s certificate to a person whose certificate has been lawfully
revoked.35 The requirements of reissuance are left largely to the
discretion of the board of public accountancy. No cases testing these
statutes have arisen.
The statutes of the great majority of the states and the District
of Columbia do not specify directly the powers of the board of
public accountancy to reissue a certified public accountant’s cer
tificate which has once been lawfully cancelled. One court deci
sion, Wright v. Alabama Board of Public Accountancy, arising
under such a statute denied such power to the board.36
33 15 R. C. L. 541.
34 The board of certified public accountant examiners through power vested in
the board of regents of New York university, in the case of the state of New York.
35 Certified Public Accountant Laws of the United States, American Institute
Publishing Co., Inc., N ew York, 1930.
36 123 So. 33, 219 Ala. 632 (supreme court of Alabama, 1929).
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“The statute clearly confers no authority on the board, either ex
pressly or by necessary implication, to reinstate one whose certificate
has been cancelled for unprofessional conduct, or to revive and restore
to life a certificate so revoked and cancelled; and, if such certificate
was restored to the petitioner, it would confer no authority on him to
practise as a certified public accountant.”

In Wright v. Alabama Board of Public Accountancy the only
reason given by the court for refusing to compel the board to re
issue the cancelled certificate was that the power to reissue a cer
tificate cancelled for unprofessional conduct was not either expressly
or impliedly conferred by statute. The court implied in its opinion
that, if the legislature had conferred the power of reissue of a
cancelled certificate upon the board, the court would have upheld
the statute.
Doubtless occasions may arise in which it would be just for an
accountant to have reissued to him his certificate which was can
celled for a cause that no longer exists. It is probable that the courts
in states where statutes provide for the reissuance of certificates
cancelled for unprofessional conduct will uphold such statutes.
R estriction of T he P ractice of P ublic A ccounting to P ersons
W ho H old T he C ertified P ublic A ccountant’s C ertificate

Oklahoma,37 Illinois38 and Tennessee39 have enacted public
accountancy laws restricting the practice of public accounting to
certified public accountants; and the supreme court of each of those
states has declared such restrictive laws to be contrary to the four
teenth amendment to the constitution of the United States. The
Illinois case, Frazer v. Shelton, reads in part as follows:
“* * * Throughout the history of the law in relation to accountancy
in this and other states there runs a distinction between a public
accountant and a certified public accountant. * * * The act under con
sideration here not only does not destroy that distinction, but, on the
other hand, accentuates it. In the states of Louisiana, Maryland,
Michigan, North Carolina and Tennessee acts have been passed pro37 State v. Riedell, 233 P. 684, 109 Okla. 35, 42 A. L. R. 765 (1924).
38 Frazer v. Shelton, 150 N. E. 696, 320 Ill. 253, 43 A. L. R. 1086 (1926).
39 Campbell v. McIntyre, 52 S. W. (2d) 162, 165 Tenn. 47 (1932).
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viding for the registration of accountants, both as certified public
accountants and as public accountants. In none of these states, except
Tennessee, is one prohibited from practising accountancy, but the cer
tificate as certified public accountant is by the act taken as evidence
of investigation and certification of certain qualifications which are
not so signified by the certificate as public accountant. No one in the
four states mentioned is denied the right to do accounting for as
many persons as will employ him. Numerous states have likewise
provided that certain audits and investigations shall be made by
certified public accountants. In Massachusetts the legislature in 1921
passed an act authorizing certified public accountants, approved by
the state commissioner of banks, to make audits of savings banks.
Mass. gen. laws 1921, chap. 168, section 17. In Pennsylvania it is
provided that certain school districts may employ certified public
accountants to audit their books. Pa. laws 1925, p. 382, sections 2603,
2623. In Michigan, finance companies operating under declarations of
trust are required to be examined by the state banking commissoner,
who in turn is authorized to accept the report and audit of a certi
fied public accountant in place of such examination. Mich. pub. acts
1925, p. 461.
“* * * In 1924 congress created the United States board of tax
appeals * * *, authorized to adopt rules pertaining to the conduct of
its business. An examination of those rules discloses that the only
accountants authorized to appear and practice before those boards are
certified public accountants. * * *
“The right to follow any of the common occupations of life is
an inalienable right. That right is one of the blessings of liberty and
is accorded as a privilege to the citizens of the United States by the
preamble to the federal constitution and by the declaration of inde
pendence, under the language ‘pursuit of happiness.’ The right of a
citizen to pursue ordinary trades or callings upon equal terms with all
other persons similarly situated is a part of his right to liberty and
property. * * * ‘Liberty’, as used in the constitution, embraces the
free use by all citizens of their powers and faculties subject only to the
restraints necessary to secure the common welfare. The right to con
tract is both a liberty and a property right. * * *
“It is, of course, well established that the right to liberty, property
and the pursuit of happiness is subject to the reasonable exercise of the
police power of the states. The end to be secured by the exercise of
the police power is the furtherance of the public health, comfort,
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safety or welfare, and, unless an act restricting the ordinary occupa
tions of the citizen can be shown to fall within the police power
such act is void, as violating the right of the citizen to liberty and the
pursuit of happiness. W hether or not the regulation of an occupation
has in it the elements of protection to the public health, comfort,
safety or welfare is a matter not always easy to determine. The
question is here presented: Does the business of accounting affect the
public health, comfort, safety or welfare? Unless it does, its restric
tion is not permitted under the constitution. It is readily seen that
the profession of law, by reason of its influence on the safety of the
rights of property and liberty, does affect the public welfare; that the
science of medicine, surgery and other treatment of human ills or the
prevention of disease directly affects the public health; and that the
manner of construction of buildings may well be said to affect the
public safety. W hat is there in the business of accounting upon which
the exercise of the police power may be based? Any act of account
ing, as distinguished from bookkeeping, when for more than one
employer, is deemed by this act to be public accounting and may
not be engaged in without the prescribed certificate. The statute in
this case is not limited to those who would do an accounting business
with municipalities or other public agencies; therefore the necessity
for police regulation must appear, if at all, by reason of the relation
ship of an accountant to private business concerns by which he is
employed, and thereby to the public welfare. An ‘accountant,’ as
that term is defined by standard lexicographers, is one who is skilled
in, keeps or adjusts accounts. ‘Accounting’ is defined as the act or
system of making up or stating accounts. It is readily seen that an
incompetent accountant may render an inaccurate report and cause
his employer to make a business error. This creates no effect upon the
public, however, unless the relationship existing between the public
welfare and the private business so affected is so close as to establish
that influence. Assuming that an audit shows a business failure, such
failure, while by no means desirable, does not ordinarily affect the
public welfare, and, if it did, it is not the work of the accountant,
but the condition of the business, that bears such influence. In order
to say that private business must, in the interest of public welfare,
employ one certified by the state, it must appear that the effect of an
audit of that business is a matter of public welfare and not of private
concern. If it is the latter, the audit has no element of public welfare
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in it, and a law prohibiting or licensing the business of one who
makes such audit is but an unwarranted regulation of private busi
ness and the right to contract. To say that private business must
submit to an audit on stated occasions goes no further, in principle,
than to say that private business may not employ whom it chooses
to make such audit. While restrictions of such a character are im
posed upon public-utility corporations by reason of the interest of the
public therein, no law, so far as we are advised, has gone to the extent
of attempting to so regulate purely private business. The business of
accounting for private employers has in it none of the elements of a
public utility. Laws passed by various states on this subject have
authorized the conferring of degrees upon accountants who pass an
examination or have provided for the issuance of certificates of qualifi
cation. These laws have been passed in the interest of those engaged
in the business and for their protection and advantage rather than
in the interest of the public welfare.”

The holdings of the three cases on state statutes restricting the
practice of public accounting to accountants who are certified were
fundamentally the same. The conclusions of the opinions were to
the effect that restrictive legislation, (1) deprived the uncertified
public accountants of the liberty to choose and practise a common
occupation; (2) infringed upon the right of private business inter
ests to choose accountants to perform their auditing service; (3) was
not justified by police power in that the public welfare was not
promoted by such legislation.
(1) Let us consider the first of the three controlling principles
of these cases. It is unquestionable that the courts were correct in
their statement of our constitutional guaranties of liberty and prop
erty. In 1872 the minority of the United States supreme court in
the famous slaughter-house cases 40 defined property to mean not
merely physical things one might own, but one’s trade, calling or
the occupation which he pursues. The minority opinion also held
that liberty includes one’s right of choice, his right to choose a
calling, occupation, trade, or the direction in which he would
exercise his labor. The principles laid down in the minority holding
4 0 16 Wall. 36.
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of the slaughter-house cases were later made laws in the Minnesota
rate case 41 and in Allgeyer v. Louisiana.42
No one would argue that restriction of the practice of public ac
counting to those who are certified is not depriving uncertified
public accountants of liberty and property without due process of
law unless such restriction is justified as being in the interest of
the public welfare.
(2) In regard to the courts’ consideration of the right of a busi
ness to choose its auditors, it should be said that their statements
of the law relative to one’s right to enter into legitimate contracts
are correct. The Allgeyer case also held that the liberty mentioned
in the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution
includes the right of a person to enter into all contracts which may
be proper, necessary and essential in the pursuit of his livelihood
or vocation.
It can not be doubted that, under the well-settled constitutional
law of the United States, the denial to private business interests
of the right to choose the public accountants with whom they
would contract is a deprivation of the liberty of such business
operators.
(3) The statutes restricting the practice of public accounting to
certified public accountants are invalid in that they deprive persons
of liberty and property without due process of law, unless such
statutes are justified by a lawful exercise of the police power re
served to the states.
The police power of the state is the indefinite power reserved to
the state under the federal constitution to control men and things
so as to protect the public peace, safety, morals, health and welfare.
The interpretations of the police power change as each tomorrow
offers different social, political and economic conditions.43
During the first seventy-five years of our national history the
individualism of Adam Smith dominated political and legal think
ing. The police power of the state was greatly over-shadowed by
the prevailing public opinion to let every man find his own life,
41134 U. S. 418 (1890).
42 165 U. S. 578 (1897).
43 F. Harold Essert, What is Meant by Police Power? 12 Neb. L. B. 208-221.
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liberty and property, and seek protection for them as best he could,
with the least possible interference by the state.43 In an effort to
preserve this individualism the fourteenth amendment was made
a part of the constitution. However, following the civil war the
growth of population, the rise of urban life, and the industrializa
tion of business made a greater degree of social control imperative.
The changed social and economic conditions were reflected in the
United States supreme court’s allowing in the slaughter-house44
and the granger 4546cases a greater exercise of the police power of
the state. Until the present moment the police power of the state
has continued to be broadened in its application to meet the
changed political, social and economic conditions.
In a recent case, Home Building and Loan Association v. Blais
dell,46 Chief Justice Hughes of the United States supreme court
wrote the opinion which upheld the right, under the police power,
of Minnesota to delay the foreclosure of real-estate mortgages.
Holding that while emergency does not create power, emergency
may furnish the occasion for the exercise of power, Chief Justice
Hughes said, “It is manifest from this review of our decisions that
there has been a growing appreciation of public needs and of the
necessity of finding ground for a rational compromise between in
dividual rights and public welfare. The settlement and consequent
contraction of the public domain, the pressure of a constantly in
creasing density of population, the interrelation of the activities of
our people and the complexity of our economic interests have in
evitably led to an increased use of the organization of society in
order to protect the very bases of individual opportunity. Where,
in earlier days, it was thought that only the concerns of individual
or of classes were involved, and that those of the state itself were
touched only remotely, it has later been found that the fundamental
interests of the state are directly affected; and that the question is
no longer merely that of one party to a contract as against another,
but of the use of reasonable means to safeguard the economic
structure upon which the good of all depends.”
44 16 W all. 36.
45 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113.

46 54 S. Ct. 231 (1934).
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In view of the business events that have transpired during the
depression, in view of the widespread losses sustained by the in
vesting public due in no small measure to inadequate and incom
petent accounting reports, used as the bases for the sale of securities
to hundreds of thousands of investors in every part of the nation,
some means of securing more efficient public accounting services is
vital to the safeguard of “the economic structure upon which the
good of all depends.”
The federal government has realized the great importance of the
public accounting profession to the general public welfare in plac
ing upon public accountants, in the securities act of 1933 47 and
the securities exchange act of 1934,48 heavy penalties for preparing
or certifying financial statements known by such accountants to be
false. In fact, the United States government extends to certified,
and denies to uncertified, public accountants the privilege of prac
tice before the board of tax appeals.49
47 See page 76 of this treatise.
48 See page 86 of this treatise.
49 Note: Rules of Practice before the United States Board of Tax Appeals, revised
to Feb. 1, 1931, rule 2, admission to practice: “A register will be maintained by
the board in which will be entered the names of all persons entitled to practise
before the board. Corporations and firms will not be admitted or recognized.
“The following classes of persons whom the board finds, upon consideration of
their applications, to be citizens of the United States, of good moral character and to
possess the requisite qualifications to represent others may be admitted to practice
before the board:
“ (a) Attorneys-at-law ***
“ (b) Certified accountants duly qualified under the law of any state or territory
or the District of Columbia.
“An application under oath for admission to practice shall be addressed to the
United States board of tax appeals, Washington, D. C., and must state the name,
residence address and office address of the applicant, the applicant’s connection as
a member or an associate of any firm of attorneys or accountants, the name of
any professional societies of which applicant is a member, and the time and place
of his admission to the bar, or qualification as a certified public accountant. The
application of an attorney-at-law shall also state whether the applicant has ever
been suspended or disbarred from practice as an attorney in any court or before
any department or agency of the United States. The application of a certified public
accountant shall also state whether applicant has been suspended or expelled
from any professional society or society of certified public accountants, whether
his right to practise as a certified public accountant has ever been suspended or
revoked in any jurisdiction and whether applicant has ever been suspended or
disbarred from practice before any department or agency of the United States.
Such application shall be accompanied by a certificate of the clerk of the court
in which the applicant is admitted to practice to the effect that he has been
so admitted and is in good standing; or a certificate by the proper state, terri-
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The requirements for the issuance of the certified public account
ant’s certificate and the responsibilities attached to a continuous
holding of the certified public accountant’s certificate constitute a
great step in the direction of securing for private businesses and
the investing public alike honest and skillfully prepared accounting
reports.
The cases, Lehmann v. State Board of Public Accountancy, 208
Ala. 185, 94 So. 94, State v. De Verges, 153 La. 349, 95 So. 805,
People v. Marlowe, 203 N. Y. S. 474, and Henry v. State, 97 Tex.
crim. rep. 67, 260 S. W. 190, cited as authority for holding invalid
the restrictive statute merely stated that the statutes with which
those cases were concerned dealt only with the false assumption of
the certified public accountant’s certificate and not with the restric
tion of the practice of public accounting to those certified. It can
not be correctly said that these cases cited went further than to
imply dicta to the effect that restrictive legislation for public ac
countants is invalid.
In view of the present political, social and economic conditions
demanding greater control of private business, it is probable that
the United States supreme court would uphold a statute restricting
the practice of public accounting to those certified.
torial or district authority to the effect that the applicant is a certified public
accountant in good standing, duly qualified and entitled to practise in such state
or territory or the District of Columbia. Each applicant shall take an oath in
the form prescribed by the board.
“The board may, in its discretion, deny admission, suspend or disbar any
person who, it finds, does not possess the requisite qualifications to represent
others or is lacking in character, integrity or proper professional conduct. An
attorney or a certified public accountant who has been admitted to practice may
be disbarred only after he is afforded an opportunity to be heard.
“The board shall have the right at any time to require a statement, under
oath, of the terms and circumstances of any contract of employment of an
attorney or a certified public accountant with the taxpayer he represents.”

C hapter III

THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE PUBLIC ACCOUNT
AN T’S EXPERT TESTIMONY IN COURT
G eneral N

ature of

E xpert T estimony

entering upon consideration of the law relating specifi
cally to the expert testimony of public accountants, some atten
tion may well be devoted to the general nature of expert testimony.
Whether or not one is an expert witness is a matter of degree.1
Expertness is a result of experience. Between the extremes of a
baby with practically no experience and a highly trained technician
there are a great many degrees of expertness. Every one who takes
a witness stand has acquired many experiences in life; he has
formed concepts which make it possible for him to reach decisions
as to the matter that reacted upon his senses, about which he is
testifying. If the experience is one common to mankind, the wit
ness is presumed to be able to understand the meaning of what
he saw, heard, smelled, tasted or felt and can give to the court his
shorthand interpretation of his sensations, that is, his mental re
action to the happening at the moment of the experience. Though
the witness can not express his judgment on the main issue before
the trier of facts, he, in common with all mankind, must interpret
his sensations in the light of his past experience. If his experience
has been that common to mankind, then the witness is presumed
to be qualified to testify on an inferential fact which came into his
experience. In a sense, he is an expert; but he is not the sort of
expert who is required to have preliminary evidence of a knowledge,
skill and technique not common to mankind.
An expert witness, in the sense the term is generally used, means
one who possesses peculiar knowledge, wisdom, skill or information
efore

B

1 Wigmore on Evidence, volume I, section 555. McKelvey on Evidence, pp. 230271.
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in respect to a subject-matter under consideration. The knowledge
and technique of the expert witness must be such as is acquired
only by study, investigation, observation, practice or experience,
which does not fall to the lot of mankind in general. The witness
is said to be expert because he can present and interpret inferential
facts involving a science or an art not known to the average juror.
The expert witness is used in order to make the material under
review intelligible to the jurors who are presumed to have had
only the experience of men moving in the ordinary walks of life.
The jurors utilize the expert’s knowledge of facts and interpreta
tions for the same reason that the business man or layman seeks the
advice and aid of persons who possess special skill and technical
knowledge.2
The qualifications of the witness to produce expert testimony
should be shown by the witness’s statements in response to the
questioning of the proponent’s counsel. The right of crossexamination of the witness to determine his qualifications to testify
as an expert may be claimed by the opponent. The determination
of the competency of the witness to testify as an expert is always
left to the discretion of the trial judge. Appeal courts will not over
rule the trial court’s discretion in such matters except in extreme
cases of abuse, as where it is shown that the trial judge was
prejudiced.3
E nglish L aw R elative

to the

A dmissibility

of an

A ccountant ’s

E xpert T estimony

A careful search through the issues of the English professional
accountants’ organ, The Accountant, published in London, for the
years 1893 to 1933, inclusive, revealed several strong articles on the
technique of rendering service as an expert witness in accountancy
but not a single reference to any English statute or court decision
on the subject. Likewise, an exhaustive search through the English
digests of law revealed not a single case or statute on the scope of
the admissibility of an accountant’s expert testimony. A request
2 W igm ore on Evidence, 1923, volume I, sections 555 and 556. McKelvey on
Evidence, pp. 230-271.
3 22 Corpus Juris, p. 526, sec. 610.
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was sent to the editor of The Accountant for a statement of the
English law with respect to the admissibility of the expert testimony
of an accountant. The editor of The Accountant graciously set
forth the English law on the subject in a letter, dated November
24, 1933. A portion of the letter reads as follows:
“In reply to your letter of November 6th, your question is a
little difficult to answer as, so far as we are aware, the scope of the
evidence which an accountant is permitted to give has never been
legally defined, nor has there been any case on this point. As a matter
of practice, however, an accountant’s evidence is always admissible on
any question of practice relating to the audit or presentation of
accounts or on such matters as professional charges.”
A merican L aw R elative
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No law in American jurisprudence relating peculiarly to ac
countants is so well defined and settled as that concerning the ad
missibility of the testimony of an expert accountant. More than
three score of cases have included rulings on the admissibility of
an expert accountant’s testimony. One case dates as far back as
1854; other cases were spread sparingly from that date to 1920;
then from 1921 until 1934 a great many decisions arose clarifying
the law on the accountant as a witness.
The case rulings on admissibility of the accountant’s testimony
have grown out of both criminal and civil actions; and in these
rulings no distinction is made between civil and criminal actions.
T h e A dmissibility

of

A ccounting R ecords

as

E vidence

The admissibility of an accountant’s statements and schedules
and also his expert testimony must necessarily be predicated upon
the admissibility of the accounting records themselves as evidence
in court. The law relative to the admissibility of accounting records
has evolved through a steady process of growth; and to obtain a
proper understanding of its present status it is necessary to follow
this growth.
As early as 1600 in England traders and handicraftsmen estab
lished the custom of recording in their books (parties’ account-
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books) evidence of sales made on account. Quite often the trader
or handicraftsman failed to give customers credit for their pay
ments and used their bookkeeping records to prove in court the
claims against the customers who in fact had already settled their
debts. These records were regularly admitted as evidence in court,
whether the entries were made by the owner or by one or more
of his clerks and whether the entrant were living or dead. To cor
rect this abuse a series of statutes was passed in the reign of
Charles I. The statutes virtually prohibited the admission of parties’
account-books, i.e., books prepared by the litigant himself, as
evidence.4 The statutes were based on the theory that a man should
not be permitted to make evidence for himself. It was not until the
nineteenth century that parties’ account-books, that is, books pre
pared by the litigant himself, were, by statute, made admissible
evidence in England.5
However, in the eighteenth century the English courts held that
records prepared by servants or clerks who swore under oath that
they prepared the records in the usual course of business for their
master were admissible evidence. The decisions also provided that,
in case the clerk or servant had died, proof that the records were
prepared by such clerk or servant in the usual course of the business
rendered the records admissible evidence. A little later, in the nine
teenth century, the general scope of the rule was enlarged so as to
cover all entries made “by a person, since deceased, in the ordinary
course of business,” whether a person wholly unassociated with the
owner or the clerk of the owner or the owner himself. This rule is
universally recognized in England today.6
In the American colonies laws were passed making parties’
account-books inadmissible evidence where the entries were made
by the party himself, unless such party swore to the accuracy of the
entries under oath. Such statutes made it possible for small traders
to produce evidence in court, even though such traders were them
selves incompetent to take the stand, by merely swearing to the
genuineness of the records. The parties’ account-books subject to a
4 Wigmore on Evidence, volume III, sec. 1518.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
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great many limitations are still admitted in American courts under
the parties’-account-books doctrine.
The practice of admitting as evidence a litigant’s accounting rec
ords prepared by third persons, such as clerks, servants or strangers
since deceased was established by the American courts in the early
part of the nineteenth century, following the English decisions on
the point. This rule for the admissibility of a litigant’s records pre
pared by a third person in the regular course of the litigant’s busi
ness as evidence in court, rather than the rule of the parties’ accountbooks, is generally applied today in American cases wherever the
question of the admissibility of accounting records arises.
It is worth while to consider the nature of the doctrines of the
parties’ account-books and the third person’s entries in the regular
course of the litigant’s business.
While in the early English law the admission of account-books as
evidence was objected to on the ground that a man should not be
allowed to make evidence for himself, in more recent times the
usual objection to such evidence is that accounting records are past,
extrajudicial, hearsay data. However, modern courts generally hold
that accounting records constitute an exception to the hearsay rule
of evidence. The reasons for making this exception to the hearsay
rule are given below separately for the doctrine of regular entries
in general and the doctrine of parties’ account-books.
The regular entries in general are accepted as admissible evidence
because of necessity and the circumstantial guaranty of trustworthi
ness.7 Where the entrant is unavailable the records themselves may
be admissible because the records are the only testimony available
from the entrant.
The entrant is deemed unavailable to testify in case of: (a)
death; (b) insanity; (c) illness effectively preventing attendance;
(d) absence from the jurisdiction. It is held by some courts that,
on the ground of inconvenience, it is not necessary in a large
business to have all the employees who had anything to do with
the transactions under consideration testify, but that, instead, the
records verified by one employee may be admitted as evidence.
7 Wigmore on Evidence, vol. III, secs. 1521-1535.
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Practical inconvenience as an excuse, subject to the judge’s dis
cretion to require the entrant’s production for cross-examination
where the nature of the dispute renders it desirable, should be the
guiding principle for courts to follow. In fact, statutes provide for
the admission of corporation books, banker’s books, hospital books,
and common carrier’s books as evidence without the verification
of those who had to do with the records.
Beside necessity there is the circumstantial guaranty of trust
worthiness which justifies the admission of regular entries in gen
eral, which, of course, are not subject to cross-examination. The
courts agree that: (a) the habit of making entries with regularity
insures, in some degree, accuracy and honesty—it is easier to enter
transactions correctly than to falsify them; (b) the entrant generally
realizes that his errors or misstatements will eventually be disputed
by customers or others with whom his employer deals; hence, the
entrant will be inclined to make his entries correct; (c) the proba
bility of censure from his employer is a strong deterrent to the
entrant against his making erroneous records.
The circumstantial guaranties of trustworthiness may be over
come by proof of a motive to prepare false records.
The entries offered as evidence must relate to the business and
must have been made in the regular course of the business—they
must be a part of the system of entries. A single, isolated entry
made after the books have been closed is not admissible. Whether
or not an entry has been made in the regular course of the business
is a matter for the trial judge to determine. An entry to be ad
missible must have been made at or near the time of the occurrence
of the transaction. In the usual course of a business the entries are
prepared contemporaneously with the transaction. In making the
entries there is no limitation as to the mode of written expression.
A mark or sign that is interpretable as having a definite meaning
will suffice. The absence of an entry where an entry ordinarily
would have been made had there been a transaction should be
interpreted to mean that no transaction occurred. While in some
jurisdictions the original memoranda of the transactions have been
required as evidence, generally the original records, the journals,
are all of the records that courts require as evidence. Some courts
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have allowed the ledger to which were posted the journal entries
as evidence where the journals could not be produced.
The parties’ account-books were made admissible evidence in
exception to the hearsay rule because of necessity and the circum
stantial guaranty of trustworthiness.8 Though, under modern rules
of evidence, the justification of the admission of the parties’ accountbooks as evidence on the ground of necessity is not plausible, the
rule admitting such books as evidence persists in exception to the
hearsay rule. The parties’ account-books were made admissible in
the colonial and state courts of America to meet the needs of the
early small traders who kept their own accounts and were not
competent to give evidence under a rule of evidence then existing,
which prevented an interested party from testifying in a trial.
The great limitations upon the use of the parties’ account-books
(often called parties’ shop-books in legal discussion) as evidence
may be recognized after a presentation of a few of the restrictive
rules. The trader’s own entries of cash payments or loans were not
admissible because the trader could have notes or other memo
randa of such transactions. A few courts have admitted such evi
dence under the parties’-account-books doctrine, while many other
courts have admitted this sort of evidence, that is, entries of cash
payments and loans recorded by the owner himself, under the
doctrine of entries made in the regular course of the business, as
explained above. Under the latter doctrine the regularity of the
entries during the usual course of the business is the basis of the
trustworthiness of the entries and is the justification of their ad
mission. Under the parties’-account-books rule entries of a guaranty
for the performance of a third person have been held inadmissible
where the third person’s evidence was available. Under the parties’account-books rule an entry of a special contract was not admissible
evidence where the special written contract itself was available.
Also, in certain occupations the parties’ account-books were not
admissible evidence where better evidence could be obtained. For
instance, it was deemed that pupils afforded better evidence than
the schoolmaster’s records. Finally, the admission of the parties’
8W igm ore on Evidence, vol. III, secs. 1536-1561.
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account-books was limited to small transactions and transactions
not in violation of good morals.
The rules involved in the parties’ account-books doctrine were
and are extremely rigid.9 Under such rules the parties’ accountbooks may be admissible even though witnesses of the transactions
are available, and they may not be admissible even though wit
nesses of the transactions are not available. The admissibility of the
records is not dependent upon the actual necessity of the particular
case, but upon the question whether or not the case falls within the
requirements of the doctrine of the parties’ account-books.
In addition to the description of the parties’-account-books doc
trine already presented, a consideration of some other characteristics
of the doctrine is desirable. The circumstantial guaranties of trust
worthiness of the party’s entries in his own books are based upon
the belief that regularity of habit, difficulty of falsification and fair
certainty of detection will balance or outweigh his tendency to
falsify his records for self-interest. Under this doctrine it is required
that the entries be contemporaneous with the transactions—that
the books present an honest appearance. In some states the supple
tory oath that the books were correctly kept is still required by
statute; while in other jurisdictions cross-examination of the litigant
who prepared the books is allowed to take the place of his supple
tory oath. Finally, under the parties’-account-books doctrine courts
interpret an omission of an entry to mean that no transaction
occurred.
Under modern legislation removing the disqualification of wit
nesses on account of interest in the issue, a party to a suit has been
made competent to testify in his own behalf; 10 hence, there no
longer exists the necessity of introducing the party’s account-books
prepared by himself. The party produces infra-judicial evidence
himself; he is subject to cross-examination and uses his records
merely to refresh his memory. In taking the witness stand the party
is not now subject to all the delimitations surrounding his account
books as was the case when he had to offer his own account-books
9 W igm ore on Evidence, vol. III, secs. 1536-1561.
10 W igm ore on Evidence, vol. III, secs. 1559, 1560.
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as evidence because of the fact that he was not permitted to testify
in his own interest.
Though it remains possible under American law, as a result of
tradition, to admit as evidence parties’ account-books, it is generally
not wise to do so because of the many rigid limitations placed upon
such evidence. The usual course of practice is to use the parties’
account-books merely to refresh the memory of the party witness
and thus avoid the inconveniences concomitant with the accountbooks doctrine. Records prepared by persons unavailable are ad
missible under the doctrine for entries prepared in the regular
course of business, which has already been described.11
In the preceding pages the discussion has been concerned with
the admission of the party’s records as evidence to support his own
case. The extent to which a party’s records may be used as evidence
against him or to support the cause of the opponent in the suit
deserves consideration. Let us now in this consideration shift the
point of view, the owner of the records becoming the partyopponent and the one seeking such records as evidence becoming
the party.
During the eighteenth century the chancery of England regularly
enforced what was known as a bill for discovery to require a partyopponent to produce to the court for inspection any documents
containing evidence which bore on the party’s case. The party was
not permitted to inspect any portion of the documents not directly
supporting the party’s case. In other words, the party was not
allowed to inspect such portions of the documents as bore solely
upon the party-opponent’s case. It is apparent that it was impossible
in many cases to separate the information into the two classes of
data. But such was the theory of the rule; and the rule was applied
regularly in equity trials.
The common-law courts would not enforce the discovery of the
party-opponent’s records. However, a litigant in a common-law
court could obtain either production or access for inspection of
his opponent’s records by filing with the chancery a bill for dis
covery. This process was long, tedious and expensive. At present
statutes in England and America have extended to the litigant in a
11 Wigmore on Evidence, volume III, sections 1517-1561.
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civil action the same privilege of discovering the genuineness and
contents of his opponent’s records as may be obtained in an equi
table proceeding. This privilege is allowed after the issues are
joined either before or during the trial. Under authority granted
by the statutes the court compels either the production or access for
inspection of the party-opponent’s records usually through a sub
poena or the traditional order for discovery utilized by the chancery.
Before the records are submitted to the party for inspection, the
court determines what information may be sought by the party in
establishing his own case.12
The party-opponent is exempt from disclosure of his records
where his records contain self-incriminating evidence or certain
trade secrets. The matter of privilege for an accountant’s working
papers would follow the principles governing the admissibility of
confidential communications between accountant and client. (See
page I75.)
As a result of centuries of legal conflict the principle that a
witness is entitled to immunity from the production of selfincriminating evidence has become well established in the common
and constitutional law of England and America. This privilege
merely protects one from the disclosure of his privately owned rec
ords by means of a legal process against him as a witness. If through
a subpoena or any other order of the court in a process treating
one as a witness it is sought to compel an ordinary witness or a
party-witness to produce his privately owned accounting records
the tendency of which is self-incriminatory, the witness may have
full protection in refusing to give up custody of the records. By
virtue of the testimonial process the witness would at any time be
liable to take oath to the identity or authenticity or origin of the
accounting records. The oath in such circumstances would violate
the privilege of immunity from self-incriminating testimony.
Hence, the courts deny such evidence produced through any testi
monial compulsion. But, on the other hand, if the accounting
records are obtained, not through a testimonial process, but through
any means, legal or not legal, the records may be used to incrimi
nate the ordinary witness or the party-witness, provided the proof
12 Wigmore on Evidence, volume III, secs. 1857-1861, and volume IV, sec. 2219.
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of their identity, authenticity or other circumstance affecting them
is made by other persons, without any employment of the accused’s
oath or testimonial responsibility.13
Records of the government and accounting records of corpora
tions and banks are not deemed privately owned records of the
officers of such institutions and can be produced in court, where
removal from the institution is not prohibited by statute, even by
testimonial process to afford evidence against accused officers. Even
where removal is prohibited by statute, courts will enforce the
testimonial process to gain access to the records of such institutions.
It has been held that where it can be shown that records nominally
belong to a corporation but in reality belong to an officer of the
corporation such records may be withheld by an accused corporate
officer against a testimonial process.14
Courts in England and America generally allow to a limited
degree freedom from disclosure of private trade secrets. The private
secrets which are protected by the privilege of non-disclosure in
court may be the chemical and physical composition of substances,
the mechanical structure of tools and machines, names of customers
and the subjects and amounts of expense. In order that the freedom
from disclosure of trade secrets may be obtained the exigency of
secrecy must be made particularly plain to the court. Generally, the
privilege is allowed only when the disclosure of the secret facts is
merely a subordinate means of proof as compared to the other
available evidence in the case. Often the disclosure is restricted to
the judge or his delegate; and in this way a fair degree of pro
tection is obtained. Where full disclosure of trade secrets appears
to the judge as being indispensable to the ascertainment of truth,
revelation is generally required. The principles governing the
privilege of trade secrets apply to the production or access to
accounting records as well as to other documents and testimonial
evidence.15
13 Note: A much criticized minority holding has broken away from the longsettled fundam entals, and has held that the party whose docum ents were obtained

by illegal search has a right to obtain their return by motion before the trial,
Weeks v. U. S., 232 U. S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 341 (1914), Flagg v. U. S., 233 Fed.
481 (1916). The Flagg case applies specifically to books and papers.
14 Wigmore on Evidence, vol. IV, secs. 2250-2265.
15 Wigmore on Evidence, vol. IV, sec. 2212.

A dmissibility
A dmissibility
S chedules

of an
of

of

A ccountant ’s T estimony

E xpert A ccountant ’s S tatements

V olum inous

and

153
and

M ultifarious B ooks

In 1854 the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts held, as ad
missible, evidence consisting of summary statements of accounting
records in the case of Boston & Worcester Railroad Corporation v.
Dana 16 in the following language:
“The defendant further objects that schedules, made from the
original papers and documents previously proved in the case, showing
certain data and results obtained therefrom, and verified by the wit
ness by whom they were prepared, were improperly admitted. But it
appears to us that questions of this sort must necessarily be left very
much to the discretion of the judge who presides at the trial. It would
doubtless be inexpedient in most cases to permit ex-parte statement
of facts or figures to be prepared and submitted to the jury. It should
only be done where books and documents are multifarious and
voluminous, and of a character to render it difficult for the jury to
comprehend material facts without the aid of such statements, and
even in such cases they should not be admitted, unless verified by
persons who have prepared them from the originals in proof, and
who testify to their accuracy, and after ample time has been given
to the adverse party to examine them and test their correctness. Such
was the course pursued in the present case, and there can be no doubt
that, in a trial embracing so many details and occupying so great a
length of time as the case at bar, during which a great mass of
books and documents were put in evidence, it was the only mode of
attaining to an intelligible view of the cause before the jury.”

In the Boston & Worcester Railroad Corporation v. Dana case
the court held that, because of the need of presenting to the jury
an intelligible view of multifarious and voluminous accounting
records, summary statements and schedules of such records were
admissible as evidence provided the persons who prepared the
statements and schedules verified their accuracy and provided the
adverse party had ample time and opportunity to examine and
test the accuracy of the summaries. Apparently there is no Ameri
can authority in conflict with the principle of this case. Much of
the language of the case has been appropriated in more than a
16 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 83.
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score of the cases cited in the succeeding pages of this chapter. A
holding almost identical was rendered in 1930 by the Ohio court of
appeals.17 Without question the principle of the above case may
be accepted as established law.
A dmissibility of E xpert T estimony of an A ccountant

In 1899 the rule in Boston & Worcester Railroad Corporation v.
Dana, supra, was broadened by the supreme court of California
in the case of Crusoe v. Claris 18 so as to make admissible the tes
timony of an accountant who has summarized the records in ques
tion.
The American courts are uniform in holding that an accountant’s
expert testimony is admissible. A clear justification of the rule was
set forth in 1932 by the supreme court of Mississippi in the case of
Crawford v. State 19 as follows:
“An elemental requirement in the production of evidence is that
it shall be intelligible to the triers of the facts and to the person
being tried; and the further requirement is that it shall be definite
and that the right of cross-examination shall be preserved. Moreover,
the production must be in such a state of preparation as to expedite
the trial and prevent trespasses upon the time of courts and juries.
It follows, therefore, that, when intricate accounts and voluminous
business records are to be inquired into and the facts upon particu
lar issues said to be disclosed by said records are to be adduced in
proof, it must be done by way of the previous preparation, by a
competent person, of definite ana pertinent schedules, tabulations, or
other suitable and practical compilations, and the person who has
made the compilations must be introduced as a witness, so that the
records in evidence may be explained and the pertinent parts thereof
definitely and cogently pointed out, and so that cross-examination
may be permitted to search into the soundness of the compilations or
schedules and of a reasonable compliance with the foregoing require
ments, a pile of books of account will prove no more in law than, as a
practical matter, they have disclosed in a concrete and definite form
to the minds of those who are to determine the issue or issues, and
17 McNaughton v. Presbyterian Church, 172, N. E. 561, 35 Ohio App. 443.
18 50 P. 700, 127 Cal. 341.

19 138 So. 589.
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this, save in rare cases, could reasonably be, in actual and dependable
substance, but little more than nothing.”

In Crawford v. State the court gave as a reason for making ad
missible the expert accountant’s testimony as to the content and
meaning of intricate and voluminous accounting records the need
for the jury to obtain an understanding of the accounting mate
rial. It is apparent to the layman that accounting records are unin
telligible to the average juror, and that without an explanation of
such records the average jury would be left without a proper
understanding of the inferential facts of the case. Necessity is the
justification of the rule. The rule is uniformly accepted in American
courts.
T h e P arol-evidence R ule

and the

E xpert A ccountant ’s

T estimony

The parol-evidence rule renders inadmissible any evidence the
effect of which is to vary the terms of a written instrument or to
change, cut down or alter the effect of the instrument.20 The rule
applies to written instruments which give evidence of voluntary
relations between two or more parties—relations which may be
created, defined, transferred or extinguished by expressed will of
the parties. Among examples of such voluntary relations are sales,
contracts, negotiable instruments, wills, releases and deeds.
Generally, contracts are expressed in writing to avoid the indefi
niteness and misunderstanding which often accompany oral agree
ments. In the writing of a contract there is generally a greater
amount of deliberation and consideration than is found in the mak
ing of oral contracts. Hence, the courts are disinclined to disturb
the condition of matters embodied in a written contract. The courts
generally refuse to admit evidence tending to show that the parties
had intentions different from those revealed by the writing itself.
This rule, however, is so narrowly circumscribed by exceptions
that it has well nigh ceased to be a rule of law. The rule is little
more than a convenient way of saying that the party to a valid
contract should live up to his agreement.
20 McKelvey on Evidence, fourth edition, pp. 475-491.
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Oral evidence may be introduced to show that a contract is not
what it appears from the writing to be. Since, after all, the binding
effect of an agreement is dependent upon circumstances external to
the writing itself, oral evidence may be used to invalidate the
agreement on account of fraud in the execution of the agreement,
failure of consideration, duress, undue influence or a mistake as
to the identity of the subject matter involved. Where the full tenor
of an agreement does not appear from the writing, collateral oral
testimony may be offered to show fully the parties’ intentions.
Such incompleteness of the instrument must appear from either the
writing itself or the surrounding circumstances. Any collateral oral
agreement modifying or rescinding a written agreement, if made
subsequent to the written agreement, may be proved in court. Where
a business custom enters into and becomes a part of a contract,
such custom may be proved by oral testimony if the writing is
silent as to the custom. It has been repeatedly held that where
technical language, signs or abbreviations have been employed in a
written contract expert witnesses may give explanations and in
terpretations of the instrument so that the jury may acquire an
understanding of the intentions of the parties to the agreement.21
The American courts are uniform in holding that the testimony
of an expert accountant does not come within the parol-evidence
rule. The supreme court of North Carolina in 1928 definitely stated
the position of the American courts in the case of State v. Maslin 22
as follows:
“Several exceptions relate to expert testimony which was admitted
to elucidate certain entries in the books of the bank. The objection is
that the entries were free from ambiguity and that parol evidence
was not admissible in explanation. The principle that as a rule parol
evidence can not be received to contradict, alter or modify the terms
of a written instrument which speaks for itself has no application
here. The evidence was offered for the purpose of tracing sundry
entries on the books through a series of transactions which tended
to show that funds had been taken from the trust account and else
where applied. It is hard to see how the jury could have understood
21 McKelvey on Evidence, fourth edition, pp. 475-491.
22 143 S. E. 3, 195 N. C. 537.
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the significance of these entries without the aid of expert testimony,
or how they could have taken the books and satisfactorily have traced
any of the funds while making up their verdict. The entries were not
changed; their meaning was explained. There was no invasion of
the province of the jury by the expression of an opinion upon a fact
in issue. * * *”

California has provided by statute that the expert testimony of
an accountant is an exception to the rule that the only evidence of
the contents of a writing is the writing itself. That statute was
quoted in part by the supreme court of California in 1930 in the
case of Johnstone v. Morris 23 as follows:
“* * * Section 1855 of the code of civil procedure provides in part:
‘There can be no evidence of the contents of a writing, other than the
writing itself, except in the following cases: * * * 5. W hen the original
consists of numerous accounts or other documents, which can not be
examined in court without great loss of time, and the evidence sought
from them is only the general result of the whole.’
“Although it is true that Mr. Dolge did not do all of the actual
checking required, we do not deem that essential to permit the sum
mary to be introduced. He testified very clearly that his report was
made from the original tags, cheques, and books of account, and
that he had personal knowledge of the same. The tags, cheques and
books were all made available to appellant, and could all have been
introduced into evidence, but it was to prevent such a time-wasting
and lengthy procedure that section 1855, subdivision 5, of the code of
civil procedure was passed. * * *”

In each of the two cases, State v. Maslin and Johnstone v. Morris,
supra, the court admitted as evidence the expert accountant’s
explanations of the accounting records under consideration. This
is in harmony with the well-settled law which permits oral testi
mony to explain technical matters included in written agree
ments.24 The rule is enforced to give to the jury a proper under
standing of the written data in the shortest and easiest way possible.
23 292 P. 970.
24 McKelvey on Evidence, 4th ed., pp. 487-490. Quigley v. De Haas, 98 Pa. 299.
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T h e A ccountant ’s E xpert T estimony N ot B arred
of

H

earsay or

by th e

R ules

P rimary E vidence

If A, while on the witness stand, testifies as to what he heard
B, who is not a witness or a party to the suit, say in regard to fact
X, which is the subject of proof, A’s assertion is hearsay evidence.
Hearsay evidence is testimony of something that has been said or
written by a person who is not a witness or a party to the suit.
The general rule followed by courts in respect to hearsay evidence
is to reject such evidence because it has not been tested by crossexamination. A fundamental rule of law in England and America
is the requirement that all evidence be purified by the process of
cross-examination. The cross-examination allowed to the opposing
party is designed to reveal the errors, inconsistencies and false
hoods of the testimony of the witness. The right of cross-examina
tion is thought by some eminent jurists to be the greatest legal
engine ever invented to test the trustworthiness of evidence and to
discover the truth.25
However, the test of cross-examination may be dispensed with
where the necessities of the case require evidence from witnesses
who are unavailable and where the circumstances are such as to
make it sufficiently clear that the evidence is free from inaccuracy
and untrustworthiness. If a witness is unavailable by reason of
death, absence from the jurisdiction or any other cause acceptable
to the court, the court is presented with the alternative of receiv
ing the statements of the witness without the test of cross-examina
tion or failing to utilize the knowledge of the witness. In a situa
tion of this sort the court is always confronted with the problem
of determining whether in the interest of truth it would be better
to reject or to receive such information untested by cross-examina
tion. If in addition to the necessity of receiving statements from an
unavailable witness there is some degree of trustworthiness more
than the ordinary to be expected of the statements, the statements
may be admitted as evidence. Courts have not attempted to obtain
uniformity in the degree of trustworthiness which various circum
stances presuppose. The courts take the view that common sense
25Wigmore on Evidence, volume III, sec. 1367.
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and experience have from time to time pointed out certain circum
stances as practically adequate substitutes for the test of crossexamination wherever there exists a necessity of the information
in the case.
In permitting exceptions to the hearsay rule, courts have not
applied the principles of necessity and trustworthiness of the in
formation with equal strictness 26—sometimes one, sometimes the
other, has carried the greater importance in the decision. Any at
tempt to give a thorough survey of the exceptions to the hearsay
rule of evidence would involve a whole volume. For present pur
poses it will not be necessary to do more than merely to enumerate
some of the exceptions and to apply the two principles, necessity
and trustworthiness, to the cases in which it was held that a public
accountant’s expert testimony is an exception to the hearsay rule
of evidence.
Matters of family pedigree may be proved by written or oral
statements handed down from father to son. Statements made by
witnesses in other trials where the parties and the issues in dispute
were the same as those in the case in which it is sought to intro
duce the statements form an exception to the hearsay rule. Hearsay
statements have uniformly been admitted to prove matters of pub
lic interest, such as the location of territorial boundaries and the
incorporation of a governmental subdivision. Where any act such
as a crime or tort has occurred and declarations relevant to the act
were made spontaneously at the time when the act occurred, the
declarations are admissible evidence. The term, res gestae, applied
to this last situation means that the acts speak for themselves.
Books and documents of a public nature, in which are recorded facts
to be preserved for public reference, are admissible evidence by
common and statutory law. Since the 18th century courts have held
that private accounting records form an exception to the hearsay
rule of evidence. The necessity for the use of such evidence arose
from the unavailability of a witness because of death, absence from
the jurisdiction, incompetency or inconvenience. The fact that the
entries were made in the regular course of the business, it was
thought, justified the belief that the entries were trustworthy as a
26 W igm ore on Evidence, volume III, secs. 1420-1427.
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result of the circumstances in which they were normally recorded.
The habit of doing accurate work, the fact that it is easier to record
the truth than to falsify, the consciousness of the entrant, while
recording, that his erroneous or false entries will eventually come
to light have been held to be circumstances which will afford suffi
cient assurance of the trustworthiness of the records and be an
effective substitute for the test of cross-examination.27
Let us now pass to a consideration of the accountant’s expert
testimony in its relation to the hearsay rule. The supreme court of
Louisiana in 1921 held in the case of State v. Perry 28 as follows:
“The fourth bill was taken to a witness being allowed to testify that
on the date when the deposit in question was received the bank was
insolvent. The objection was that the books of the bank were the
best evidence.
“The witness was testifying as an expert accountant, giving the
result of his examination of the books of the bank. This kind of
evidence is an exception to the rules of hearsay and primary evi
dence. * * *”

While courts require that the best evidence available, and not
secondary or hearsay evidence which may be substituted for the
best or primary evidence, be used in a trial, yet, in the case of State
v. Perry, the court was in agreement with sound principles of law
in holding that the admission of the expert accountant’s testimony
was an exception to the rules of hearsay and primary evidence.
Granted that the accounting records themselves in a given case are
admissible evidence, the expert accountant’s testimony as to the
content and meaning of the records may be admissible evidence as
a result of necessity for the use of such testimony and as a result
of the circumstantial guaranty of trustworthiness. It is necessary
to accept the testimony of an expert accountant in order to convey
to the lay jury an understanding of the records constituting infer
ential facts which bear upon the main issue of the case. A sufficient
assurance of trustworthiness of the accountant’s expert testimony
is obtained from the fact that an accountant is normally in the
habit of doing his work accurately, the fact that it is easier to make
27 Wigmore on Evidence, volume III, sections 1360-1810.
28 90 So. 406, 149 La. 1065. See also Hankins v. State, 213 N.W. 344.
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an honest review than a false one, the consciousness on the part of
the accountant that the accuracy and honesty of his report will be
tested by cross-examination of him personally and probably by a
review of the records by the opposing party. Hence, the public ac
countant’s expert testimony can not be precluded by the hearsay
rule of evidence.
C ustody of R ecords

In respect to the custody of records about which the accountant’s
expert testimony is offered there are three distinct classes of deci
sions. The universally accepted rule is that the records must be
in custody of the court so as to afford the opposing party an
opportunity to cross-examine the accountant witness by means of
a comparison of his testimonial statements with the records them
selves. This requirement is dispensed with where the trial judge is
satisfied that the records should not be removed to the court-room
because of the great public and private inconvenience that would
ensue therefrom and also where the books have been lost before
the trial takes place. While many cases have required that the
court have custody of records as a prerequisite to the admission of
expert testimony concerning the books, only two cases are quoted
here. The decision in the first case, Ruth v. State,29 rendered by the
supreme court of Wisconsin in 1909, reads in part as follows:
“It is urged by the accused that the court committed prejudicial
error in admitting the evidence of the experts respecting the state of
the account between the Arcadia and Winona banks, and the condi
tion of the accounts of the Arcadia bank. The claim is that these
experts were permitted to testify that items of book entries were
shown to be incorrect by means of summary statements and tables
which they had taken and made from the book accounts of the books
29 140 Wis. 373, 122 N. W. 733. Similar decisions are as follows: Brown v. First
National Bank, 113 P. 483, 49 Colo. 393; Young v. State, 103 S. E. 804, 25
Ga. App. 562; Herberg v. State, 222 S. W. 559, 87 Tex. Cr. R. 439; State v.
Williams, i n A. 701, 94 Vt. 423; Camp v. State, 122 S. E. 249, 31 Ga. 737;
Newton v. State, 127 A. 123, 147 Md. 71; People v. Hatfield, 208 N. W. 682,
234 Mich. 574; Pierce Pet. Co. v. Osage Coal Co., 271 P. 675 (Okla.); McNaughton v. Presbyterian Church, 172 N. E. 561, 35 Ohio App. 443; State v. Olson,
287 P. 181 (Utah); Bush v. Board of Education of Clark County, y / S. W. (2d)
849, 238 Ky. 297; Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Mayor and Council of W il
mington et al., 157 A. 208 (Delaware).
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of both banks, without introducing in evidence all of these books and
the entries on which such statements were based, and without produc
ing any evidence tending to show that the book entries and accounts
of the W inona bank were correct and true. The practice of per
mitting expert accountants to examine long book accounts and to
give in summary form the results thereof for the information of
the court and jury is approved as practical and proper in the trial
of causes involving the examination of long book accounts. A proper
administration, of course, requires that the opposing party shall
be afforded the time and opportunity to test the correctness of the
evidence, and for this purpose to have access to the books and the
use of them for the purposes of cross-examination. In so far as this
practice was adopted in the case, we find nothing in the record
showing that the evidence of the experts on this subject was improper.
The claim that the failure to offer in evidence all of the account
books of the Arcadia bank which was covered by this evidence
operated to defendant’s prejudice is not shown, for it appears that
all such books were brought into court, were identified and were
accessible to the defendant and his attorney.”

A slight variation from this decision may be noted in the second
case, Stephen v. United States,30 decided in 1930 by the circuit
court of appeals, ninth circuit, which held that the expert ac
countant’s testimony relative to accounting books was admissible
where the records were kept in the prosecution’s possession in the
building, but not in the court room, where the trial was conducted.
A portion of the opinion reads:
“* * * The prosecution had in some manner acquired possession of
these books of account and records, approximately 250 volumes, and
for convenience kept them in two rooms in the building where the
trial was had. * * * Ordinarily the party offering such testimony
should be required to produce in court or to make available for his
opponent’s use the documents and books used by the witness, but
even that rule is not universally followed and where recognized it
is subject to exceptions. * * *”

The reason for requiring production of documents31 before
the tribunal rather than permitting merely oral testimony as to
80 41 F. (2d) 440.
31 Note: Accounting records come within the definition of documents. 2 Words
and Phrases (2nd series) 167; Wigmore on Evidence, volume II, section 1223.
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their contents, under the so-called best or primary evidence rule,
has been based upon the experience of courts that generally wit
nesses do not carry accurate recollections of documents.32 It has
been found that the human memory serves as a rather poor medium
through which to portray the contents, nature of paper and hand
writing, and the signatures of written documents. Hence, the
courts have been rigid in their requirements that the documents
themselves be produced in court. While accounting records must
necessarily be explained to the court by an expert, it is vital to a
correct showing of the truth of the case that the opponents be
allowed to test the trustworthiness of the accountant’s expert tes
timony through an examination of the records. It is apparent that
the most immediate check upon the witness’ testimonial statements
is made possible where the books are in the court room. Further
more, it may easily be possible that an exhibition of the records
before the jury will reveal the character of the handwriting and
the books themselves so as materially to aid the cause of truth
finding. Where the books are stored under the custody of the court
in a room adjoining the court room or in the building in which
the trial is conducted, the opportunity to test the accountant’s tes
timony may easily be afforded to the opposing party.
This sort of situation would seem to suffice as a means of test
ing the trustworthiness of the expert testimony. It has uniformly
been conceded by courts that the opportunity of cross-examination
by the opposing party, even though the opportunity be not availed
of, will answer sufficiently the requirement that evidence be tested
by cross-examination.33 Moreover, the records under the court’s
custody in a room adjoining the court room or in the building
in which the trial is conducted could be conveniently made avail
able for an inspection by the jury itself.
The second type of cases which deal with the custody of records,
about which the expert accountant’s testimony is offered, has dis
pensed with the requirement of the custody of the records by the
court as a prerequisite to the admission of the accountant’s testi
mony concerning the books, where the removal of the books to the
32 W igm ore on Evidence, volume II, sec. 1179.

33 Wigmore on Evidence, volume III, sec. 1371.
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court-room would work great public and private inconvenience.
Two cases of this type are included herein, the first of which,
Pioneer Lumber Co. v. Van Cleave34 decided in 1925 by the St.
Louis court of appeals, Missouri, reads in part as follows:
“* * * We recognize the rule that, where the results of an examina
tion of many books, papers or records are to be proved, and the
necessary examination of such documentary evidence can not be con
veniently or satisfactorily made in court, it may be made by an expert
accountant or other competent person, and the results thereof be
proved by him, provided the books, papers, or records themselves
are properly in evidence or their absence satisfactorily explained. * * *”

The other case dispensing with the requirement of custody of the
books by the court because of the public and private inconvenience
of their removal is State v. Matfyns,33 which was decided in 1930
by the supreme court of Missouri. A portion of the opinion follows:
“* * * In Citizens' Trust Co. v. Ward, 195 Mo. App. 223, 190
S. W. 364, a witness was permitted to testify to the condition of bank
books and records which were not introduced in evidence and so far
as the opinion discloses were not even in the courtroom, and it was
held that no error was committed.”

The determination of the sufficiency of preliminary facts offered
as explanation of the absence of the books about which expert
testimony is presented is within the discretion of the trial judge.
Where production of the records would work great public in
convenience, as in the case of accounting records kept by banks,
railroads, express companies, telephone and telegraph companies,
insurance companies and hospitals, courts have accepted expert
testimony concerning the records without requiring the presence
of the records before the tribunal. In a few jurisdictions statutes
excuse the production of corporation books where an accountant’s
expert testimony relative to the books is offered in court.36 The
statutes are doubtless intended to excuse production of accounting
records because of inconvenience; but the statutes are fallacious in
34 279 S. W. 241.
35 34 S. W. (2d) 1.
36 Wigmore on Evidence, volume II, sections 1177-1230.
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that they discriminate in favor of incorporated enterprises. Actual
inconvenience of production, and not the form of legal organiza
tion, should be the basis of excusing absence of the records. Though
the cases have extended the privilege of non-production of records
on account of inconvenience only to public officers in some in
stances and to business enterprises affected with a public interest,
it would seem that the exigencies of modern private businesses also
would justify in many cases the non-production of accounting rec
ords on the ground of inconvenience. It is not infrequently true
that a private business has a vast network of branches or subordi
nate units at which records reflecting the financial and operating
conditions of each unit are kept. At the head office summary con
trol records of the entire organization are usually kept. To require
production of all the original records of such a concern would be
highly impracticable. It is questionable, too, whether the opposing
party would be able during the course of a trial to check a wit
ness’s statements against such records even though the records were
in the courtroom. Even an expert accountant employed by the op
posing party probably would not find time during the course of
the trial adequately to test the expert testimony of the proponent
against the records where many books were involved. A better
plan would be to require that the opposing party be given ample
opportunity to examine the records prior to the trial. The data
obtained in such examination might well serve the purposes of
cross-examination. Such a mode of cross-examination would prove
far more effective than the exhibition of a maze of records before
a lay jury in an attempt to invalidate the testimony of an expert
accountant who had based his statements upon a great amount of
auditing experience.
In the past few years a public realization of the importance of
private business enterprises to the general public welfare has devel
oped. Drastic means of social control have been set up for the pur
pose of promoting the public welfare through the medium of
private business. The closing down, stopping or even hampering
the operations of a private business by requiring the removal of
the accounting records to a court-room may easily cause consider
able public and private inconvenience. Hence, trial judges should
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allow the introduction of expert testimony concerning the absent
records of a private business where, in the particular circumstances,
the removal of the books from the business would work an unrea
sonable amount of inconvenience to the business and to the public.
The third class of cases (dealing with the court’s custody of
records about which expert testimony is offered) dispenses with
the requirement of the court’s custody of the records as a prerequi
site to the admission of such evidence where it is shown that the
records have been lost. Two cases setting forth this opinion are
presented here. The supreme court of Oregon in 1929 in the case
of Hubble v. Hubble 37 held that where the expert bookkeeper and
auditor examined an automobile dealer’s books and the books were
subsequently destroyed, the accountant was permitted to testify
as to the content of the records. In 1932 the circuit court of appeals,
third circuit, in the case of Kay v. Federal Rubber Company 38
admitted testimony of an accountant who had examined an auto
mobile-tire dealer’s books which were destroyed before the time
of the trial. The decision reads:
“Error is assigned to the admission, under objection, of the testi
mony of an accountant, who had examined the books of the bank
rupt. The ground alleged is that, since some of the books were not
produced or could not be found, his testimony was based upon in
complete records. The court rightly held that that fact went to the
value, and not to the admissibility, of the accountant’s deductions.
While an adverse party is entitled to have the best evidence produced
against him, there is nothing in the record in this case to show that
the books produced were not the best evidence available.”

Failure to produce accounting records on account of loss has
been held to be not a bar to the admission of an accountant’s
expert testimony relative to the accounting records. The question
of proof of loss of the records deserves consideration. The suffi
ciency of the proof of loss of documents 39 has been concerned
in court decisions not only with loss in the narrow sense of the
word but with loss through destruction. Strictly speaking, destruc37 279 P. 550.
38 60 F. (2d) 454.
39 N ote: T he principles governing the production of documents apply
accounting records. Accounting records constitute one kind of documents.
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tion means termination of existence, while loss means merely the
inability of discovery. The moment destruction becomes question
able at all, as when not proved by eye-witnesses of a burning, the
inquiry is raised whether the search for the documents has been
sufficient. The proof of a loss usually carries the implication that
the thing not found has ceased to exist and thus resembles the
case of destruction. Thus, naturally the sufficiencies of proofs of
destruction and loss are inextricably woven together; and courts
have sought to determine the amount of search necessary to show
loss in the broad sense of the word. While there are conflicting
opinions, the doctrine expounded by many classical cases, thought
to be correctly decided by most eminent authority, holds that there
is not and can not be any universal or fixed rule to test the suffi
ciency of the search for documents alleged to be lost.40 The suf
ficiency of the search to prove loss depends upon the circumstances
of each case. The search must have been made with such diligence
as was reasonable in the circumstances. The party proving the
documents must have used all reasonable means to obtain them. It
necessarily follows that the determination of the sufficiency of the
search and the sufficiency of the proof of loss of the documents
should be left entirely to the discretion of the trial court. This
principle is supported by the weight of authority.
The deliberate loss or destruction of documents brought about
by the proponent in order to destroy the best evidence will operate
as a bar to the admission of testimony as to the content of the
documents. However, if the documents were destroyed in the ordi
nary course of business and without any intent to conceal evidence,
courts generally, after explaining to the jury the circumstances of
destruction, have allowed testimony relative to those documents.
The circumstances of destruction, though apparently innocent, may
affect the value of the evidence.
Where documents are detained by the opponent, the proponent is
excused from production as a prerequisite to the offering of testi
mony concerning them. It is apparent that the reason for excusing
non-production is the inability of the proponent to obtain the
documents. In order that the proponent may be excused from the
40 W igm ore on Evidence, volume II, secs. 1193, 1194.
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production of documents, on the ground that they are being with
held by the opponent, he must offer proof of control of the docu
ments by the opponent, demand or notice to opponent for the
documents for use in the trial and failure of opponent to produce
such documents. An admission by the opponent that the records
have been lost or destroyed will make any further proof of loss
unnecessary.
Briefly, accounting records must generally be produced in court
in order to serve as a test of the trustworthiness of the accountant’s
expert testimony; but the production of the accounting records may
be excused where production is not feasible, as in cases of great
inconvenience resulting from the removal of the records from the
place of business, loss of the records or detention of the records by
the opposing party.41
A uthenticity of R ecords

That accounting records must be properly authenticated as a
prerequisite to the admission of an expert accountant’s testimony
concerning them is a well-settled rule of law. The principle is
presented in the case of Le Roy State Bank v. Keenan’s Bank 42
which was decided by the appellate court of Illinois in 1928. A
portion of the opinion follows:
“* * * While the results of the examination of voluminous docu
ments, writings, records and books may be proved by expert account
ant or other competent person who has made the examination, the
documents, records or books upon which the examination is based
must be of such a character as to be themselves admissible in evi
dence. The oral evidence is admissible because the voluminous charac
ter of the instruments of evidence precludes their examination in
court, and the testimony to results reached by their examination is
merely a statement of what those instruments show. It was, therefore,
necessary that the books and papers which the expert accountants
examined should themselves have been competent evidence. In order
to render an account-book admissible in evidence, it is essential that
proof as satisfactory as the transactions are under the circumstances
41Wigmore on Evidence, volume II, sections 1177-1230.
42 169 N. E. 1, 337 111. 173. In accord: Hubble v. Hubble, 279 P. 550; Brook
field Co. v. Mart, 4 P. (2d) 311; Stephens v. United States, 41 F. (2d) 440.
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reasonably susceptible of, shall be given that the entries made are
correctly recorded. * * * Where the testimony of a witness who made
the entries is not available, it is competent to establish the authenticity
of the book by other evidence. The only evidence produced of the
authenticity of the books which the accountants examined is the
testimony of the cashier of the Le Roy bank. H e did not become
cashier until three months after the making of the contract and the
transfer of the assets to that bank. He did not make all the entries in
the books. He did not testify, and could not testify, to the correct
ness of all those entries. Entries were made by the assistant cashier
and other persons whose names were mentioned in the cashier’s testi
mony, but they were not called to show that the entries were correctly
made, and there was no testimony that they were not available.
Exhibit A-20, which was used in reaching the results arrived at by
the accountants, was in large part not a book of original entry, but
was, so far as more than half of the period which it purported to
cover was concerned, copied from other books to whose authenticity
and correctness no one testified. For these reasons the books were
not admitted in evidence. The conclusions of the accountants, how
ever, based on these books, which were not so verified as to make
them competent evidence, were received and were made the basis of
the judgment which was rendered (in the lower court). * * * Since
the books were not shown to be competent evidence, the statement
of the conclusions reached by a consideration of them was not com
petent evidence and should not have been admitted.”

The holding of the Le Roy State Bank v. Keenans Bank case
that the admissibility of an accountant’s expert testimony concern
ing accounting records is dependent upon the authenticity of the
records themselves is well-established law. The court in this case
also enunciated the rule that the authenticity of the book entries
may be established by testimony of a witness who made the entries,
or, if the entrant be not available, by other evidence. The dispute
involved largely only those records which were prepared prior to
the time the cashier became associated with the records. Hence,
doubtless the court was correct in holding that the cashier was
disqualified to verify the genuineness of the bank books, espe
cially in view of the fact that the persons making the entries could
have been offered to testify concerning the entries on the books.

170

R e s po n sib il it ie s

and

R ig h ts

of

A ccountants

The philosophy upon which the decision is based is in agreement
with the well-recognized principles of law on the point.
Because of the great variety of situations that arise in regard to
the inferential facts tending to prove to the satisfaction of the
trial judge the admissibility of evidence, quite often no general or
universal rules governing the proof of admissibility can be estab
lished. Hence, in many situations the determination of the proof
necessary to justify the admission of evidence is left entirely to
the discretion of the trial judge. However, in the case of the au
thentication of documents, situations have had enough in common
to justify some general rules applicable to the establishment of
the validity of instruments, i.e., the proving of the genuineness or
authorship of the documents.
Some of the general rules applicable to the authentication of
documents (including accounting records) are presented here.43
A writing, of itself, is evidence of nothing and therefore is not,
unless accompanied by proof of some sort, admissible as evidence.
There must be some evidence of the genuineness of the writing
before the writing can be used as a basis for testimonial evidence.
Only a reasonable certainty in the proof of the genuineness of
the accounting records should be required; it is not necessary that
the proof should be conclusive; prima-facie evidence that the rec
ords are genuine is sufficient to warrant their reception. Certain
modes of indicating the genuineness of documents, including ac
counting records, are uniformly accepted as sufficient to determine
their admission as evidence. Each of the following methods of
proof of admissibility of evidence has been held sufficient in itself
to justify the placing of evidence before the jury: ( 1) Testimony of
witnesses who had personal knowledge of the entries and the
transactions upon which the entries were based; (2) circumstantial
evidence, that is, handwriting of the entrant, or age of records
under certain conditions.
There have been some variations from the rule that a witness
in order to verify accounting records must have personal knowledge
of both the transactions and the entries. It has been held repeatedly
that the cashier of a bank who oversees all transactions and tests
43 Wigmore on Evidence, volume III, sec. 1530.
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the accuracy of the books is competent to testify as to the authen
ticity of the bank books. It has also been held that a supervising
officer who has general knowledge of the transactions and entries
is competent to verify the records. It has also been held that the
authenticity of accounting records can be proved by testimony of
the bookkeepers who had not personal knowledge of the transac
tions. In such rulings the courts take the position that the produc
tion on the witness stand of a numerous host of salesmen, shipping
clerks, teamsters, foremen or other subordinate employees would
generally be improper. While it can not be said that the testimony
of one who has only general knowledge of the transactions and
the books or of one who has knowledge of the entries but not of
the transactions, may prove sufficiently the authenticity of account
ing records is the generally accepted rule, it is to be hoped that
courts in the future will uniformly follow this practical rule.44
Where the keeper of the records is deceased, authentication of
the bookkeeping records can be effected by proving the keeper’s
handwriting in the records.45 It is probable that a verification of
the genuineness of accounting records through proof of handwrit
ing would be permissible where the bookkeeper has become insane
subsequent to the making of the entries or where he is absent from
the jurisdiction.
Proof of the genuineness of account books is made conclusive by
a judicial admission of the opponent. A judicial admission by the
opponent is an agreement before the trial judge after the issues are
joined, either before or during the trial, that the opponent will not
dispute the authenticity of the records. While in American courts
the use of the judicial admission of the opponent is rarely available
to the proponent of the records, the practice of dispensing with
trouble and expense of producing evidence of the genuineness of
accounting records where the opponent has no reasonable grounds
to object to their authenticity is to be commended to trial judges
and litigants alike.
44 W igm ore on Evidence, volume III, section 1530.
45 W igm ore on Evidence, volume III, section 1530; Delaney v. Framingham Gas,
Fuel and Water Co., 202 Mass. 359, 88 N . E. 776 (1909).
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The fact that the opponent has destroyed or suppressed the ac
counting records is uniformly treated as sufficient evidence of exe
cution to go to the jury.
In many jurisdictions of the United States it is provided by
statutes that if the documents are named in the pleading as the
foundation of the claim or defense, proof of genuineness is not
required unless the opponent denies authenticity of the records on
oath either in the formal plea or in a separate affidavit.46
While the cases are rare, wherever the courts have ruled on the
point they have uniformly held that account books, in common with
other documents, may be authenticated by age. However, the ruling
of authentication by age requires that the records be at least thirty
years old, that there must have been a natural custody of the
books, and that the books must be unsuspicious in appearance.
Courts have presumed that witnesses who had personal knowledge
of the records and transactions have ceased to exist after the lapse
of thirty years from the time of the making of the entries. Even
where there are living witnesses who had personal knowledge of
the transactions and records and are available, courts have not
required the testimony of such witnesses.47 The custody of the
ancient books must have been natural. The fact that books have
come from a place where it normally would be expected that the
books should be kept tends to remove presumptions of fraud and
strengthens the belief in their genuineness. Custody by the party
offering account books for a period of more than thirty years has
been held to have been a proper custody.48 Again, books kept
in custody for more than thirty years by a manorial steward were
held to have been in such custody as was necessary to enter the
account books as evidence under the ancient documents rule in an
action brought by the feudal lord of the estate.49 While no clear
marks of suspicion of improper execution of account books have
been accepted, courts ruling upon the point have required that the
records must show no appearance of fraud. It should be clearly
46 W igm ore on Evidence, volume V, section 2596.

47 22 Corpus Juris, p. 946, Sec. 1165.
48 Bertie v. Beaumont, 146 English reports 105 (1816).
49 Wynne v. Tyrwhitt, 106 English reports 975 (1821).
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understood that the authenticity of account books can not be estab
lished by the ancient-documents rule unless the books have been
in existence thirty years or more, have been kept in proper custody
and present an honest appearance.50
A C ertified P ublic A ccountant’s C ertificate N ot
to

a P rerequisite
Q ualification as an E xpert W itness in
M atters of A ccounting

The supreme court of Oklahoma in 1928 in the case of Bell v.
Tackett 51 relative to the accountant’s qualifications to testify as
an expert held, in part, as follows:
“Counsel objected to this evidence in the trial court, after showing
that the witness was not a certified accountant, under sections 10922
to 10928, article 10, chapter 87, C. O. S. 1921 (restricting the
practice of public accounting to certified public accountants). We de
cline to hold that such evidence of a person, otherwise qualified,
would be incompetent by such failure to comply with said statutory
provisions, inasmuch as said sections have heretofore been held un
constitutional by this court in the case of State v. Riedell, 109 Okla. 35,
233 P. 684, 42 A. L. R. 765.”

The court held in Bell v. Tackett that a public accountant is not
required to have a certified public accountant’s certificate in order
to give testimony as an expert accountant. This ruling is in har
mony with the general practice of trial judges in permitting an
expert to testify even though the expert does not belong to a particu
lar class or profession. Though a trial judge may take into account
the fact that an expert has a particular degree or diploma, the
judge is not bound to permit the expert to testify because the
witness holds a degree or diploma. It is equally true that a trial
judge may permit an expert to testify as such even though the
expert does not possess a particular degree or diploma. Whether
or not the witness has acquired special skill relating to the particu
lar subject-matter under review is the controlling fact trial judges
consider in the exercise of their discretion in determining the quali50 W igm ore on Evidence, volume IV, sections
sections 1138-1178.
51 272 P. 461, 134 Okla. 164.

2128-2160;

22

Corpus Juris,
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fications of the witness to testify as an expert. The matter of
determining the qualifications of the witness to testify as an expert
is nearly always left to the discretion of the trial judge.52
C redibility of W itness

In 1931 the Kentucky court of appeals held, in the case of Bush
v. Board of Education of Clark County 53 as follows:
“* * * It is argued by counsel for appellants that the evidence was
not competent on another ground, that is, that Gustetter was an inter
ested party, and that he had been in possession of the tax books for
several months before he completed his audit, and that their verity
was thereby destroyed. It is also testified to that he made contra
dictory statements, and that he offered to settle with Bush without
making any report. He denied all of these statements except that he
was interested, but none of these things rendered him incompetent
as a witness. They only went to his credibility.”

The Bush v. Board of Education of Clark County case ruled that
the fact that the accountant witness was contradictory in his testi
mony or that he was interested in the ultimate issue of the con
troversy did not preclude the admission of his testimony but af
fected merely the trustworthiness of his testimony. This case, while
apparently the only American one of its kind affecting the testi
mony of an accountant, is in accord with the well-settled principles
of law involved.
The credibility of a witness is concerned with the probative
effect which may be attached to his testimony. In seeking to show
contradictions by cross-examination or by other proof, testimonial
or circumstantial, the ultimate aim is to persuade the tribunal that
the witness has completely erred in regard to the particular facts
which the witness has sought to establish. It is the truth of the
contradicting evidence as opposed to the truth of the witness’
assertions that constitutes the probative end. It is the function of
the tribunal, not to dismiss consideration of relevant assertions
that have been contradicted, but rather to ascertain the relative
52 22 Corpus Juris, p. 536, section 624; Wigmore on Evidence, volume I, sec
tions 555-561.
53 37 S. W. (2d) 849, 238 Ky. 297.
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trustworthiness of the conflicting assertions of the opposing
parties.54
The disqualification of a witness to testify On account of his
being an interested party became a universal rule of law in Eng
land by the seventeenth century, and later it was adopted in
America. A century after its adoption a very definite decline in
the application of the rule appeared in the English and American
law. Today the disqualification has everywhere disappeared except
in the case of testimony of the survivor of a transaction with a
decedent, when offered against the deceased’s estate. The theory
of the rule of disqualification on account of interest was based
originally on the belief that the interested party would be apt to
falsify in behalf of his own interest, and that the jurors, inclined
to base their verdict on the number of witnesses testifying under
oath rather than on the quality of evidence, would render a false
verdict. The reason for the rule no longer exists. The modern
courts take the position that interested witnesses often testify hon
estly, and that, even if the witness attempts to falsify, through the
medium of cross-examination the trustworthiness of the testimony
of the interested witness is effectively established before the jury.
The jury should not be denied the benefit of valuable information
which tends to prove or disprove either directly or inferentially
the main fact in issue merely because the information offered comes
from a witness who is an interested party in the suit.55
C onfidential C ommunications B etween P ublic A ccountant
and C lient

Only one case in England and America is concerned directly in
establishing the common law governing the confidential communi
cations between public accountant and client. The opinion in that
case, In re Fisher 56 decided in 1931 by the federal district court,
S. D. New York, follows:
“It appears that the witness William Bernstein acted as bankrupt’s
accountant for a number of years, and, after his admission to the bar,
also acted as bankrupt’s attorney. Upon the basis of the privilege
54 Wigmore on Evidence, volume II, sections 1000-1004.
55 W igm ore on Evidence, volume I, sections 575-578.
56 51 F. (2d) 424.
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arising from the attorney-client relationship, he has refused to answer
questions relating to bankrupt’s books and to produce in evidence
monthly account sheets made by accountants in his employ in course
of auditing bankrupt’s books.
“There is no privilege with regard to communications made to
accountants. The information given to the witness and to the ac
countants in his employ for the purpose of making financial state
ments and doing other work characteristically performed by account
ants is not privileged, despite the fact that the witness may also have
rendered legal advice on the basis of such data. * * *
“Furthermore, the privilege accorded to an attorney is the privilege
of the client and not the attorney. * * * For this reason the attorney
can not claim privilege where the client has already disclosed the
substance of the communication. * * * Nor can he claim privilege
where the communication was made with the understanding that it
was to be imparted to third parties.
“In the case at bar it appears that the bankrupt has already testi
fied with respect to the matters contained in his books and records.
And the income-tax returns and financial statements drawn up from
the communications made by bankrupt to the witness were obviously
intended to be communicated to others.
“For these reasons, the witness should be directed to testify with
regard to the bankrupt’s books and to produce in evidence the
monthly work sheets made by the accountants.”

This case, In re Fisher, was in accord with well-settled law in
holding that the privilege of non-disclosure of confidential com
munications between the attorney and client was for the benefit
of the client and not the attorney. The privilege of confidential
communications can be granted an attorney only on motion of his
client. However, the accountant’s chief concern with In re Fisher
is the fact that the court refused to allow the privilege of confi
dential communications in the accountant-client relation. This re
fusal to allow to the accountant immunity from disclosure of his
client’s confidential communications is contrary to sound commonla w p r in c ip le s a n d s h o u ld n o t b e f o llo w e d in fu tu r e d e c is io n s.

It is well to review the common-law principles involved in the
privilege of confidential communications.57 From the early six57 Wigmore on Evidence, volume V, secs. 2285-2329.
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teenth to the later eighteenth century in England the privilege of
refraining from producing confidential information on the witness
stand was universally allowed in the common-law courts in the
trial of civil cases. The practice was justified on the ground that
the court ought to respect the word or pledge of a man of honor.
The decline of the extension of the privilege to refuse to give confi
dential testimony naturally followed from its obstructive effects
upon the cause of justice. By 1800 the privilege to keep secret
confidential matters was confined to attorneys, jurors, public officers
and husband and wife. Courts no longer concerned themselves
with the preservation of the honor of the witness but rather sought
to preserve the life, liberty and property of the person who con
fided the secret to the witness. In the attorney-client relation it was
the interest of the client, not the honor of the attorney, for which
the courts made confidential information privileged. Hence, the
courts allowed, and still do allow, the privilege, not on the attor
ney’s motion, but only on the request of the client. Certain broad
principles were laid down by the common law for the purpose
of determining the type of relationship which ought to be blessed
with privileged information. By common law four conditions were,
and are, required to make a relation eligible for the privilege of
keeping secret confidential information. (1) The communications
must have been made in the belief that they would not be dis
closed. (2) The element of confidentiality must be essential to the
promotion and continuation of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which society wishes to encourage.
(4) The injury that would result from the disclosure of the con
fidential communications must be greater than the benefit which
would accrue from the correct disposal of litigation.
The attorney-client relation meets all four requirements of the
privilege of confidential communications. Practically all the com
munications between client and attorney are made in confidence.
Were it not for the belief that his communications would be kept
secret, the client would not give his attorney full information.
Though an attorney often does enable a guilty person to escape
punishment, for the sake of the innocent the secret relation of the
attorney and client should be encouraged. The injury resulting
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from the attorney’s failure to get from his client incriminating in
formation may easily outweigh the benefit which would be obtained
from a revelation of the secret information coming from the
accused. If the attorney’s confidential information were available
to the prosecution, the prosecutors would fall into the practice of
producing the secret communications of the accused rather than
substantiating his convictions with other proof.
It is not necessary to show in detail the application of the four
principles to both petit and grand jurors.58 It is apparent to the
reader that the communications between jurors are confidential and
must be confidential for a full and satisfactory relationship. The
community fosters the relationship. Certainly disclosures of jury
proceedings would intimidate jurors from exercising freedom of
judgment, resulting in an injury to justice much greater than the
benefit that might be derived from disclosures of the communica
tions in other trials.
The relation of public officers with persons in matters of state
secrets meets all the tests for the allowance of privileged informa
tion required by common law.59 The subject is almost as broad as
the governmental activities. For the purpose of illustrating the
application of the common-law principles of privileged communi
cations, let us consider the case of an informer who conveys secret
information to a detective. Were the detective not permitted to keep
inviolate such information, it might easily be dangerous to the
informer. The relation between detective and informer would cease
to exist. To be sure, the community is interested in fostering the
relation of detective and secret informer so as to discover crime.
And, lastly, the injury growing out of the loss of the information
would exceed the benefit to be derived from the disclosure of the
informer’s identity. The rule is well-established law, but is limited
to the identity of the informer. Furthermore, a trial judge may
compel the disclosure of the identity of the detective’s informer
where the trial judge deems that such information is necessary to
prevent the failure of justice.
58 Wigmore on Evidence, volume V, secs. 2346-2364.
59 Ibid., secs. 2367-2379.
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It must be apparent that as between husband and wife many
communications are confidential, and that the confidentiality of such
communications is a vital element entering into the perpetuation
of the marital relationship.60 As a matter of public policy society
fosters the institution of marriage. It is generally agreed that the
detriment that would follow disclosure of marital secrets would
outweigh the benefits that would result from such disclosure.
The physician-patient relationship has been held by common law
not to meet the four tests.61 Failure to meet any one test removes
the relationship from the scope of privileged communications.
Courts have taken the position that most of the patient’s commu
nications are not made in the belief that they will be kept secret.
In the second place, the patient would come to a physician even if
he knew the nature of his communications and ailments would be
disclosed to others—so the courts have ruled. In the third place,
society is certainly interested in promoting the relation of physician
and patient. Lastly, the injury that would result from disclosure
would be insignificant as compared to the benefit that may be
obtained from medical testimony. Judges have thought that the
patient would not be concerned about disclosures except in cases
of abortion and venereal diseases; and in those cases generally the
patient does not deserve secrecy. Though the privilege of secret
communications has been denied to the relation of physician to
patient by common law, the privilege has been extended by legis
lation in many states.
The public accountant-client relation meets all four requirements
of the common law for privileged communications. In practically
every audit there are communications of a confidential nature made
by the client to the public accountant; and in some instances the
public accountant gives confidential information to his client. With
out the belief that the secrets of his business—his lists of customers,
present and potential, his plan of organization, his costs of opera
tions, his secret processes—would be held in confidence, the client
would cease to employ the services of public accountants, for the
very existence of his business may be dependent upon these secrets.
60 W igm ore on Evidence, volume V, secs. 2332-2341.
61 Ibid., secs. 2380-2391.
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In the third place, the community unquestionably is interested in
fostering the relation of accountant and client. If not, why has
the community enacted laws promoting the standards of accounting
practice? And in the fourth place, the detriment resulting from
the disclosure of the client’s secrets might easily be far reaching.
In many instances the very existence of a business is dependent
upon its superior organization, its peculiar knowledge of its mar
ket, its low cost of production or other characteristics not known
to competitors. The revelation of these secrets might easily destroy
the business itself. The knowledge that such secrets might be
revealed would deter entrepreneurs from originating promotions.
The stifling effect of disclosures would be enormous and doubtless
would exceed the benefit that might accrue to the administration
of justice through the public accountant’s revelation of secrets
peculiar and vital to the business.
In the case In re Fisher, supra, the court did not take the trouble
to analyze the accountant-client relation to determine whether that
relation fulfills the requirements of common law for privileged
communications. It is true that accounting statements are designed
for exhibition to others generally and would not, therefore, consti
tute a communication in confidence. The working papers of the
accountant are not designed for presentation to others. The work
ing papers generally contain confidential matters never revealed in
the financial statements. The working papers, as well as other com
munications made in confidence, meet all the requirements for
privileged information.
Until the courts have overruled In re Fisher and have held that
the common-law doctrine of privileged communications applies to
the public accountant-client relation, it is necessary to resort to
legislation. Nine states have enacted statutes making confidential
communications in the accountant-client relation privileged. Those
statutes logically fall into three classes. In the first type are in
cluded the public accountancy laws of Arizona, Iowa,62 Louisiana,62
M ic h ig a n ,62 a n d T e n n e s s e e .62 T h e A r iz o n a sta tu te f o llo w s .63
62Certified Public Accountant Laws of the United States, American Institute
Publishing Co., Inc.
63 Laws of Arizona, regular session of 1933, chapter 45, section 9.

A dmissibility

of

A ccountant ’s T estimony

181

“Certified public accountants and public accountants practising in
this state shall not be required to divulge, nor shall they voluntarily
divulge, any information which they may have received by reason of
the confidential nature of their employment. Information derived
from or as a result of such professional source shall be deemed con
fidential, provided, however, that nothing in this section shall be
taken or construed as modifying, changing or affecting the criminal
or bankruptcy laws of this state or of the United States.”

This type of statute means, then, that in criminal and bank
ruptcy trials the confidential communications between public ac
countant and client are not privileged. The statute helps a little,
in that the privilege is extended to all trials except criminal and
bankruptcy cases.
In the second class are statutes of Florida and Illinois.62 The
Florida statute enacted in 1931 reads as follows: 64
“All communications between certified public accountants and pub
lic accountants and the person, firm or corporation for whom such
certified public accountant or public accountant shall have made any
audit or other investigation in a professional capacity, and all in
formation obtained by certified public accountants and public account
ants in their professional capacity concerning the business and affairs
of clients shall be deemed privileged communications in all courts of
this state, and no such certified public accountant or public account
ant shall be permitted to testify with respect to any of said matters,
except with the consent in writing of such client or his legal repre
sentative.”

The type of statute exemplified by the Florida law, supra, re
quires complete immunity from disclosure of confidential commu
nications between public accountant and client in all courts within
the jurisdictions of such state laws.
The third type of law granting immunity to secret communica
tions made in the accountant-client relation is found in Colorado.
The Colorado statute reads as follows: 65
“A certified public accountant shall not, without the consent of
his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client
64 H. B. Skillman, 1934 Cumulative Supplement to the Compiled General Laws
of Florida, chapter 50, section 3935 (1 3 ).
65 Session Laws of Colorado, 1929, chap. 185, sec. 1(6), p. 644.
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to him in person or through the media of books of account and
financial records, or his advice, reports or working papers given or
made thereon in the course of professional employment, nor shall a
secretary, stenographer, clerk or assistant of a certified public account
ant be examined without the consent of the client concerned concern
ing any fact, the knowledge of which he has acquired in such
capacity.”

The chief distinguishing characteristic of this Colorado statute
is the fact that it applies to certified public accountants and not
to public accountants in general. In 1931 the supreme court of
Colorado in the case of Hopkins v. People 66 held that where a
county or a county court employs a certified public accountant to
audit the books of a third party there does not exist that accoun
tant-client relation between the certified public accountant and the
third party necessary to make the certified public accountant’s
information from the audit confidential under the Colorado stat
ute. While the supreme court of Colorado did not find it neces
sary to determine the validity of the statute in order to decide
the case, the court impliedly approved the statute in holding that
the case did not come within the statute. This type of statute
should meet with the hearty approval of certified practitioners. It
should be an inducement to clients to select certified public ac
countants to do their audits.67
P reparation of a P art of A udit by A ssistants N ot a B ar to
A dmission of E xpert A ccountant’s T estimony

That a public accountant’s testimony is not rendered inadmis
sible by the fact that a part of the examination of the records was
performed by assistants of the public accountant provided the pub
lic accountant has personal knowledge of the accuracy of the audit
was set forth in 1930 by the supreme court of Missouri in the case
of State v. Matk ins 68 as follows:
“Craig’s testimony shows that he was assisted in making the audit
by his employee Gibson, that he was personally present about two
6 6 1 P. (2d) 937.
67 Note: For the public accountant’s liability to his client for damages sus
tained from the negligent disclosure of confidential communications, see page 60.
68 34 S. W. (2d) 1. In accord: Johnstone v. Morris, 292 P. 970 (1930); AEtna
Casualty & Surety Co. v. Wilmington, 157 A. 208 (1931).
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weeks of the time the work was in progress, and that it was all done
under his direction, and in substance that he had familiarized him
self with the records and the results shown by the audit and knew
the audit to be correct. We think he was competent to testify to the
result of the examination. * * *”

The cases enabling a public accountant to give expert testimony
from audits made by assistants where the accountant has super
vised the audit and personally knows the audit to be correct repre
sent the weight of authority. In fact, an exhaustive search has
revealed no adverse ruling with respect to the matter.
The cases allowing an expert accountant’s testimony based upon
an audit performed by his assistants are founded upon reason. It
would in many audits be impossible for the accountant to perform
all the work of the review. If the jury is to have the benefit of
summaries, the work of assistants must be accepted as the founda
tion of the accountant’s testimony. The circumstances of the assist
ant’s performance of an audit tend strongly to establish the accu
racy of their work. The accountant knows full well that his success
as a practitioner is dependent in no small degree upon the quality
of service obtained from his employees. He, therefore, selects his
assistants so as to obtain only those helpers who will render honest
and efficient service. On the other hand, the members of the ac
countant’s staff are aware of the fact that the individual success
of each in a large measure will be in proportion to the excellence
of the service he gives to his employer. The fact that the ac
countant directed and supervised the audit is further assurance
that the audit correctly shows the condition of the records. Hence,
the accountant’s testimony based upon the audit prepared in such
circumstances should be a trustworthy showing of the condition
and contents of the accounting records under consideration.
A n E xpert B ookkeeper ’s T estimony A dvisory, N ot B inding

In 1915 the court of appeals of Georgia held in the case of Citi
zens Bank of Tifton v. Timmons 69 that:
“Where a witness duly qualified as an expert general bookkeeper
and as a bank bookkeeper, it was not error to admit his testimony,
69 84 S. E. 232, 15 Ga. App. 815. In accord: U n ite d States v. P orter, 9 F . (2d)
153.
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based upon an inspection and examination of the books of a bank, as
to the meaning, interpretation or construction of an account in evi
dence appearing on such books then under examination, measured
by the rules, methods and usages generally prevailing among com
mercial bookkeepers and bank bookkeepers. Such testimony is ad
visory merely, and is not binding upon a jury, though they can not
arbitrarily disregard it; but the weight and value to be attributed to
it is for determination by them.”

This decision needs little comment. If the jury were bound by
the opinion of the expert witness, the jury would in effect be
deprived of its function of fact finding. Under the safeguards
surrounding the selection of jurors it is presumed that the jurors
are free from bias and partisanship. The expert witness, usually
called by a party to the suit, is subject to influences tending toward
bias. His pecuniary subservience to a party in the suit could cer
tainly disqualify him as a juror.70 For this reason, courts will not
compel the jury to render its verdict in accordance with an expert’s
opinion.
C onclusions of an E xpert A ccountant

The principles evolved by the courts with respect to the admis
sibility of an expert accountant’s conclusions drawn from his audit
fall naturally into two groups: (1) The expert accountant’s testi
mony must be confined to a statement of the facts shown by the
books. (2) The expert accountant may state to the court his opin
ion as to value.
Let us first consider the fundamental common-law rule which
requires that the expert accountant confine his testimony to a state
ment of the bare facts shown by the books.71 An adequate concept
of this principle must be based upon a proper understanding of its
development. Prior to the eighteenth century there had been little
thought on the opinion of a witness in England and America. It
was during that century that the word “opinion” came to mean
to the legal mind a conclusion of a lay-witness who had no facts
to contribute, no knowledge, no personal acquaintance with the
70 35 Corpus Juris, p. 321, Section 337.
71 Wigmore on Evidence, volume IV, secs. 1917-1929.
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man or the land or the loan or the affray about which he was
speaking. This sort of evidence was neither objected to nor ex
cluded. The court and jury merely ignored it in forming the ver
dict. However, during the nineteenth century the conclusions of a
lay-witness who had not observed the facts of the case were for
mally rejected by the courts on the ground that the conclusions
were merely superfluous. In the opinion of the courts, jurors as
laymen were quite as capable of forming opinions as to facts in
issue as were the lay-witnesses who had not personally observed
the happenings in dispute. The courts took the position that the
jurors should not be confused by diverse opinions of lay-witnesses
who had not personal knowledge of the facts. To admit such opin
ion evidence was thought to infringe upon the time of the jury.
This rule is still followed uniformly in England and America with
respect to the opinion of a lay-witness who was not a personal
observer of the facts of the case. On the other hand, if the witness
had personal knowledge of the facts in the case as a result of the
exercise of his own senses, he was allowed to state such facts and
then express his opinion based upon his observations. However,
in stating the facts the witness was required to know the truth of
his testimony. He was not permitted to say that he thought, be
lieved or was of the opinion that certain alleged facts of the case
were true or untrue. Such is the law in England today; but in the
United States a witness is generally required to present before the
jurors only the bare facts which he observed. In America the laywitness is permitted to state to the jury his impressions and
opinions of his observations only where the facts were such as
could not be described to the jury.
An expert witness may testify in both England and the United
States on matters under the consideration of the court even with
out having had personal observation of the facts of the case. In
response to hypothetical questions, he can offer expert opinions
on matters that can not ordinarily be interpreted by the jury. The
expert witness through study and experience knows facts not avail
able to the lay-jurors, and, using his observations of scientific facts
as a basis, he can interpret and draw conclusions such as are indis
pensable to a proper understanding of the case on the part of the
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jurors. In the United States if the expert witness need only pre
sent the bare facts obtained from his investigation in order that
the jury may grasp an understanding of the case, the court will
not allow the expert witness to offer his opinion. If the jury can not
interpret the bare facts of the investigation, then the court will
permit the expert witness to state his conclusions. The purpose of
the rules is to afford the jury a proper understanding of the truth
of the case.72
The admissibility of opinionative testimony of public accountants
has come before the courts of the United States in at least a dozen
instances. Several opinions giving different effect to the rule that
the expert accountant’s testimony is limited to a statement of the
bare facts shown by the records are presented in the following
excerpts. The general principle that the expert accountant’s testi
mony must be confined to a statement of the facts shown by the
books was set forth in a syllabus by the supreme court of Georgia
in 1923 in the case of Payne v. Franklin County,73 as follows:
“Error is assigned because the court, over objection, permitted a
witness, who was an auditor for Franklin county, and who had made
an audit of the books and accounts of the treasurer, to testify, in
answer to the question, ‘From having made an audit of all the books,
papers, and documents in evidence, I will ask whether or not you did
find any shortage as a result of your examination,’ as follows: ‘As a
result of the first examination we found a deficit of $20,368.21.’ The
objection was that the question called for a conclusion of the witness,
and that the answer was a mere conclusion, and that as an expert
accountant he was not authorized to give his conclusion or general
opinion. Such evidence was admissible to aid the jury in their in
vestigation, the question as to what are the proper deductions to be
made from the entries in the books and papers being at last solely
for the jury.”

In harmony with the Georgia case, supra, the supreme court
of Michigan in 1931, in the case of Thompson v. W alter,74 con72 Wigmore on Evidence, volume IV, sections 1917-1929.
73 116 S. E. 627, 155 Ga. 219. In accord: People v. Hatfield, 208 N. W. 682,
234 Mich. 574.
74 234 N. W. 144, 253 Mich. 126. In accord: Diamond A lkali Co. v. Henderson
Coal Co., 134 A. 386, 287 Pa. 232. See also: Kersh v. State, 153 So. 284 (1933).
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fined the province of the expert accountant’s testimony to a state
ment of facts shown by the books. A portion of the opinion reads:
“The auditor could not testify from his examination, in advance,
of the books, what they would show, if introduced in evidence. It is
the books, the contents of which may be summarized, which must be
present in court, and introduced in evidence, and the witness may
testify to what the books show. He could not invade the province of
the jury, who were to pass upon and determine the facts. The audi
tor could not testify to anything beyond what was shown from an
examination of the books themselves, but he could testify as to his
compilations, computations and conclusions therefrom or the aggre
gate amount of any specific items shown thereby. The process of
binding component facts into a more concise and general statement
is a mere mechanical process.”

In 1925 the St. Louis court of appeals in the case of Pioneer
Lumber Co. v. Van Cleave75 presented clearly a little different
aspect of the controlling principle of the preceding cases, in re
quiring that the accountant-witness do not express his opinion as
to the ultimate issue of the case. The opinion reads in part:
“* * * but we have found no authority, nor have we been cited
any, which has extended the rule to the extent of permitting such
accountant witness, after having testified to the results of his examina
tion, to express his opinion as to the ultimate issue in the case. In
receiving the opinion of a witness the danger is ever present that the
jury may substitute such opinion for their own, and the courts will
not require parties to encounter this danger unless some necessity
therefor appears. Accordingly, where all the relevant facts be intro
duced in evidence, and the jury are competent to draw a reasonable
inference therefrom, opinion evidence should not be received.
“Courts, as far as practicable, exclude the inference, conclusion,
or judgment of a witness as to the ultimate fact in issue to provide
against the mischief of invasion of the province of the jury. 22
Corpus Juris, 499. The instant case clearly falls within that class in
which all of the books and documentary files were in court, and the
relevant facts contained in them introduced in evidence, and con
sequently permitting the opinion of the accountant with reference
to the sole question in issue in the case, was obviously an invasion
75 279 S. W. 241.
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of the province of the jury. Therefore, in considering the demurrers
at the close of the case, we exclude from consideration the opinion
evidence of the said accountant witness as to his opinion of the
ultimate issue in the case.”

In 1927 the supreme court of Alabama in the case of Edwards v.
State 76 followed the general principle of the preceding cases and
the great weight of authority on the subject and helped to define
precisely the scope of the accountant’s expert testimony. In this
case it was held that the accountant-witness could not explain
transactions under dispute, because he had not personal knowl
edge of the transactions. The accountant was permitted to explain
only the books’ showing of the transactions. A portion of the opin
ion follows:
“* * * It was, of course, competent for the auditor to give evidence
of what he found upon the books and of the cheques themselves,
but, it not being contended that he had any personal knowledge of the
transactions, he could not properly explain them and state what they
represented, it being manifest that such evidence was predicated solely
upon the conclusion or opinion of the witness.”

The excerpts given above represent the well-established authority
on the admissibility of the accountant’s expert testimony. The gen
eral rule running through all the cases confines the province of
the expert accountant’s testimony to a statement of what the books
show. The accountant can not express his opinion as to the ultimate
issue in the case. Where the auditor does not have personal knowl
edge of the transactions under consideration—and he generally does
not—he can not explain the transactions nor state what they repre
sent; he can merely state what the vouchers and journals show
such transactions to be. The auditor can not testify: “I think, I
believe, I am of the opinion that, or I conclude that certain trans
actions took place, or that certain facts in issue are true or untrue.”
On the other hand, the auditor is permitted to state to the court:
“The books show certain transactions to have taken place. The
records show a shortage in inventory. The books show that cash
is missing to the amount o f --------.” In other words, the accountant
76 111 So. 765.
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in producing testimony is limited to a statement of the character
and content of the accounting records. The revelation of the facts
as found in the books is the scope of the accountant’s testimony.
The making of inferences from the facts revealed by a statement
of the showing of the books is purely within the province of the
jury. If the expert accountant’s testimony concerns any accounting
fact which might properly be understood by the lay-jurors, the
accountant testifying is limited to a bare statement of the fact;
the jurors alone make deductions from the fact. However, if the
accounting fact is one that is not intelligible to the lay-jurors, the
accountant-witness is permitted to explain the fact to the jurors.
Then, finally, if the fact is such that it can not be explained so that
the jury may obtain a proper understanding of the fact, the expert
accountant may present to the jury his conclusions as to the fact
shown by the books.77
The cases defining the scope of the accountant’s testimony make
his rôle before the jury too narrow, too restricted to accomplish
the greatest good in the cause of truth. In theory the courts seek
to bring to the jury practically the same degree of understanding
of facts as is possessed by the witness. Except in the case of a very
simple set of books it is impossible for the accountant to convey an
adequate picture of the character and content of accounting rec
ords. The jury can not be made to comprehend the meaning of the
records in the way the accountant understands it. The accountant
through many years of study, training, and practice has acquired
an apperceptive background which enables him to place interpreta
tions and meanings upon the accounting data, which are not pos
sible to the lay-jurors. The ability of the jury to discover the truth
would be facilitated if the accountant-witness were permitted not
77 N ote: (1885) Railroad Co. v. Schulz, 43 Oh. St. 270, 283, 1 N . E. 324: “It
m ust not be supposed th at there is any rule of evidence concerning the opinions
of witnesses w hich is peculiar to fences, highways, bridges or steamboats or to
any other special subjects of investigation. W here the facts concerning their con
dition can n ot be m ade palpable to the jurors so that their m eans o f form ing
opinions are practically equal to those of the witnesses, opinions of such w it
nesses may be received, accompanied by such facts supporting them as they may
be able to place intelligently before the jury.” T his case represents the weight of
authority on the point.
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only to state what the records contain but also to state his opinion
as to the inferences to be drawn from the records.78
Courts, in the case of expert testimony on value, have made
an exception to the rule which prohibits a witness from giving
opinionative testimony. The courts of the United States generally
allow opinionative evidence concerning value. Anyone who has
peculiar knowledge of the value of specific property or of a business
enterprise may offer his opinion of such value before the jury. It
is quite often impossible for the witness to picture to the jury all
the factors that lead him to place upon specific property a certain
value. Hence, from necessity, in order that the jury may utilize
the expert witness’ information on value, courts allow his testi
monial opinion relative to the worth of specific property or of a
business' enterprise.79
In agreement with the principle admitting expert testimony
generally with respect to value, several courts have broadened the
scope of the admissibility of the accountant’s expert testimony to
include his opinion relative to the worth of property or of a busi
ness enterprise. In support of this principle the supreme court of
Georgia in 1927 in the case of Bitting v. State 80 held:
“* * * It does not seem to us that any of the evidence to which
objection was made was improperly admitted for any reason sug
gested in the exceptions or argument of counsel. It has frequently been
held that proof of value is merely matter of opinion, no matter how
the information of the witness may have been derived, whether based
upon his own estimate, or upon an estimate accredited by the witness,
but derived from the opinions of others. And while this court has
decided that ‘the opinions of persons cannot be proved or used in
evidence this way; that is, a witness will not be permitted to prove
the opinions of others on any question,’ if the testimony sought to
be excluded is given as the opinion of the witness himself, and
vouched for by the witness as such on his oath, it is not to be
excluded merely because upon cross-examination the sources of his
78 Note: For a discussion of the desirability of American courts’ following the
English ruling permitting even lay-witnesses to state their opinions after they have
presented personally observed facts see Wigmore on Evidence, volume IV, section
1929.
79 Wigmore on Evidence, volume IV, sections 1940-1944.
80 139 S. E. 877.
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information and the information which caused him to form the
opinion testified to are discovered. The jury may discredit the opinion
of the witness after they know the causes which lead to the forma
tion of his opinion; but the opinion of the witness as to value, if
it is his own opinion, is admissible as evidence for whatever it may
be worth, regardless of the reliability of the data upon which he was
induced to base his opinion. * * *”

Bitting v. State, supra, held that an expert witness’ opinion with
respect to value is admissible regardless of the sources of the
information upon which the witness has based his opinion. An
other case, Stephens v. United States,81 decided in 1930 by the
circuit court of appeals, ninth circuit, quite in agreement with the
preceding case, held that an expert accountant’s testimony on value
may be admissible even though the witness’ opinion is not based
solely upon the accounting records of the business or property to
be valued. A portion of the decision reads:
“Another contention in this group relates more particularly to the
testimony of the witness Bryan. Referring to what appear to be
annual financial statements of Stephens & Co., he criticized them as
not reflecting the true financial condition of the company as of the
dates to which they relate. One of the criticisms was that they ex
hibited as assets stocks or bonds which, as he contended the record
showed, had either not been issued or of which the company had
not acquired possession and ownership during the periods covered
by the statements. Clearly, we think the objections made to this part
of the testimony are without merit. The other criticism was that
some of the statements exhibited items of stocks or bonds as assets
at highly excessive overvaluations. In reaching his conclusion as to
what would have been a reasonable valuation he frankly stated that
he resorted to information not appearing in the books and records
of the company. But it appears that he was not only a trained ac
countant in the strict sense, but that he had had long and wide
experience in connection with business where it was necessary to
observe and place valuations upon such securities, and, as he put it,
he followed the same course in this case in resorting to sources of
information touching value ‘as I have done all my life in valuing
securities.’ While the propriety of receiving his testimony in this
81 41 F. (2 d ) 440.
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respect is not entirely free from doubt, we are of the view that the
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it, and that there was
no prejudicial error.”

Closely akin to the two preceding cases is the case of Manley v.
State,82 decided by the court of appeals of Georgia in 1927, which
held that an expert accountant’s testimony as to the solvency of a
business may be competent evidence. A portion of the opinion
reads:
“It is true that R. E. Bentley, an expert witness in behalf of the
state, testified that he had made an examination and analysis of the
books of this bank, and that from such examination and analysis said
bank was insolvent as far back as the first of 1915, and that such
insolvency had continued from that date down to the time the bank
closed its doors and went into the hands of the superintendent of
banks for liquidation. This opinion of this witness is competent
evidence on the question of the insolvency vel non of this bank.
Such an opinion is not conclusive upon the jury. The testimony is
intended to aid them in coming to a correct conclusion upon the
subject; but the jury is not bound by such opinion and can disregard
* * *”

The rule which allows an expert accountant’s opinionative testi
mony on questions of value has the support of the well-settled
common law permitting expert witnesses generally to testify with
respect to value.83 The accountant through his review and analysis
of accounting records can make estimates of values in a manner
not intelligible to the lay-juror. Moreover, the technique employed
would be beyond the comprehension of the jury. Hence, in order
that the jury may avail itself of this technical information as to
value, the accountant-witness is permitted to state his conclusions
as to the value of the business the records of which he has ana
lyzed. The determination of the financial condition of a business
as to solvency is a special problem of estimating values. Hence,
the courts allow an accountant who has reviewed the records of a
business to state whether or not he thinks the business was insol
vent at the time the cause of action arose.
82 144 S. E. 170, 166 Ga. 563.
83 Wigmore on Evidence, volume IV, secs. 1940-1944.

A dmissibility

of

A ccountant ’s T estimony

193

A ccountant’s R ight to R efresh his M emory from R ecords

The supreme court of Nebraska in 1922 in the case of Heilman v.
State 84 held:
“* * * An expert accountant who has examined the books of a
public officer to ascertain an issuable fact and compiled a statement
may refresh his memory from the compilation and testify to the
result. The books, records, vouchers and documents used by the expert
in making his computation were in court available to defendant, and
the evidence was not objectionable on that ground.”

The object of placing evidence before the court is to convey to
the jury a proper understanding of the truth of the case. Since the
accountant-witness is primarily concerned with conveying to the
minds of the jurors a knowledge of the accounting records under
consideration, certainly, any aid, such as a re-examination of the
records, that would facilitate an accurate representation of the truth
would be permitted by the court.
84 189 N. W. 303, 109 Neb. 15.

C hapter IV

SOME SPECIAL RIGHTS OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
C hamperty

comprehensive treatment of champerty must involve some
attention to maintenance, for champerty is a special kind of
maintenance. The common law and the statutes of both America
and England are so diverse in their rulings on the two subjects
that no adequate definition of either can be given. Any general
statement regarding the nature of either misdemeanor must neces
sarily be qualified by diverse exceptions, depending upon the stat
utes and court precedents of the jurisdiction in which the remedy
against the misdemeanor is sought.1
Maintenance is an officious intermeddling in a suit that in no
way belongs to one, by maintaining or assisting either party with
money or otherwise to prosecute or defend it. According to the
early common law and statutes of England maintenance was an
offense against public justice, since it kept alive strife and conten
tion and perverted the remedial process of the law into an engine
of oppression.2
Champerty is a species of maintenance. It is a bargain to divide
the proceeds of a litigation between a party to the suit and the
attorney or layman supporting the litigation. The division of the
proceeds of the litigation distinguishes champerty from maintenance
in general.
While maintenance and champerty were prohibited by the Roman
law, the modern law on the subjects is based largely upon the
developments that took place in feudal England. It was a common
any

1 Note: Where the jurisdiction of the complaint against maintenance or cham
perty is different from the jurisdiction in which the cause of action arose, the
suit must always be tried in accordance with the laws of the jurisdiction where
the complaint is made. (Thornton on Attorneys at Law, volume II, p. 662.)
2 4 Blackstone’s Commentaries 135.
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practice during the early legal history of England for great and
powerful feudal lords to take upon themselves litigation in behalf
of weaker members of the community. In many instances the claims
were unjust; but the feudal lords overawed the courts and obtained
judgments, the benefits of which went largely to the feudal lords.
Hence, to combat this pernicious practice, common-law decisions
and statutes made maintenance and champerty crimes, and rendered
invalid contracts tainted with those misdemeanors.
While the early law was severe on the perpetrators of mainte
nance and champerty, except where maintenance was extended
for purely charitable purposes, there is no record that anyone was
punished criminally for the commission of either misdemeanor.
The effect of the laws on maintenance and champerty is to be
found in the voiding of contracts. In modern times there is not
the great amount of need for rigid laws on champerty and mainte
nance which existed in feudal Europe. The statute of limitations,
the statute of frauds and the giving of costs against the unsuccess
ful party have contributed to prevent groundless and vexatious
litigation and have caused a relaxing of the severe rules against
champerty and maintenance of mediaeval England. In many states
the doctrine of maintenance and champerty is scarcely recognized,
even by the courts. Where the laws of maintenance and champerty
are recognized the many exceptions have modified their ancient
severity. Neither maintenance nor champerty has been held to
exist where the person maintaining and the suitor stood in some
social relation, as that of relatives by consanguinity or affinity, mas
ter and servant or landlord and tenant.3 It is well-settled law that
maintenance or champerty does not exist where the one offering
assistance in litigation has any interest whatever in the subject of
the suit. Whether this interest is great or small, vested or con
tingent, certain or uncertain, it is, if honestly believed to exist,
sufficient to remove the case from the rules against maintenance
and champerty.4
By the great weight of modern authority fees charged by an
attorney to a client for professional services and dependent upon
3 Reece v. Kyle, 49 Ohio St. 475, 31 N. E. 747, 16 L. R. A. 723.
4 5 R. C. L . p . 274.
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the amount of recovery are not within the rules against mainte
nance and champerty. But if the attorney agrees, not only to prose
cute or defend the case for a fee contingent upon the success of
the litigation, but also to bear the expense of witness fees or costs
of the suit, the agreement is champertous. If, in addition to the
contingent-fee stipulation, the agreement provides that the client
shall not settle by compromise or otherwise without the consent
of the attorney, the agreement is champertous. If the contingent
fee was a reward for the attorney’s services as a witness or for
the quashing of a criminal prosecution, the agreement providing for
such fee is champertous. Even where the attorney’s contract is
champertous and, therefore, void, the attorney is generally per
mitted to recover on a quantum meruit for the value of services
rendered.5 Some courts, including the supreme court of the United
States, refuse to be concerned with all the technicalities of the com
mon-law tests of champerty and maintenance and consider merely
whether the particular contract in question is oppressive in charac
ter, and, if not, to uphold it, though the attorney agreed to bear
the expenses of the litigation and contracted for a share of the
proceeds.
In the main, the rules of maintenance and champerty applicable
to attorneys govern in the contractual relationships between lay
men. A difference lies in the fact that the attorney contributes his
services while the layman generally hires the legal service neces
sary to prosecute or defend the suit whose court costs he has agreed
to bear and in whose proceeds he has been promised a share. Not
all courts require that the layman must bear the costs of the suit
in addition to sharing in the proceeds of the trial before he can be
said to be guilty of champerty; some courts have held agreements
void for champerty where the layman was promised a share in the
5 Note: By the weight of authority it is no defense to an action that the plain
tiff has made a champertous contract for its prosecution, unless the cause of action
be based upon the champertous agreement, as where the cause of action was
assigned to the plaintiff by a champertous agreement. For further illustration, if
a note or an account be assigned to an attorney for litigation with the under
standing that the attorney is to get a percentage of the profits from litigation, the
cause of action is invalid; but if no assignment is made to the attorney and the
suit is brought in the name of the client, the cause of action will not be invalidated
by the fact that the attorney is to bear costs of the suit and divide the proceeds
of the litigation with the client. (Thornton on Attorneys at Law, volume II, p. 684.)
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recovery in consideration of his rendering services to the litigant
or securing evidence to sustain the suit or attending to the prose
cution or defense of the suit.6
Some of the more important general characteristics of the laws
of maintenance and champerty having been set forth, it remains
to show to what extent the public accountant is subject to the
rules of maintenance and champerty. The occasions on which an
accountant as such might deem it necessary to enter into an agree
ment involving maintenance or champerty would be rare. The
most probable situations inviting champertous agreements by pub
lic accountants would be in practice before the agencies for the
collection of income taxes, federal and state. The accountant would,
in such practice, be acting as a counselor and should be subject to
the same rules of maintenance and champerty as are applicable to
the attorney.
It might easily happen that an accountant would be asked to
enter into a champertous agreement to furnish evidence. It seems
to be the weight of authority that an agreement to furnish existing
documents and information already in the hands of the promisor
to a litigant for use as evidence in an action from which the prom
isor is to share in the recovery is not champertous.7 On the other
hand, if the one providing the existing information further stipu
lates that he will procure for a contingent fee other information
necessary to sustain the suit, the agreement is champertous, tending
to perjury and a perversion of justice.8 By the weight of authority
an agreement to pay an ordinary witness as compensation a fee
in excess of the statutory amount is invalid, on the ground that
the agreement lacks consideration and has a tendency to perjury.
An agreement to pay a witness a fee contingent on the success of
the suit is doubly vicious in that the agreement not only violates
the statutory-fee bill, but also tends to induce the witness to color
his testimony so as to win the suit. In common with a lay witness,
the compensation of an expert witness can not be made to depend
6 W illiston on Contracts, volume III, sections 1711-1716; 5 R. C. L., pp. 268286; T h o rn to n on Attorneys-at-law, volum e II, pp. 652-687; Note— 16 L. R. A.
745.
7 Annotation, 34 A. L. R. 1537.
8 Ibid.; Annotation, 16 A. L. R. 1433.
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upon the contingency of the successful outcome of the litigation.
Likewise, by the weight of authority,. an expert witness can not
demand compensation in excess of the statutory witness fee before
testifying to facts within his knowledge, although it may have
required professional study, learning or skill to ascertain them.9
If the expert witness has acquired knowledge of the facts through
previous employment with a litigant or anyone else, he must tes
tify without more compensation than the statutory fee. On the other
hand, if the witness, after he has been summoned to testify, must
make preliminary preparation or render professional services for
the purpose of qualifying himself to give expert testimony, he is
entitled to compensation for such preparatory services.10 Hence, a
public accountant in response to a court order to testify could not
be compelled to make an audit without compensation in order that
he might qualify to testify as an expert concerning certain account
ing records.
An American case dealing with champerty on the part of an
accountant was decided by the supreme court of Wisconsin in 1924.
The facts of this case, Miller v. Anderson,11 were as follows:
The plaintiff, who was an accountant, was employed as head
accountant and credit man of the Interstate Packing Company at
Winona, Minnesota, for a year beginning in February, 1922. In
the early part of his employment the accountant heard the super
intendent state that the company owed a stock shipper at Tomah,
Wisconsin, a large sum of money and that the company remained
silent about the debt because the shipper was unaware of the
claim. After the accountant left the employ of the Interstate Pack
ing Company he ascertained the name of the stock shipper, de
fendant in this case, and entered into a contract with the shipper
for the collection of the debt.
The contract entered into between the plaintiff accountant and
the defendant stock-shipper provided that the accountant, with the
9 Note: The English courts and a substantial minority of American decisions
have held that an expert witness can not be coerced to testify unless he has had
compensation greater than the fee allowed a lay-witness.
10 Annotation, 2 A. L. R. 1576; Annotation, 16 A. L. R. 1457; Williston on
Contracts, vol. III, sec. 1716.
11 196 N. W. 869, 183 Wis. 163, 34 A. L. R. 1529.
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coöperation of the shipper, should make such investigations of
shipments and sales made by the stock shipper to the Interstate
Packing Company as the accountant deemed necessary to deter
mine whether any debt was due by the Interstate Packing Company
to the shipper. The contract further provided that, if it should be
ascertained that a balance was due the shipper from the Interstate
Packing Company and if such debt should be collected, the ac
countant and the shipper would share equally in all moneys thus
received.
After the execution of this contract the accountant and the
shipper obtained from the railroad over which the shipper had made
his shipments the number of carloads of stock the shipper had
sent to the Interstate Packing Company. By means of an intensive
search the accountant and shipper were able to find among the
shipper’s possessions sales tickets issued by the Interstate Packing
Company, which tallied with records of the railroad. Then the
accountant and the shipper compared these tickets with the credits
to the shipper’s account on the books of the bank where he was
accustomed to make deposits. All the sales tickets except two corre
sponded with the credits to the shipper’s account on the bank
books. After the accountant and the shipper determined the amount
of the two shipments for which no payment had been made, the
shipper drew a draft for that amount upon the Interstate Packing
Company. The draft was returned unpaid. Then the shipper went
to the Interstate Packing Company and succeeded in collecting
$3,750. The shipper refused to remit half of the collection to the
accountant; and the accountant brought an action for that sum
against the shipper. The shipper set up the defense of champerty.
The court’s opinion in part follows:
“That a champertous contract is void and will not be enforced is
a trite proposition. Contracts to pay for collecting and procuring testi
mony to be used in evidence, coupled with a condition that the
contractee’s right to compensation depends upon the character of the
testimony procured, or upon the result of the suit in which it is to
be used, have been uniformly condemned by the courts as contrary to
public policy, for the reason that such agreements hold out an induce
ment to commit fraud or procure persons to commit perjury. Thus, a
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contract to pay a physician a percentage of the recovery for acting
as an expert in a personal-injury action is against public policy.
“Likewise, it has been held * * * that an agreement to pay a
witness more than the statutory witness fees for appearing and testify
ing to facts within his knowledge is contrary to public policy and
void. This is especially true where the compensation is dependent
upon the successful outcome of the litigation.
“It will be observed that these several principles involve a common
element, namely, existing or contemplated litigation. Such contracts
are held to contravene public policy because they tend to the perver
sion of justice. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the contract
between the parties for the purpose of ascertaining whether it con
templated the institution of any action or proceeding and the rendi
tion of any service or assistance on the part of the plaintiff condemned
by the foregoing principles.
“It must be conceded that the contract, on its face, does not provide
for the institution of any litigation, nor does any suggestion appear
therefrom that either of the parties had any such thought in mind.
But in cases such as this we are not confined to a consideration of the
written contract. Parol evidence is competent to show that a writing
valid on its face is a mere cover for an illegal transaction. * * *
The answer alleges that the written contract was and is a part of
an attempt to cover a simultaneous oral understanding and agreement
between the parties which does offend against the foregoing prin
ciples. Parol evidence of the negotiations leading up to the written
contract was therefore admitted and must be considered in this con
nection. But the parol evidence fails to reveal any thought at any
time on the part of either of the parties that litigation with the pack
ing company would be necessary or likely. In fact, it was not suggested
by either party, so far as the parol evidence discloses. The nearest
approach to such a suggestion occurred after the contract had been
executed and after the draft made upon the packing company had
been returned unpaid. The parties then went to a lawyer’s office, and
the plaintiff suggested that the account be placed with a lawyer, to
be handled in the form of a collection. But the defendant did not
like that. H e thought he knew the vice-president and stock buyer of
the packing company and that he could make a settlement with him.
H e went to Winona and effected a settlement with him. The record
discloses a situation where the defendant had simply lost sight of the
fact that he had not been paid for two carloads of stock shipped to
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the packing company. W hen he was first told that the packing com
pany was the debtor which the plaintiff had in mind, he could not
believe that the packing company owed him anything. It was plain
tiff’s task to get together defendant’s records and accounts and the
records of the railway company, for the purpose of informing de
fendant of the true situation of affairs. Plaintiff knew that the packing
company knew that they were owing the defendant. Certainly plain
tiff did not assume that litigation would be necessary to enforce
collection. There was no agreement, expressed or implied, that plain
tiff would bear any part of the expense of the litigation. There is no
evidence to show that it was assumed by either party that, even if
litigation should result, plaintiff would be a necessary witness. As we
now view the case, we are at a loss to divine the character of the
evidence which plaintiff could have given, had litigation resulted,
that would have been in any sense substantial or material. De
fendant’s case would have been proved by showing that he had
shipped a certain number of carloads of stock. This could have been
shown by the records of the railroad company. Defendant’s own
testimony would have been sufficient to show that he had not been
paid for two carloads so shipped. It would then have devolved upon
the packing company to prove payment. Any testimony that the
plaintiff might have given would have been so remote and of so little
weight or materiality that it can not characterize the contract as one
having for its purpose the influencing of litigation. To condemn this
contract as one against public policy is to carry the principles invoked
by the respondent to a prudish extreme, and would compel a holding
that a business man whose accounts have become confused or involved
may not employ an accountant to audit them for a compensation
contingent upon the amount eventually collected. To such an extreme
we are not prepared to go where the gist of the contract is not to
promote successful litigation, but rather to place the client in the pos
session of the true facts concerning his affairs and accounts.”

In the case of Miller v. Anderson, supra, there were the follow
ing conditions in the alleged champertous agreement:
(1) A compensation contingent upon collection of a debt.
(2) A promise by the plaintiff to search defendant’s records to
procure evidence to substantiate the claim which the plaintiff knew
existed.
(3) No litigation contemplated.
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(4) No mention or implication that plaintiff was to bear any
cost of litigation.
The agreement was not champertous, for in every champertous
agreement there must be present or contemplated litigation. Fur
thermore, the agreement was not champertous because the contin
gent remuneration was to be derived from an ordinary collection
of a business debt and not from the proceeds of a law suit and
also because the information was to be procured to substantiate a
business debt and not to sustain litigation. Certainly, an accountant
may perform an audit for a fee contingent upon certain collections
where litigation is not contemplated.
While decisions generally have not been concerned with the
adequacy of evidence to sustain litigation where champerty is
alleged, yet the court’s position in this case seems to be well taken
in holding that an agreement to furnish evidence for litigation is
not champertous unless the evidence affords substantial proof in
the case. If there is no material or substantial proof in the evidence
which the plaintiff can offer, he can do little or nothing by the
production of such evidence to pervert the course of justice. This
thought inclines toward the recent innovation of certain courts,
including the supreme court of the United States, in brushing aside
the technicalities of champerty and seeking to determine whether
or not the agreement in reality tends toward oppression and per
version of justice.
While the court in this case is correct in the philosophy of the
law of champerty, it appears to be erroneous in taking the position
that the only evidence the plaintiff could have produced for litiga
tion was from his knowledge of the accounts of the packing com
pany. While the cases that have been involved with the commission
of champerty through production of documentary or other evidence
have been concerned with information not in the possession or
control of the litigant, it would seem that, as in this case, where
th e e v id e n c e w a s in su c h a c o n d it io n th a t it c o u ld n o t b e u sed

without the services of an accountant, even though the records were
possessed or controlled directly or remotely by the litigant, courts
should hold that the accountant procured evidence in making the
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search or audit and interpretations indispensable to the use of the
records as evidence.
O wnership of W orking P apers

English cases are singularly silent on the subject of ownership
of papers upon which accountants base their reports to their
clients.12
An important decision rendered in 1927 by the supreme judicial
court of Massachusetts in the case of Ipswich Mills v. Dillon 13 set
a precedent for American courts with respect to the rights of a
public accountant to his working papers. In this case the defendants
had been employed for many years prior to 1926 to conduct the
audits and prepare income-tax returns for the plaintiff textile mill.
The plaintiff in 1926 in order to obtain certain data for incometax purposes demanded from the defendants “all papers in your
possession belonging to Ipswich Mills.” The accountants refused to
give up the papers; and the plaintiff sought a court order to compel
the defendants to deliver the papers.
The Ipswich Mills v. Dillon case held as property of the public
accountant the following records, papers, letters and documents
prepared in the course of the accountant-client relationship:
(1) Office copy of client’s income-tax return, a copy of which
had been sent to the client.
(2) Office copies of schedules relating to the client’s income-tax
returns, copies of which had been sent to the client.
(3) Carbon copies of letters from accountant to collector of in
ternal revenue.
(4) Carbon copies of letters from accountant to his client.
(5) Original letters from client to accountant.
(6) Original letters from client’s attorney to accountant.
(7) The research data, or working papers, the accountant had
obtained from a review of the client’s accounting records.
Since the accountant in this case conceded that the client was
owner of papers that had originated in the client’s office or in the
12 “The Ownership of Accountants’ Working Papers,” The Accountant, London,
1927, volume 77, p. 187.
13 157 N. E. 604.
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office of the client’s selling agents, or in the office of someone asso
ciated with the client’s selling agents, the court did not rule on the
title to such papers. Such papers doubtless were the property of
the client, since apparently the accountant had nothing to do with
them except to gain custody of them for purposes of review.
The decision in the case, that the public accountant is an inde
pendent contractor and not an agent of his client, is well substanti
ated by reason and by precedents in other professions. The public
accountant assumes none of the essential characteristics of an agent
in his contract with his client. The professional accountant does
not represent the mind of his client in the making, changing or
cancelling of business contracts for the client with third parties.
The public accountant is not subject to direction and control by the
client as is an agent to his principal.
Since the public accountant acts in the capacity of an independent
contractor and not as an agent in dealing with his client, the work
ing papers he must prepare in order to render his reports to his
client become his own property. He contracts with his client to
furnish reports showing the condition of the accounting records of
the client and does not agree to provide the client with means by
which such reports are prepared.
The public accountant is responsible to his client to render effi
cient income-tax service. Because of the many contingencies that
may arise after the return has been prepared and sent to the col
lecting agency, it is vital to the accountant that he retain a copy
of the return, for only in this way can the client be assured of
competent income-tax service. Unless the courts grant the account
ant title to his copy of the income-tax return, the professional ac
countant can have no assurance that he will be able to retain the
data necessary to cope with subsequent contingencies.
As the accountant should be allowed to retain title to copies of
income-tax returns rendered for his client, so should the accountant
be permitted to own carbon copies of letters sent by the account
ant. In the c o u r se of accounting practice questions concerning pre
vious audits arise and require the attention of the auditor. The
continuation of the accountant’s relation with his client may hinge
upon the accountant’s giving prompt attention to matters involv
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ing the former audit. It may easily happen that the information
necessary to solve the question is contained in the carbon copy of a
letter. It is essential to the practice of public accounting that the
practitioner be permitted to own carbon copies of letters relating
to audits he has performed. Only in this way can the accountant
give to his client continued and trustworthy service.
Courts uniformly allow to the recipient of a letter complete title
for all purposes except publication. The paper and the manuscrip
tion upon it constitute a gift by the sender to the recipient. Of
course, a public accountant should not be permitted to reveal to
third parties confidential information received by letter from his
client; but he should be permitted to own the letters he receives.
While the Ipswich Mills v. Dillon is the only case on the owner
ship of the public accountant’s letters, documents and working
papers prepared in the course of the accountant-client relation, the
principles of the case are sound and should be followed in future
decisions.
Virginia has a statute which entitles a public accountant to own
ership of his working papers:14
“All statements, records, schedules and memoranda made by a
certified public accountant or a public accountant, or by an employee
or employees of a certified public accountant, or public accountant,
incident to or in the course of professional service to clients by such
certified public accountant, or public accountant, except reports sub
mitted by a certified public accountant, or public accountant, to a
client, shall be and remain the property of such certified public
accountant, or public accountant, in the absence of a written agree
ment between the certified public accountant, or public accountant,
and the client, to the contrary.”

Florida has a similar statute.15 No cases have arisen under these
statutes of Virginia and Florida.
T

he

A ccountant ’s L ien

upo n

H

is

E mployer ’s B ooks

Prior to a consideration of the subject of the accountant’s lien
upon his employer’s records as a security for the payment of service
14 Acts of assembly, Virginia, 1928, chapter 454, section 572a.
15 C ertified P u blic A cco u n ta n t L a w s o f th e U n ite d States,

Publishing Co., Inc., p. 41.

American Institute
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fees, it is well to devote some attention to the nature of a lien.
A lien is a legal claim or charge on either personalty or real estate
as security for the payment of some debt or obligation. On the
basis of source of creation liens are divisible into common-law,
equitable, maritime and statutory. On the basis of the scope of the
claims, liens are divided into general and specific.
A common-law lien is a right originating from a contract im
plied in law by which possession of personal property may be
retained until some debt due on or secured by such property is
paid or satisfied.16 A common-law lien will be implied where a
lien in a particular set of circumstances has received immemorial
recognition at common-law or is uniformly and generally allowed
by trade custom or practice. When the custom is first proved to
establish a lien, the lien arises from the intentions of the parties as
interpreted from the facts within the custom; but after commonlaw courts have repeatedly held a lien to exist in accordance with
the particular trade custom or usage, the type of lien becomes so
well established that it is implied in law. The common law makes
a contract in the circumstances in order to afford a sure remedy
to a person who has performed services for another. The claimant
has neither title nor a right to obtain title to the property; he
simply has a right of detainer for use as an effectual agency for
inducing or compelling a settlement of a just claim. It necessarily
follows, then, that a common-law lien can exist no longer than the
duration of possession by the claimant. Furthermore, the party
claiming the lien must show the just possession of the thing held;
the lien can not be founded upon an illegal or fraudulent act or
breach of duty.
An equitable lien is a charge or encumbrance placed upon per
sonal or real property by a contract expressed, or implied in fact, to
insure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation.17 The
charge or encumbrance is not a conveyance of title to the creditor,
nor is it a right to obtain title, but rather a right to have a certain
obligation settled through sale of identified property under court
order. An equitable lien is created by the intentions of the parties.
16 Jones on Liens, volume I, secs. 1-26.
17 Jones on Liens, volume I, secs. 27-96.
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An equitable lien is a means of affording justice where it may be
deduced from an express contract or surrounding circumstances that
the parties must have intended that a charge be maintained upon
specific property to insure performance of some obligation. While at
common law a lien means merely the right of possession until a
pecuniary recovery is made from the general resources of the debtor,
in equity a lien affords a way of satisfying rights and obligations out
of identified property even though the chattel is not possessed by the
creditor. As between the debtor and creditor the lien may be effec
tual even though possession of the property is retained by the debtor.
The kinds of equitable liens are as varied as the possibilities of form
ing contracts creating them. An example of an equitable lien
arising from an express contract is to be found in an agreement of
a merchant to permit the sale of his stock of merchandise under
court order to satisfy a claim of purchase money in case of default.
An implied equitable lien arises when a debtor gives an order to a
third person to pay a creditor out of a specific fund under the con
trol of the third person.
By legislation in America practically all the common-law liens
and many of the equitable liens have been enlarged in their scope
or have been made more effectual by provisions for their enforce
ment.18 In many instances the statutes have gone beyond the liens
previously recognized at common law or in equity and have cre
ated a number of new liens. The tendency of legislation is to
extend the protection afforded by liens to all persons who supply
labor or materials for others. A common form of remedy in a
statutory lien is a legal attachment. But in some states the statutes
provide for equitable action as a remedy for the statutory lien.
The equitable action is usually in the form of a decree for a sale of
the property in order to obtain funds to satisfy the debt upon
which the lien is based.
A specific lien is a right which attaches to specific property as
security for some demand for the unpaid price of work done or
materials furnished in repairing or constructing the identical chattel.
While a specific lien may be created by common law, a contract or
a statute, the origin of this type of lien is to be found in the com18 Jones on Liens, volume I, secs. 97-112.
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mon law. The specific or particular lien was made necessary to
protect tradesmen and artisans for the price of work done on goods
in their possession. The principal specific liens upon personal
property at common law are those of mechanics and artisans, inn
keepers, carriers, sellers or vendors and landlords under the process
of distress. The specific lien has been adopted by equity and statutes
to include situations where possession is not in the creditor. The
specific or particular lien is favored by the decisions and legislation.
It adds confidence to business and does not place any unconscion
able restraint upon property.
A general lien is a right attached to a particular chattel to serve
as security for a general balance of account due from the owner.
While the general lien is generally confined to common law, it may
be equitable or statutory. General liens are looked at with jealousy
by courts, because such liens encroach upon the common law and
destroy the equal distribution of the debtor’s estate among his
creditors. The principal general liens are those of factors and
brokers, bankers, lawyers upon their clients’ papers and moneys,
warehousemen and wharfingers.19
Two cases have defined, though inadequately, the rights of an
accountant to a lien on his employer’s books. Each case appeared
in 1901. Burleigh v. Clark, Lim.,20 was decided by the chancery
division of England:
“The accountant now took the view that he had a lien on the books
of the company for work done, and he refused to deliver up the
books except on payment by the receiver of his account, £137. The
way in which he got possession of the books was this: H e asked leave
of the directors and the secretary to take away the books to his own
office, as he said the company’s office was small and inconvenient for
him, and he could do the work better in his own office.
“His lordship said that the affidavits filed showed that the re
spondent claimed a lien, not as auditor, but as accountant. In his
opinion the question of an auditor’s lien did not arise and had it done
so, he considered that an auditor had no such lien; but that point he
did not now decide. In respect of the share register, the accountant
had no possible lien on that, but he held that he was entitled to a lien
19 Jones on Liens, vol. I, secs. 1-152; 37 Corpus Juris, pp. 306-323.

20 The Accountant, London, 1901, volume 27, law reports section, p. 65.
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on such books only as he had actually worked upon, in respect of his
proper remuneration for work upon those books only.”

Scott Shoe Machinery Co. v. Broaker,21 the other opinion, was
rendered by the city court of New York. In this case an action of
replevin was brought by a client to recover possession of books in
the hands of certain public accountants who held the books in
an effort to enforce payment for services rendered to the client.
The decision reads:
“At common law, liens were given to attorneys, warehousemen,
wharfingers and to other special classes of persons. There was no such
thing as an accountant’s lien. And, except in the case of these favored
classes, the only persons having a lien at common law are bailees
employed to change, alter, repair or do work upon some article, and
who by their services have added something to its value. In this
latter class are the liens of tailors, carpenters, etc. This class appears
to be the same as is provided for by section 70 of the New York
lien law. The defendants certainly do not come within this class.
They have done nothing to the books but have merely made an
examination of them. After their examination the books remained as
they were before, nothing whatsoever having been added to their
value. The object of the examination made by an accountant is the
preparation of a report. The report may be something of value, or it
may not, but the books themselves are not the least changed or
improved by the investigation.”

These two reported cases, dealing with the accountant’s lien upon
his client’s books, are doubtless correctly decided in the light of
the well-established law of liens. In the two cases the only sem
blance of a lien was a specific lien at common law, and that had
necessarily to be predicated upon the possession of the records by
the accountant and also upon the improvement of the records by
the accountant’s labors. In other words, an accountant’s lien upon
his client’s books must be based on a possession lawfully obtained
and an improvement of the records effected by the accountant
through recording entries or otherwise. Generally the accountant
will not obtain possession of his client’s records, nor will he usually
improve the records themselves. Hence, in most instances the two
21 71 N. Y. S. 1023, 33 Misc. Rep. 382, 10 N. Y. Ann. Cas. 130.
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most essential elements of the common-law lien would be absent
from the accountant’s dealings with his client. Even where the
elements of possession and improvement of the books are present
it cannot be expected that courts will allow more than the commonlaw specific lien. It can not be expected that courts will allow to
the accountant the common-law general lien upon his client’s books
to ensure collection of his service fees, in view of the jealous atti
tude courts usually assume towards general liens.
The occasions upon which an accountant might acquire an
equitable lien to secure payment for services, indeed, would be rare.
Any demand on the part of the accountant for an express contract
giving him a lien upon his client’s records would probably mean
the termination of relations with the client. However, it is conceiv
able that an implied equitable lien may arise in favor of the ac
countant. It might happen that a client would give an order to a
collecting agency to pay out of funds collected from the client’s
accounts receivable a certain sum as compensation to an account
ant for auditing services. In such circumstances the accountant
would have an implied equitable lien upon the collection fund to
secure payment for auditing services.
No state seems to have a statute giving the public accountant a
lien upon any property of his client to secure payment for auditing
services. In fairness to accountants, state legislation might well
provide for a lien upon the records or other property of clients to
secure payment for auditing services. Of course, any such statute
should be coupled with an appropriate remedy such as impounding
of records or the sale of property to effect payment of the debt.
R ights of the P ublic A ccountant U nder U nited States
B ankruptcy A ct

A proper understanding of the public accountant’s rights under
the United States bankruptcy act must be based upon a general
concept of the section dealing with priorities and, then, upon a
survey of the court interpretations dealing specifically with public
accountants. With this end in view the statute is quoted and dis
cussed generally and then the cases pertaining to accountants are
presented and reviewed.
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“United States bankruptcy act of 1898, as amended, section 64:
Debts which have priority, (a) The court shall order the trustee to
pay all taxes legally due and owing by the bankrupt to the United
States, state, county, district or municipality, in the order of priority
as set forth in paragraph (b ) hereof: provided, that no order shall
be made for the payment of a tax assessed against real estate of a
bankrupt in excess of the value of the interest of the bankrupt estate
therein as determined by the court. Upon filing the receipts of the
proper public officers for such payments the trustees shall be credited
with the amounts thereof, and in case any question arises as to the
amount or legality of any such tax the same shall be heard and
determined by the court.
“(b) The debts to have priority, in advance of the payment of
dividends to creditors, and to be paid in full out of bankrupt estates,
and the order of payment shall be (1) the actual and necessary cost of
preserving the estate subsequent to filing the petition; (2) the filing
fees paid by creditors in involuntary cases, and, where property of
the bankrupt, transferred or concealed by him either before or after
the filing of the petition, shall have been recovered for the benefit of
the estate of the bankrupt by the efforts and at the expense of one
or more creditors, the reasonable expense of such recovery; (3) the
cost of administration, including the fees and mileage payable to
witnesses as now or hereafter provided by the laws of the United
States, and one reasonable attorney’s fee, for the professional services
actually rendered, irrespective of the number of attorneys employed,
to the petitioning creditors in involuntary cases while performing
the duties herein prescribed, and to the bankrupt in voluntary and
involuntary cases, as the court may allow; (4) where the confirmation
of composition terms has been refused or set aside upon the objec
tion and through the efforts and at the expense of one or more
creditors, in the discretion of the court, the reasonable expenses of
such creditors in opposing such composition; (5) wages due to work
men, clerks, traveling or city salesmen or servants which have been
earned within three months before the date of the commencement of
the proceeding, not to exceed $600 to each claimant; (6) taxes payable
under paragraph (a) hereof; and (7) debts owing to any person who
by the laws of the states or the United States is entitled to priority:
provided, that the term ‘person’ as used in this section shall include
corporations, the United States and the several states and territories of
the United States. * * *”
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It is established law that where state statutes giving priority of
claims against a bankrupt are in conflict with the priorities laid
down in section 64 of the United States bankruptcy act, the federal
statute is given precedence under constitutional authority conferred
upon the national government to enact and enforce national bank
ruptcy laws.22
Interpretations of the act may be. gleaned from decisions of the
federal courts. The priorities recited in section 64 apply merely
to the general assets of the estate. They are superior only to the
rights of general or unsecured creditors. A mortgage or other lien
given and accepted in good faith and for a present consideration,
which is not voidable as a preference or otherwise in fraud of the
bankruptcy act, is, with respect to property subject to such liens,
superior to the prior claims enumerated in section 64 of the act.
The courts interpret section 64 to mean priority over other claims,
not out of the funds derived from the sale of the bankrupt’s prop
erty, but out of such sum as remained after the satisfaction of the
debts duly secured by liens lawfully existing when the bankruptcy
proceedings were instituted. Courts have taken the position that
it was the plain intent of congress, in framing the bankruptcy act,
not to impair but to protect and preserve statutory, common-law
and equitable liens as well as mortgages, thought to be indispensable
to the protection of business transactions and commercial prosperity
of the country.23 The federal courts have also justified the priority
of statutory liens over the priorities set forth in section 64 on the
ground that a contrary holding would operate as an undue en
croachment upon rights reserved to the states. While a number of
cases have relegated certain statutory liens to the position of 64b (7)
providing for the priority of debts due persons entitled to priority
under the laws of the United States or the states, statutory liens,
with other liens and mortgages, are generally given first claim on
the bankrupt’s assets.24
22 In re Rodgers & Garrett Timber Co. (D. C., Md. 1927) 22 F. (2d) 571; In
re Glover Casket Co. (D . C., Ga., 1932) 1 F. Supp. 743; In re Inland Dredging
Corporation (C. C. A., N. Y., 1932) 61 F. (2d) 765, certiorari denied (1933)
53 S. Ct. 403.
23 In re Proudfoot,
F. 733 (1909).
24 United States Code Annotated, title 11, bankruptcy, sec. 104, p. 73 (1927);
Ibid., p. 4 of 1933 cumulative pocket part.
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The actual and necessary cost of preserving the bankrupt’s estate
subsequent to the filing of the petition is next in priority following
liens. While the determination of what items shall be included in
the actual and necessary cost of preserving the bankrupt’s estate is
within the sound discretion of the court in control of the proceed
ings, it may well be expected that the judicial discretion will follow
other cases in allowing items of expense as costs of preserving the
estate. Debts resulting from the following expenditures have been
held, apparently by the weight of authority, to come within the
preferred claims as costs of preserving the estate: receiver’s salary; 25
receiver’s current expenses incurred for the estate; 26 rent to land
lord for storage of bankrupt’s property during receivership; 27 re
ceiver’s expenses incurred to preserve bankrupt’s stock of fish; 28
wages of guards to protect property of estate subsequent to filing
of petition whether during receivership or trusteeship; 29 assignee’s
expenses of appraisal for sale prior to filing petition in bank
ruptcy; 30 audit services after common-law assignment prior to
bankruptcy adjudication; 31 wages of laborers who operated factory
during receivership; 32 fire-insurance premiums during period of
common-law assignment preceding filing of bankruptcy petition
and period between time of filing of petition and appointment of
trustee.33
Let us now consider some of the claims which courts have held
to be included in the second group of priorities described in sec
tion 64b. Fees paid by creditors for filing the petition in bank
ruptcy have been uniformly held to come within the second group
25 In re Scott (D. C., N. C., 1900) 99 F. 404.
26 In re Veler (C. C. A., sixth circuit, 1918) 249 F. 633.
27 In re Erlich (D. C., Pa., 1924) 297 F. 327. Note: It is well-settled law that
where a landlord has a statutory lien on bankrupt’s property for rent at the time
of commencement of bankruptcy proceedings the claim has precedence over the
priorities of section 64 of the bankruptcy act. See: In re Menzies (D. C., Arizona,
1932) 60 F. 1064; U. S. C. A. 11, bankruptcy, section 104, p. 18 of 1933 cumu
lative pocket part.
28 In re Alaska Fishing & D. Co. (D. C., Wash., 1909) 167 F. 875.
29 In re Mitchell (C. C. A., 2nd. circuit, 1914) 212 F. 932.
30 In re Cooper (D. C., Mass., 1917) 243 F. 797.
31 In re Hanson Co. (D. C., Iowa, 1922) 283 F. 850.
32 In re Erie Lumber Co. (D. C., Ga., 1906) 150 F. 817.
33 In re South Bend Lumber Co. (D. C., Wash., 1924) 2 F. (2d) 783.
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of priorities of section 64b.34 Debts incurred by a trustee or ex
penditures made by creditors for the purpose of recovering to the
estate property concealed or transferred before or after the filing
of the petition in bankruptcy, where the transfer or conceal
ment was made in actual or constructive fraud, by the weight of
authority have been included in the second class of priorities of
section 64b.35
What items shall be included in costs of administration, the third
group of section 64b, is within the reasonable discretion of the
court in control of the proceedings. In the absence of abuse the
court’s discretion will not be questioned upon appeal. Items gen
erally interpreted by the courts as coming within costs of adminis
tration are these: office expenses of trustee; care and custody of
bankrupt’s property while in hands of trustee; rent during trustee
ship; commissions of receiver and referee; expenses incurred in car
rying out bankrupt’s contracts; accountant’s services; attorney’s
fees.36
The discussion of the fourth class of priorities of section 64b,
which gives priority to the cost of successful resistance to confirma
tion of creditors’ composition agreement, should be preceded by
some attention to the meaning of confirmation of creditor’s com
position agreement under the act. Section 12 of the bankruptcy act
provides that “a bankrupt may offer, either before or after adjudica
tion, terms of composition to his creditors, after, but not before,
he has been examined in open court, or at a meeting of his creditors,
and has filed in court the schedule of his property and the list of
his creditors required to be filed by bankrupts.” The court may
compel dissentient creditors to join in the agreement. On confirma
tion by the court and distribution of the consideration the case is
settled. Section 64b (4) which provides for priority of creditors’
claims for expenses incurred in successful resistance to confirmation
of a composition agreement was added in 1926. It seems that no
court has ruled upon the new provision. Hence, we have not a court
in te r p r e ta tio n o f th is fo u r th g r o u p o f p r io r c la im s. H o w e v e r , th e
34 In re Silverman (D. C., N. Y., 1899) 97 F. 325.
35 U. S. C. A., title 11, bankruptcy, sec. 104.
36 U. S. C. A., title 11, bankruptcy, secs. 102 and 104.
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wording of this added provision makes it clear that the judge, in
his discretion, in the order named in section 64b, may give priority
to creditors’ claims for reasonable expenses for attorney’s fees,
witness fees, and other costs incident to a successful opposition to
a confirmation of a composition agreement between the bankrupt
and his creditors.
The fifth group of claims under section 64b, which gives priority
to wages, has been interpreted by a long line of decisions. The
wages must have been earned within the period of three months
preceding the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings. The wage
earner must have been a servant, not an independent contractor,
in order that his claim may receive priority under this fifth provi
sion. Generally, high executives have been held not entitled to
priority with respect to their salaries. Presidents, general managers
and treasurers of corporations have been held to be without the
preferred group of section 64b(5). On the other hand, the salary
of a manager of a branch of a chain-store system has been held to
come within this fifth group of prior claims. Generally, this provi
sion of section 64b has been interpreted to apply to wages of com
mon laborers, clerks, salesmen, stenographers and bookkeepers.
A foreman’s salary is a preferred claim under the fifth group if the
foreman did the same kind of work as his subordinates were
doing.37
Prior to 1926, under section 64, courts generally placed taxes
second only to liens; but, under the amended section, taxes, federal
and state, have been relegated to sixth place in the priorities set
forth in section 64b.38
The seventh set of claims in order of priority, which consists of
debts to persons entitled to priority under state or federal laws, is
really an adoption of such laws so far as they do not conflict with
the intent and purposes of the bankruptcy act. Claims under this
seventh provision do not include specific liens and mortgages, but
they do include freight charges of railroads under federal control,
bank receiver’s claim against bankrupt for double liability as stock37 U. S. C. A., title 11, bankruptcy, sec. 104.
38 Ibid.
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holder, landlord’s prior claim under state statute and mechanics’
liens which are given preference by state laws.39
The enumeration of items in the seven groups of prior claims of
the bankruptcy act is not intended to be exhaustive but sufficient
to show how the public accountant’s claims for services may be
properly placed.
Apparently only two cases have dealt with the public account
ant’s claims for services rendered before the time of adjudication
in bankruptcy, as a part of the first group of preferred claims under
section 64b, which provides for priority of debts incurred to pre
serve the estate. In re Hanson & Tyler Auto Co.,40 the first of the
two cases, involved the following facts:
The Hanson & Tyler Auto Company in 1920, at the request of
certain creditors, authorized the plaintiff accountants to make an
audit of its business but later refused the auditors access to the
books. The creditors then held a meeting for the purpose of having
a general assignment of the bankrupt Hanson & Tyler Auto Com
pany made under the laws of Iowa. The creditors also employed
the plaintiff accountants to perform the audit. The estimated cost
of the audit was $1,500; but the actual cost was $3,337.99. The
accountants began the audit before the state-law assignment became
effective and completed the audit thereafter. The completed audit
was used by the trustee under the state-law assignment, and later
by the trustee in bankruptcy after the case was taken to the federal
district court of Iowa. After ruling that the court would protect
“an assignee under state laws and under provision of a state court
to the extent of the service or expense which is beneficial to the
estate,” the court held in regard to the preference of the account
ants’ claim for their services as follows:
“W ith respect to the matter under consideration, it does not appear
that an audit was in fact made for the assignee under the general
assignment. The audit was made under an arrangement with the
bankrupt itself and certain creditors of the bankrupt and largely com
pleted before the assignment under the state law was made. It is
claimed, however, that it was not completed, and that some of the
39 U. S. C. A., title 11, bankruptcy, sec. 104.
40 D. C., Iowa, 1922) 283 F. 850.
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work overlapped the period of the assignee’s administration, but
how much does not appear. The estimated cost at the time the
arrangement was made is said to have been $1,500. The complete
audit for which the charge is made is certified by the referee with the
record and evidence, and the court is fully convinced that the esti
mated sum is very ample compensation for the making of the audit
in question. There is an item in the bill of $865.49 for traveling
and subsistence expenses. This item is a very unusual one to be in
cluded without explanation.
“Now, on this 31st day of July, 1922, said matter comes on for
final determination and order in the premises, and, after carefully
considering the claim as filed, the summary of evidence certified, and
the entire record in the case, the court is convinced that $1,500 is very
ample compensation for the services performed, and especially when
the item for traveling and subsistence expenses is allowed in addition,
which the court reluctantly includes, making an aggregate allowance
of $2,365.49. From this should be deducted the $250 paid on Novem
ber 18, 1920. The court is further of the opinion that the sum of
$500, of the $1,500 service item, may be allowed as preferred, on
account of having been rendered to the assignee under the state law
and being beneficial to the estate.
“It is therefore ordered and adjudged that the order of the referee,
which is now reviewed, be modified, and that said claim be estab
lished in the sum of $2,115.49, and that said claim to the extent of
$500 only be established and allowed as a preferred claim, the balance
to be established as a general claim only, and that the order of the
referee, petitioned from, as so modified, be approved and affirmed.”

In the Hanson & Tyler Auto Co. case the court ruled that the
claims for audit services rendered after the assignment under state
laws was made and before the bankruptcy adjudication took place
were preferred under section 64b of the bankruptcy act. In the first
place the court held that the auditors’ claims should be preferred
on the ground that proper recognition of the assignment under
state laws should be made. This policy on the part of federal courts
is in effect an adoption of the state laws into the bankruptcy pro
ceedings so far as such laws do not conflict with the bankruptcy
act. This ruling would place the auditors’ claims within group 7 of
the preferred claims under section 64b, which provides for priority
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of claims preferred under state and federal laws. The court, how
ever, went further and held that the auditors’ claims were entitled
to priority because their services were instrumental in preserving
the bankrupt’s estate during the period of assignment. Under this
ruling the auditors’ claims were advanced to the position of the
first group of prior claims under section 64b, which provides for
priority of claims on account of services rendered to preserve the
bankrupt’s estate. Claims for services rendered the assignee under
the state laws prior to adjudication in bankruptcy should receive
the same status with respect to priority as claims for services ren
dered during receivership. Generally, expenses incurred during re
ceivership are classed as costs of preserving the estate. Certainly an
audit rendered to ascertain the property and debts during receiver
ship partakes of the nature of services to preserve the estate. In re
Hanson & Tyler Auto Co. should be a guide for future decisions.
In re Cabel Upholstering Co.41 is the second of the two cases
dealing with the placing claims for auditing services rendered dur
ing receivership within the first group of preferred claims under
section 64b. The decision follows:
“The involuntary petition in bankruptcy was filed February 28,
1924. An examination of the statement rendered by the attorney
shows that all services, with the exception of two items, were rendered
prior to bankruptcy. The statement rendered by the auditor does not
show what part of the services were rendered prior to bankruptcy and
what were rendered after, but the referee finds that for the most part
the services were incurred prior to the filing of the petition, and that
whatever services were rendered afterwards did not tend to preserve
the estate.”

The court in the Cabel Upholstering Co. case gave little consid
eration to the accountant’s services to the bankrupt. The court was
correct in refusing to give priority to claims for auditing services
rendered prior to the time of filing the petition in bankruptcy.
Such claims are construed as debts to general unsecured creditors.
It is possible that the public accountant’s services subsequent to
filing the petition were slight and could not have been material
41 (D. C., Mass., 1925) 6 F. (2d) 1019.
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in preserving the estate. If so, the court was correct in refusing
to give preference to claims for such services; but if the audit had
been performed in any considerable proportion during receivership
the court should have included the claims for that proportion as
costs of preserving the estate.
The decision In re M. E. Smith & Co.,42 a case placing the ac
countant’s claim for services rendered during trusteeship under
section 64b(2) which gives priority to costs of administration of
the estate of the bankrupt was in part as follows:
“I find, therefore, as a finding of fact, that the claimant did perform
accounting (auditing) services for the former trustee herein, with the
consent and approval of the referee during the years 1927 to and
including a part of the year 1930, and that the reasonable value of the
unpaid balance due said claimant is the sum of $1,029.75; that said
claim was, and is, a valid claim against said bankrupt estate as an
administration expense, and should have been paid before the declara
tion of any dividend, or at least before the declaration of a final
dividend to the creditors, * * * (claim ordered paid out of un
claimed dividends).”

The M. E. Smith & Co. decision is sound in holding that audit
services rendered during trusteeship are costs of administration.
Generally, cases have held that current expenses incurred for the
estate during the trusteeship are costs of administration. Though it
might be argued that an audit helps preserve the estate during the
trusteeship, as in checking cash and inventories, yet, generally the
ascertainment of property will be effected through an audit during
the receivership, and the audit during the trusteeship will serve
largely the interests of administration. In re M. E. Smith & Co.
should be of controlling importance to courts in future decisions.
When, in the case of the bankruptcy of a stockbroker, it becomes
necessary for the trustee to engage accountants to unravel the details
of the bankrupt’s books in order to trace securities of creditors, ex
penditures for such services are chargeable to the claimants of the
securities, except those who were able to trace their securities with42 (D. C., Neb., 1931) 52 F. (2d) 212.

220

R esponsibilities

and

R ights

of

A ccountants

out the aid of accountants. This principle was established by In re
J. C. Wilson & Co.43 as follows:
“It was necessary for the trustee to engage accountants to unravel
the details contained in the Harris books. An order has been made
apportioning this expense among various claimants including the
trustee. * * * No question has been raised as to the reasonableness
of the charges. While it is true that the trustee represented general
creditors, and doubtless has done everything in his power in their
interest, nevertheless it is also true that the work on these accounts
was for the benefit of the claimants, and work which it would have
been necessary for them to have done, if this arrangement had not
been made. These disbursements, in my opinion, were therefore
chargeable to each claimant in the amounts set forth in the petition
of M. & L. W. Scudder. In a case such as that of Mrs. Conant, who
was able to trace her securities without the aid of accountants, no
charge for that service should be made.”

The decision in the case of J. C. Wilson & Co., that security
owners who were not able to trace their securities which had been
pledged by the broker with money lenders and who availed them
selves of the services of public accountants in the employ of the
trustee should be charged individually with the costs of the account
ants’ services incurred in discovering their securities is beyond ques
tion sound. Since the securities were owned by the customers
(claimants) of the bankrupt, the expense of tracing them would
not constitute a charge against the estate of the bankrupt. As to
the mode of enforcing the order the case is silent, and there seems
to be no other case in point; but a court, sitting in equity, would
probably give priority to the accountants’ claims over other claims
against the securities, in view of the fact that the accountants’ serv
ices were rendered at the instance of the trustee in bankruptcy.44
43 (D. C., N . Y., 1917) 252 F. 631.
44 N ote: As to the reasonableness of charges for services of public accountants
in bankruptcy proceedings see: In re Weisman (D . C., Conn., 1920) 267 F. 588;
Kennedy v. Nathan (C. C. A., Pa., 1930) 43 F. (2d) 71; In re Kroeger Bros. Co.
(C. C. A., Wis., 1921) 276 F. 8.
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A ddition to P ersonal S ervices
A ccountant

of

Where it is clear from the contents and circumstances of an
auditing contract that only the personal services of the public ac
countant are engaged, additional cost such as traveling expenses
and compensation for necessary assistance and the like incurred in
making the audit must be paid for by the client. The supreme court
of Montana in 1925 in the case of Callan v. Hample 45 gave a clear
justification of the rule:
“* * * The character and effect of the employment of an expert
accountant does not differ materially from the employment of a
doctor, a lawyer or other professional man. He is retained to perform
services requiring his personal skill and technical knowledge not
common to the one employing him, and therefore to proceed with the
work in accordance with his own methods and ideas without being
subject to direction or orders from his employer as to details. Such
an employment does not constitute the relation of master and servant
and is not governed by the rules applicable to such relation. (26 Cyc.
970; Eldred v. Mackie, 178 Mass. 1, 59 N. E. 673; Groesbeck v. Pinson,
21 Tex. Civ. App. 44, 50 S. W . 620.) Such employment of pro
fessional men and skilled workers may necessarily entail the employ
ment of others to attend to certain details, and the outlay of incidental
expense money, and a contract to pay the expenses thus necessarily
incurred, as well as and in addition to the reasonable value of the
services of such an one, may be inferred from the nature of the em
ployment and the surrounding circumstances.
“The expert accountant could not be required to pay for necessary
assistance, toll charges and traveling expenses, out of the reasonable
compensation for his personal services any more than a doctor could
be required to pay nurses’ wages, drug bills and hospital expenses
out of his compensation, or a lawyer to pay filing fees, witness fees
and necessary traveling expenses out of the reasonable compensation
for his services.”

The bankruptcy courts regularly allow public accountants’ claims
for clerical and stenographic expenses necessary in bankruptcy
audits. While reasonable amounts of traveling and hotel expenses
45 236 P. 550, 73 M ont. 321.
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of the accountants have generally been allowed in bankruptcy
audits, the courts make such allowances with no little reluctance.46
The allowance for expenses in addition to the cost of the auditors’
services should be made unless it can be shown that it was the clear
intent of the auditing agreement that the accountants should bear
all costs of the audit.
N ature of A ccountant’s Services A ffect R easonableness of
C harges

Two decisions, one by the Louisiana supreme court 47 in 1928
and the other by the Louisiana court of appeals 48 in 1929, placed
high values upon accountants’ income-tax services, which the judges
classed as legal as, compared to values placed upon the usual audit
ing work which the judges thought was clerical. Perhaps the courts
have been correct in attaching a higher value to income-tax services
than to mere routine of reviewing records and making up working
papers; but time spent in the preparation of the business reports
from the working papers, in analyzing the financial and operating
condition of the business, in designing an accounting system or in
installing a budgetary control system should be compensated by
fees on a parity with those for legal services rendered in incometax matters.
A uditing C ontracts w ith C orporations and G overnmental
A gencies

The validity of public accountants’ contracts for audits entered
into with corporations and governmental agencies is dependent
upon the authority of the representative or representatives, of the
corporation or governmental subdivision. The authority of the
corporate representative is generally dependent upon the resolutions
of the directors, the corporate charter and the laws designed to
regulate corporations. Likewise, the contracting authority of a
governmental agency is dependent upon the statutes and ordinances
applying to the particular subdivision of government.
46 In re Weisman (D. C., Conn., 1920) 267 F. 588; accountant’s unusual hotel
bills and Pullman fares were not permitted as claims for bankruptcy audit, Matter
of Marks (D. C., Ga., 1909) 22 Am . Bankr . Rep. 54.
47 Robinson & Co. v. Connell, 117 So. 774, 166 La. 685.
48 Derbes v. Dixie Mill Supply Co., 124 So. 316, 11 La. App. 522.
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Two cases before the supreme court of New York, one 49 in 1907
and the other 50 in 1915, illustrate the complexities which may
arise over the authority of corporate representatives to employ
public accountants to make audits.
An example of the complexities which may affect the authority
of governmental agencies to contract appears in a decision rendered
by the supreme court of Kansas in 1908.51 The court ruled that
a foreign corporation of accountants was eligible, even though the
corporation had not obtained a permit to do business in Kansas,
to contract with the governor of Kansas to audit the records of
state departments. The reason advanced by the court was that the
corporation of accountants was not doing business in Kansas as
long as the employees of the corporation prepared only the working
papers in Kansas and made up the reports outside of Kansas.
Public accountants who care to enter into auditing contracts with
corporations or governmental subdivisions should have their con
tracts approved by competent attorneys.
P ower of P ractitioners of P ublic A ccountancy to I ncorporate

The public accountancy statutes of the various states and the
District of Columbia differ considerably in their provision for the
incorporation of public accounting firms. Most of the state public
accountancy statutes are silent on the matter. Illinois and Michigan
provide specifically in their public accountancy statutes that public
accounting firms may incorporate.52 It is probable that in many
more states authority for public accountants to incorporate is to be
found in the general laws of incorporation. Accounting firms have
been chartered in the state of New York.51
Delaware, the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, New Mexico,
South Dakota and Wisconsin prohibit by statute a corporation
from assuming the certified public accountant’s title.52 An Iowa
statute forbids the incorporation of accounting firms.52 Florida has
49 Teele v. Consolidate Amusement Co., 102 N. Y. S. 666.
50 Bartels v. Ferncliff Cemetery Association,
51 155 N. Y. S. 322, 169 App. Div. 421.
Haskins & Sells v. Kelly, 93 P. 605, 77 Kan. 155.
52Certified Public Accountant Laws of the United States, American Institute
Publishing Co., Inc.
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a statute which prohibits the practice of public accountancy by a
corporation whether domestic or foreign.53
The American Institute of Accountants holds that “audit com
panies and similar organizations are detrimental to the best interests
of the accounting profession.” 54
The very essence of the public accountant’s work is personal
service. He renders his services in a position of trust in which he
owes to his client a duty to exercise skill, efficiency and good faith
and to the public a duty to certify only business reports free from
the taints of fraud. The corporate form of organization may make
it possible for accountants to shift the individual responsibilities
which they owe their clients and the public in some circumstances.
Hence, in the interest of the client, the public and the accountant,
the corporation as a form of organization for accountants should
not be favored.
53 Certified Public Accountant Laws of the United States, American Institute
Publishing Co., Inc.
54 See appendix, page 227.

A PPE N D IX
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CO N D U CT
OF

T H E AMERICAN IN ST IT U T E OF ACCOUNTANTS
(1) A firm or partnership, all the individual members of which are
members of the Institute (or in part members and in part associates,
provided all the members of the firm are either members or associates),
may describe itself as “Members of the American Institute of Ac
countants,” but a firm or partnership, all the individual members of
which are not members of the Institute (or in part members and in
part associates), or an individual practising under a style denoting a
partnership when in fact there be no partner or partners or a corporation
or an individual or individuals practising under a style denoting a
corporate organization shall not use the designation “Members (or
Associates) of the American Institute of Accountants.”
(2) The preparation and certification of exhibits, statements, schedules
or other forms of accountancy work, containing an essential misstate
ment of fact or omission therefrom of such a fact as would amount to
an essential misstatement or a failure to put prospective investors on
notice in respect of an essential or material fact not specifically shown in
the balance-sheet itself shall be, ipso facto, cause for expulsion or for
such other discipline as the council may impose upon proper presenta
tion of proof that such misstatement was either wilful or the result of
such gross negligence as to be inexcusable.
(3) No member or associate shall allow any person to practise in his
name as a public accountant who is not a member or an associate of
the Institute or in partnership with him or in his employ on a salary.
(4) No member or associate shall directly or indirectly allow or agree
to allow a commission, brokerage or other participation by the laity in
the fees or profits of his professional work; nor shall he accept directly
or indirectly from the laity any commission, brokerage or other par
ticipation for professional or commercial business turned over to others
as an incident of his services to clients.
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(5) No member or associate shall engage in any business or occupa
tion conjointly with that of a public accountant, which in the opinion
of the executive committee or of the council is incompatible or in
consistent therewith.
(6) No member or associate shall certify to any accounts, exhibits,
statements, schedules or other forms of accountancy work which have
not been verified entirely under the supervision of himself, a member
of his firm, one of his staff, a member or an associate of this Institute
or a member of a similar association of good standing in a foreign
country which has been approved by the council.
(7) No member or associate shall take part in any effort to secure
the enactment or amendment of any state or federal law or of any regula
tion of any governmental or civic body, affecting the practice of the
profession, without giving immediate notice thereof to the secretary of
the Institute, who in turn shall at once advise the executive committee
or the council.
(8) No member or associate shall directly or indirectly solicit the
clients or encroach upon the business of another member or associate,
but it is the right of any member or associate to give proper service and
advice to those asking such service or advice.
(9) No member or associate shall directly or indirectly offer employ
ment to an employee of a fellow member or associate without first
informing said fellow member or associate of his intent. This rule shall
not be construed so as to inhibit negotiations with any one who of his
own initiative or in response to public advertisement shall apply to a
member or an associate for employment.
(10) No member or associate shall render or offer to render pro
fessional service, the fee for which shall be contingent upon his findings
and the results thereof.
(11) No member or associate of the Institute shall advertise his or
her professional attainments or service through the mails, in the public
prints, by circular letters or by any other written word except that a
member or an associate may cause to be published in the public prints
what is technically known as a card. A card is hereby defined as an
advertisement of the name, title (member of American Institute of
Accountants, C. P. A., or other professional affiliation or designation),
class of service and address of the advertiser, without any further
qualifying words or letters, or in the case of announcement of change
of address or personnel of firm the plain statement of the fact for the
publication of which the announcement purports to be made. Cards
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permitted by this rule when appearing in newspapers shall not exceed
two columns in width and three inches in depth; when appearing in
magazines, directories and similar publications cards shall not exceed
one quarter page in size. This rule shall not be construed to inhibit the
proper and professional dissemination of impersonal information among
a member’s own clients or personal associates or the properly restricted
circulation of firm bulletins containing staff personnel and professional
information.
(12) No member or associate of the Institute shall be an officer, a
director, stockholder, representative, an agent, a teacher or lecturer,
nor participate in any other way in the activities or profits of any
university, college or school which conducts its operations, solicits pros
pective students or advertises its courses by methods which in the opinion
of the committee on professional ethics are discreditable to the pro
fession.
RESOLUTIONS
Adopted by the American Institute of Accountants, September 16,
1919:
Resolved, That it is the sense of this meeting that audit companies
and similar organizations are detrimental to the best interests of the
accounting profession.
Adopted by the council of the American Institute of Accountants,
April 11, 1932:
Whereas, Estimates of earnings contingent upon future transactions
should always be clearly distinguished from statements of actual earn
ings evidenced by definite records, and
Whereas, An accountant may properly assist a client in estimating
the results of future transactions, so long as no one may be led to believe
that the estimates represent certainties,
Be it resolved, That no public accountant should permit his name to
be used in conjunction with such an estimate in a manner which might
lead anyone to believe that the accountant could vouch for the accuracy
of the forecast; and
Be it further resolved, T hat violation of this dictum by a member or an
associate of the American Institute of Accountants be considered by the
committee on professional ethics as cause for charges under the provision
of article V, section 4 (e) of the bylaws, or rule 2 of the rules of pro
fessional conduct of the American Institute of Accountants, or both.1
1 Note: For a detailed treatment of the ethics of the accounting profession, see:
A. P. Richardson, Ethics o f a Profession, N ew York, A m erican Institute Publishing

Co., Inc., 1931.
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